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CONSTRUCTIONAL AND OTHER FACTORS
RELATING TO CLASS GIFTS
Elliot G. Robbins *
should be deemed necessary on which to build what
follows hereafter, it might be found in the words of Judge
Allen. He once wrote that a "lawyer's mode and manner of
expression and exactitude of meaning are not necessarily synonymous." 1 In fact, when the lawyer attempts to describe a group
of beneficiaries, as by some form of collective designation, it is
almost inevitable that trouble should loom just beyond the horizon
unless the draftsman is thoroughly cognizant of the problems
which lie inherent in the creation of a gift to a class. That trouble
may be forestalled by an adequate delineation, within the instrument, of all the issues involved in a given form of property disposition. Inadequate thought, on the other hand, will ultimately
force some court to rationalize a conclusion as to what was meant,
which conclusion will be achieved only at the expense of interested parties and to the possible discredit of the draftsman. Such
being the case, an attempt to clarify all of the knotty problems
which underlie class gifts would not be unwarranted. It is proposed to consider herein, however, only those which adhere to
F A
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1 Marvin v. Peirce, 84 N. H. 455 at 460, 152 A. 484 (1930).
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one particular type of class gift, that is a gift to one or more
named individuals and to a unit of other persons. In its simplest
form, such a gift might read" ... to A, B, and the children of C."
What are the problems wrapped up in that short phrase, and
what of their solution?
It might, at first blush, appear that such an investigation would
be about as useful as a tertiary gleaning of a harvested field.
When it is observed, however, that courts have been singularly
unsuccessful in resolving the sundry issues native to what would
appear to be a relatively simple limitation, 2 any attempt to bring
clarity and light out of chaos, even in such a tiny area of the law,
should achieve stature and significance. To the query as to
whether it is either necessary or desirable to formulate a conclusion on the point of precisely what it was a particular testator3
had in mind when he chose to make a gift by words of the type
mentioned, it may be answered that there are approximately two
hundred decisions in which such a limitation has been at issue and
those decisions are anything but consistent. Certainly, the need
for stability and predictability in the law of property would seem
4
to make a resolution desirable.
The problems which could arise in connection with a gift by
a limitation of this nature will likely be three-fold in character.
They are apt to cluster around three points, to-wit: first, what
terminology ought to be used to clarify fully the testator's intention; second, if the issues first arise in litigation, what is the
2 There are decisions on various phases of this limitation to be found in the
reports of England, Canada, one federal district, and in thirty-three states. These
cases are tabulated in an appendix hereto marked Appendix A.
3 It should be observed, at the outset, that this article will discuss the limitation
here considered as if it arose by will. The same results should ensue if a similar
gift were to appear in a trust indenture.
4 The desire to achieve stability, and thus predictability, in the law of property
has sometimes caused courts to heed the complexities of feudal dogma to an extent
that it has become inordinately difficult to master the field. Some suggest that the
law of property is a mere showcase for the wares of the legal lexicographer, rather
than an arena for the exercise of sound jurisprudence: 21 Iowa L. Rev. 160 at 161.
Perhaps this is so. Nonetheless, concepts need to be communicated, particularly in
a will where more than one generation is interested, and as yet no successful
substitute for language has been developed. Even assuming that predictability is
important in the ordinary course of property law, it is necessary to issue a caveat
against complacency where federal tax law is also an issue: Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U. S. 106 at 118, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 at 611 (1940).
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nature of the interests which have been created; and third, what
distribution should a court decree based thereon? These questions
will be taken up in that order.
I.

CONSTRUCTIONAL TENDBYNCIES

The draftsman's responsibility is one of paramount importance, but the magnitude of that responsibility can hardly be
appreciated until one observes the floundering gyrations experienced by courts forced to determine what a testator meant by a
gift of the type herein considered. Because such dispositions describe beneficiaries by collective designation, at least in part, a
court must need resolve two major issues in respect to the effect
a given limitation will have on the devolution of a decedent's
estate. In the first place, it must be determined whether or not
the gift is a class gift at all. If it is of that character, the second
issue will relate to the quantum of the share due each distributee.
These considerations would present relatively little difficulty except for one small factor; as yet, courts have been loath to become
fully definitive in respect to class gifts.
Probably the most recurrent definition of a class gift to be
found in the cases is the one propounded by Jarman. He once
said a class gift was "a gift of an aggregate sum to a body of
persons uncertain in number at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a future time, and who are all to take in equal, or in
some other definite proportions, the share of each being dependent
for its amount on the ultimate number of persons." 5 If ever a
purported definition deserves to be dishonored, this is it.6 Without presently bothering about citation, it is enough to say that
there are innumerable cases, in not one but in every jurisdiction
concerned, which hold that any one or more of Jarman's requisites
may be deemed unnecessary to a class gift. On the other hand,
Jarman ignored many of the constructional factors which the
courts have, from time to time, found helpful, if not needful, to
5 Jarman, Wills (7th Eng. Ed., 1930), Vol. 1, p. 310.

6 See Cooley, "What Constitutes a Gift to a Class," 49 Harv. L. Rev. 903 at 925
(1936), for a penetrating critique of this definition.
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a successful determination of whether a class gift has, or has not,
been created.
No doubt it is impossible to point to any one factor as being
decisive on the point of whether a class gift does or does not
exist. The fact that a gift is not of "an aggregate sum" will not
prevent such gift from being one to a class. 7 The fact that the
beneficiaries are a "body of persons," referred to collectively,
does not necessarily make the gift one to a class. Conversely, the
fact that the takers are named individually does not preclude the
class gift idea.8 Since an ascertained group of persons may constitute a class, it has been held that the fact the group may, or
may not, increase or decrease in numbers is not to be deemed controlling. 9 It would, therefore, not be unwarranted to state that
an attempt to define a class gift with precision and rigidity would
be doomed to failure.
It is not improper, however, for a court to place considerable
reliance on constructional factors in order to ascertain whether
a class gift has been made. Actually, there would seem to be
some tendency to place a decreasing reliance on mere terminology
and an increasing concern with intention. That is, if ambiguity
exists, and if it can be ascertained from the tenor of the will or,
where proper, the surrounding circumstances, that the testator
is "group-minded," his interest being to make a gift to the entirety of takers collectively rather than individually, such a gift
will be treated as a class gift. 10
If, then, a bequest is made to one or more individuals by
name in conjunction with a group of other persons who are de7 Auger v. Tatham, 191 Ill. 296, 61 N. E. 77 (1901).
See also Page, Wills (3d Ed.,
1941), Vol. 3, § 1046; Simes, Future Interests (West Publishing Company, St. Paul,
1936), Vol. 2, § 385.
s Page, Wills (3d Ed., 1941), Vol. 3, § 1049; Carey and Schuyler, Illinois Law of
Future Interests (Burdette Smith Co., Chicago, 1941), § 224.
9 An exhaustive discussion of this point appears in Casner, "Increase in the Class
Membership," 51 Harv. L. Rev. 254 (1937).
10 In re Moss, [18991 2 Ch. 314, affirmed in Kingsbury v. Walter, [1901] A. 0.
187, 84 L. T. Rep. 139; In re Richard's Estate, 150 Misc. 102, 268 N. Y. S. 465
(1934) ; Manier v. Phelps, 15 Abb. N. C. 123 (N. Y. 1884) ; Oulton v. Kidder, 128 A.
674 (R. I. 1925) ; Dubois v. House, 294 S. W. 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; Will of
Waterbury, 163 Wis. 510, 158 N. W. 340 (1916). See also Restatement, Property,
Vol. 3, § 284.
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scribed generally, the question to be faced is (1) are all of these
takers members of a single class; (2) members of more than one
class; or (3) merely several individuals? It should be obvious
that a gift of this nature can hardly be said to fit the definition
Jarman has established, so a true issue of construction will arise.
Here is fertile ground for a weighing and balancing of conflicting
elements in an attempt to resolve the question. Still a place of
beginning is needed and, as a basic premise, it has been well established that the bequest to "A, B, and the children of C" is
prima facie a gift to a class unless the testator has expressed himself to the contrary in his will." The courts generally assume
this presumption as a place for beginning and accept or reject
the premise after exploration of the pertifient considerations.
By way of illustration, the English case of Blackler v. Webb 12
is one of the earliest cases to hold that a bequest to "A, B, and
the children of C" is, prima facie, a class gift with distribution
to be made to all per capita.13 In that case, one Samuel Bagwell
left the residue of his estate to his son James, and to his son
Peter's children, to his daughter Traverse, to his daughter Webb's
children, and to his daughter Man. Peter had predeceased the
execution of the will, but Webb survived Samuel. The court
thought that since the children of Webb would not have enjoyed
any gift if an analogy to the statute of descent controlled, no representative gift was intended, so the testator must have thought
of all takers enjoying equally. The court also noted that the
testator had made advancements 14 to his children, so there was
no indication that the decision would discriminate against the
decedent's nearest relatives by forcing them to share equally with
more distant kin. 15 These reasons may be slender reeds, indeed,
11 See cases listed in Appendix B.
12 2 P. Wm. 384, 24 Eng. Rep. 777 (1726).
13 A critical perusal of the opinion therein will not reveal any actual expression
that the gift is one to a class. It is obvious, however, from the result achieved, that
the court was thinking in these terms. Furthermore, the case has been construed
in this light rather consistently since it first appeared in the reports.
14 The term "advancements" was used loosely for properly an advancement is a
term peculiar to the law of intestate succession. The case was one affecting the
construction of a testamentary document.
15 It is submitted that the use of aliunde evidence is an undesirable mode of
construction. But see cases cited in note 76, post.
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upon which to prop a conclusion, even though that conclusion be
otherwise correct. It is to be observed, however, that when later
English courts re-examined the problem they attained the same
conclusion, although on much sounder grounds. 16
Close attention to the doctrine of stare decisis is a subconscious judicial reaction. If it is necessary to preserve certainty
and uniformity, as well as stability and symmetry in a system of
jurisprudence, adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis is undoubtedly necessary. Along that line, it is a fact that, when a
question of property law has been settled in England, the courts
of this country habitually adhere to the decision there formulated.
In view of the fact that rules of construction are an inevitable
consequence of stare decisis, it follows that, in property law at
least, a rational application of the doctrine of stare decisis ought
to be usual and proper. To adhere blindly to an English decision
when no better reason can be assigned than that it was so there
decided, to do this without inquiring what influenced the English
court to make such a decision, or to do so without ascertaining
whether equivalent reasons exist in this country, however, would
be the height of folly. It is disappointing, but not surprising,
that there should be a number of cases in this country where the
court has rested its entire determination on the decision in the
Blackler case without further inquiry. 1 7 The most unfortunate
aspect of these cases is the misuse of the doctrine of stare decisis.
Rather than making use of the authority of precedent as a canon
of caution, it has been permitted to become the master of the
situation to the point where slavish subservience to the old rule
has numbed the vision and prostituted the intellect. In certain
of the cases which insist that the Blackler doctrine is controlling,
16 See, for example, the masterly opinion of Romer, L. J., in the case of In re
Moss, [1899] 2 Ch. 314.
17 See Smith v. Ashurst, 34 Ala. 208 (1859) ; Howard v. Howard's Admr's, 30 Ala.
391 (1857) ; Pitney v. Brown, 44 Ill. 363 (1867) ; Courtenay v. Courtenay, 138 Md.
205, 113 A. 717 (1921) ; Brittain v. Carson, 46 Md. 186 (1876) ; Fisher v. Skillman's
Ex'rs, 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Green) 229 (1867) ; Myres v. Myres, 23 How. Pr. 410
(N. Y. 1862) ; Harris v. Philpot, 40 N. C. (5 Ire. Eq.) 324 (1848) ; Bryant v. Scott,
21 N. C. (1 Dev. & B. Eq.) 155 (1835) ; Stowe v. Ward, 10 N. C. (3 Hawks) 604
(1825); Whitehurst v. Pritchard, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 383 (1810); Kimbro v.
Johnston, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea) 78 (1885). The same thing is true in England: Lenden
v. Blackmore, 10 Sim. 626, 59 Eng. Rep. 759 (1840).
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for example, there has been a failure to observe that the case was
not precisely in point.18 It would be better to ignore the persuasive
effect of stare decisis entirely and to re-examine the question presented anew than it would be to misapply precedent. If, on the
other hand, a prior decision rests on sound and persuasive grounds
and concerns clearly analogous facts, it would not only be expedient, but also just and proper, to follow the earlier authority.
The use and abuse of precedent is not confined to those courts
which have been content to cite the Blackler case. There are a
number of cases which have entirely rejected the class gift concept and have held that where a will makes provision for an individual, or individuals, and a group of others, and nothing appears
from other clauses in the will or extraneous evidence requiring a
different construction, the provision is to be construed as one for
the benefit of individuals and not for a class.' 9 The basis of these
holdings is to be found, usually, in the inability of the court to
reconcile the bequest with Jarman's definition of a class gift.
There are decisions, however, based on no other reason than an
enunciated policy that, if possible, gifts to individuals are to be
18 In Pitney v. Brown, 44 Ill. 363 (1867), the conveyance was to "the children of
my late Brother" and to a brother-in-law. The court felt bound by authority, but
indicated that it would have preferred to find to the contrary. Actually, in the
Blackler case, the gift had been to the children of a living daughter. The cases of
Courtenay v. Courtenay, 138 Md. 205, 113 A. 717 (1921), and Brittain v. Carson,
46 Md. 186 (1876), also fail to draw an obvious distinction. In other cases the gift
was to the "heirs of C", rather than to C's children. See Myres v. Myres, 23 How.
Pr. 410 (N. Y. 1862) ; Harris v. Philpot, 40 N. C. (5 Ire. Eq.) 324 (1848) ; Stowe v.
Ward, 10 N. C. (3 Hawks) 604 (1825) ; Whitehurst v. Pritchard, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.)
383 (1810). It should be noted, however, that the last three cases construed the
word "heirs" to mean children. In Lenden v. Blackmore, 10 Sim. 626, 59 Eng. Rep.
759 (1840), Shadwell, V. C., refused even to hear counsel and ruled on the case
before him on the basis of the Blackler decision.
19 In re Rauschenplat's Estate, 212 Cal. 33, 297 P. 882 (1931) ; In re Fiske's
Estate, 182 Cal. 238, 187 P. 958 (1920) ; Estate of Murphy, 157 Cal. 63, 106 P. 230
(1909) ; In re Morrison's Estate, 138 Cal. 401, 71 P. 453 (1903) ; Shannon v. Eno,
120 Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 (1935) ; Kean v. Roe, 2 Harr. 103 (Del. 1835) ; Blackstone
v. Althouse, 278 Ill. 481, 116 N. E. 154 (1917) ; Kling v. Schnellbecker, 107 Iowa 636,
78 N. W. 673 (1899); Luke v. Marshall, 5 J. J. Marsh 353 (Ky. 1831); In re
Paroni's Estate, 56 Nev. 492, 56 P. (2d) 754 (1936) ; In re Kleeman, 61 Misc. 560,
115 N. Y. S. 982 (1908) ; Bryant v. Scott, 21 N. C. (1 Dev. & B. Eq.) 155 (1835) ;
Garnier v. Garnier, 265 Pa. 175, 108 A. 595 (1919) ; Priester's Estate, 23 Pa. Super.
386 (1903) ; In re Penney's Estate, 159 Pa. 346, 28 A. 255 (1893) ; Peoples Nat. Bk.
of Greenville v. Harrison, 198 S. C. 457, 18 S. E. (2d) 1 (1941) ; Murchison v.
Wallace, 156 Va. 728, 159 S. E. 106 (1931) ; Perdue v. Starkey's Heirs, 117 Va. 806,
86 S. E. 158 (1915) ; Whittle v. Whittle, 108 Va. 22, 60 S. E:. 748 (1908) ; McMaster
v. McMaster, 10 Gratt. 275 (Va. 1853) ; Estate of Pierce, 177 Wis. 104, 188 N. W. 78
(1922). See also In re Allen, sub. nom. Wilson v. Atter, 44 L. T. (N. S.) 240 (Eng.,
1881) ; Tomlin v. Hatfield, 12 Sim. 167, 59 Eng. Rep. 1095 (1841).
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favored over a construction which would lead to a finding of a
class gift.20
In respect to the first of these views, the cases would seem to
indicate that if some one of the several factors Jarman thought
necessary to establish the existence of a class gift was lacking, the
gift could only be one to individuals. Thus, if the bequest is of
a specific sum to each of the indicated takers, rather than merely
a share in an aggregate sum, that is sure indicia of a gift to individuals rather than to a class. 2 1 However, courts have found
greater cheer to be derived from other factors. It has been felt
to be extremely important to determine whether the group, in the
broad sense, was actually a "body of persons." The query is
then one as to whether or not all of the indicated beneficiaries
possessed characteristics either common to themselves or to the
decedent. If the contrary proves to be the case, there is authority
that the gift made could not be to a class. 2 2 Much has also been
made of the fact that if the amalgam of the indicated takers forms
a unit capable neither of increase or decrease there could not be
a class. 23 By the same token, the naming of an individual, or
individuals, so as to exclude others from the group composed
of "A, B, and the children of C," 24 has been thought to indicate
a gift to individuals. 25 On the other hand, a failure to name the
20 Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 (1935) ; Luke v. Marshall, 5 J. J.
Marsh 353 (Ky. 1831).
21 Auger v. Tatham, 191 Ill. 296, 61 N. E. 77 (1901). The court took additional
solace from the fact that the estate was more than ample to cover the specific sum
given each taker. It would be interesting to learn what the result would have been
if this had not been true.
22 Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 (1935) ; Blackstone v. Althouse, 278
Ill. 481, 116 N. E. 154 (1917) ; Agricultural Nat'l Bk. of Pittsfield v. Miller, 316
Mass. 288, 55 N. E. (2d) 442 (1944) ; Garnier v. Garnier, 265 Pa. 175, 108 A. 595
(1919) ; Perdue v. Starkey's Heirs, 117 Va. 806, 86 S. E. 158 (1915) ; Whittle v.
Whittle, 108 Va. 22, 60 S. E. 748 (1908) ; Estate of Pierce, 177 Wis. 104, 188 N. W.
78 (1922).
23 Blackstone v. Althouse, 278 Ill. 481, 116 N. E. 154 (1917) ; Perry v. Leslie, 124
Me. 93, 126 A. 340 (1924) ; Priester's Estate, 23 Pa. Super. 386 (1903) ; Estate of
Pierce, 177 Wis. 104, 188 N. W. 78 (1922).
24 Suppose, for example, the testator has two children named B and D. B has
three children, designated as W, X, and Y; D has two children, A and C. If the
testator should make a gift to "A and the children of B" he is eliminating the
grandchild C from the will.
25 Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 (1935) ; Hardy v. Roach, 190 Mass.
223, 76 N. E. 720 (1906). The court concerned with the case of In re Rauschenplat's
Estate, 212 Cal. 33, 297 P. 882 (1931), felt that the existence of a "contest" clause
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beneficiaries specifically does not preclude the concept of a gift
26
to individuals.
It is more usual for courts to examine the relevance of certain
criteria, other than a mere application of prior precedents or of
an established definition, in order to support or deny the premise
that a gift to "A, B, and the children of C" is prima facie a
gift to a class. The more important of these deserve some consideration. There are, in fact, many considerations which courts
are prone to find of significance, perhaps even controlling, in determining the testator's intention in respect to the limitation herein
considered.
Actually, many of the indicia cast in the balance are no more
than apt illustrations of the preoccupation of certain of the judiciary with technicalities and legal technique. They tend to establish only that there is an ability to rationalize an already-arrivedat conclusion. Often the very factors which a court may deem
important as having established the meaning or intention of
the testator seem like no more than the product of the personal
eccentricities or idiomatic expressions of the testator. It seems
most unfortunate to rest heavily on the use made by a testator
of a word or phrase, in the course of making a bequest or devise,
where the word or phrase is not critical to the disposition. As an
illustration, the term "equally divided" has been made the object of impressive research. It has been held that these words do
not contemplate a division betwixt classes or the designated individuals, but rather "among" the whole group of named takers.
In the face of that ambiguous pronouncement, it is not surprising
to note that several cases confidently announce that the term
in the will, one providing that if a beneficiary contested the will his share was to
be divided equally among the others, was significant as being a prime indication
that the testator was thinking in terms of the individuals involved, rather than of a
group. But see contra, Rohrer v. Burris, 27 Ind. App. 344, 61 N. E. 202 (1901),
and Hazard v. Stevens, 36 R. I. 90, 88 A. 980 (1913). In both of these cases it was
thought the mere naming of A, in order to eliminate a potential taker from the
group, did not detract from the testator's "group mindedness" nor did it point to
individuality in the bequest or devise.
26 In re Rauschenplat's Estate, 212 Cal. 33, 297 P. 882 (1931) ; Russel v. Welch,
237 Mass. 261, 129 N. E. 422 (1921); Eyer v. Beck, 70 Mich. 179, 38 N. W. 20
(1888). See also In re Fiske's Estate, 182 Cal. 238, 187 P. 958 (1920).
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imports only a gift to a class. 27 Other courts are just as certain
that the phrase can only indicate a gift to individuals. 2 Then
there are cases which hold that "equally divided" is an appropriate term to indicate a division between each of several groups
rather than a division among the members of only one group.2 9
Probably the decision contributing most to general unhappiness
is that one which holds that the failure of the draftsman to include
"equally between" was the determining factor in the case. 0
In several cases, "between" has been construed to mean
"among," so as to make the gift distributable "among" the
class 3 1 or "among" the individuals.3 2 On the other hand, other
courts have held the word "between" has literal application only
to a connection of two objects. Such being the case, the normal
result would be to hold the gift divisible between an individual
and a class, or between two or more classes. 3 3 Again, courts have
run the gamut in delineating the importance of this word. It
has been held that a failure to use "between" will be fatal to a
scheme of distribution ;34 that it is a "key" word;35 that it has
27 In
re Harper, [1914] 1 Ch. 70; Jackson v. Baker, 207 Ala. 519, 93 So. 469
(1922); Martin v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat. Bk. of Ocala, 125 Fla. 65, 169 So. 582
(1936) ; Carlin v. Helm, 331 Ill. 213, 162 N. E. 873 (1928) ; Brittain v. Carson, 46
Md. 186 (1876); Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N. W. 1018 (1912);
Stokes v. Tilly, 9 N. J. Eq. (1 Stockt.) 130 (1852).
28 Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 (1935) ; Kean v. Roe, 2 Harr. 103
(Del. 1835) ; Kling v. Schnellbecker, 107 Iowa 636, 78 N. V. 673 (1899) ; Purnell
v. Culbertson, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 369 (1876) ; Harris v. Austin, 125 Me. 127, 131 A.
206 (1925) ; Russel v. Welch, 237 Mass. 261, 129 N. E. 422 (1921) ; Bryant v. Scott,
21 N. C. (1 Dev. & B. Eq.) 155 (1835).
29 In re Walbran, [1906] 1 Ch. 64; Allen v. Durham, 173 Ga. 811, 161 S. E. 608
(1931) ; Dahmer v. Wensler, 350 Ill. 23, 182 N. E. 799 (1932) ; In re Ashburner's
Estate, 159 Pa. 545, 28 A. 361 (1894).
30 Russel v. Welch, 237 Mass. 261, 129 N. E. 422 (1921) ; Clark v. Lynch, 46 Barb.
68 (N. Y. 1866).
31 In re Alcock, [1945] Ch. 264, 173 L. T. Rep. 4; Almand v. Whitaker, 113 Ga.
889, 39 S. E. 395 (1901); In re May's Estate, 197 Mo. App. 555, 196 S. W. 1039
(1917).
32 In re Morrison's Estate, 138 Cal. 401, 71 P. 453 (1903) ; In re Paroni's Estate,
56 Nev. 492, 56 P. (2d) 754 (1936).
33 In re Walbran, [1906] 1 Ch. 64; Henry v. Henry, 378 Ill. 581, 39 N. E. (2d) 18
(1942) ; Murphy v. Fox, 334 Ill. App. 7, 78 N. E. (2d) 337 (1948) ; Ward v. Stowe,
17 N. C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 509 (1834) ; Roelf's Cousins v. White, 75 Ore. 549, 147 P. 753
(1915) ; Osburn's Appeal, 104 Pa. 637 (1883).
34 In re Penney's Estate, 159 Pa. 346, 28 A. 255 (1893).
35 Henry v. Henry, 378 Ill. 581, 39 N. E. (2d) 18 (1942).
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only slight persuasive value;36 and that, today, it carries no
weight at all.3 7 There are numerous other words which, from
time to time, have been held controlling,"8 particularly where the
preoccupation of a court has been with subjects and not subjectivity.
There is another device, again sounding more in technique
and less in reasoning, which has had a certain amount of force
and effect. It concerns the operation of the sundry variations on
the theme expressio unius est exclusio alterius. One phase of this
topic presents the theory that if, elsewhere in his will, the decedent shows that he knows how to make a class gift but does not
do so clearly in relation to the limitation at issue, it is reasonable
to assume he thought of those taking under such limitation as
individuals.3 9 Other variants have been spelled out in a number
of ways. If, for example, elsewhere in the will, the beneficiaries,
who also take under the limitation at issue, have been referred
to as individuals, there is no reason to assume they were not

intended to take as individuals in this instance too. 40 If, elsewhere
in the will, the same beneficiaries have been clearly indicated to
take in an individual capacity, but not so as to the limitation at
issue, a class gift must be assumed to have been intended in the
particular limitation. 41 If, on the other hand, elsewhere in the
will, the same beneficiaries have always taken as a class, it is
In re Morrison's Estate, 138 Cal. 401, 71 P. 453 (1903).
In re Alcock, [1945] Ch. 264, 173 L. T. Rep. 4.
38 For example, "each" has been held to separate a class into a group of individuals: Auger v. Tatham, 191 Ill. 296, 61 N. E. 77 (1901) ; In re Turner's Will,
208 N. Y. 261, 101 N. E. 905 (1913) ; Patterson v. McMasters, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.)
208 (1857): Donohoe's Estate, 282 Pa. 254, 127 A. 625 (1925): In re Penney's
Estate, 159 Pa. 346, 28 A. 255 (1893). See also Herman's Estate, 90 Pa. Super. 512
(1927). The following indicated words have been held to be pertinent in decisions
respecting the limitation here under consideration: "said" in Kean v. Roe, 2 Harr.
(Del.) 103 (1835) ; "legatees" in Randolph v. Bond, 12 Ga. 362 (1852); "above
named" in In re Myhill, 149 App. Div. 404, 134 N. Y. S. 467 (1912); "beloved" in
Risk's Appeal, sub. nom. Stauffer's Estate, 52 Pa. 269 (1866) : and "share and share
alike" in the cases of In re Rauschenplat's Estate, 212 Cal. 33, 297 P. 882 (1931) ;
in Harris v. Austin, 125 Me. 127, 131 A. 206 (1925) ; and in Dubois v. House, 294
S. W. 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). The word "respective" was deemed important in
Davis v. Bennet, 2 DeG., F. & J. 327, 45 Eng. Rep. 1209 (1862).
39 Auger v. Tatham, 191 Ill. 296, 61 N. E. 77 (1901); Bruce v. Warren, 22 Ohio
App. 41, 153 N. E. 273 (1926).
40 In re Morrison's Estate, 138 Cal. 401, 71 P. 453 (1903) ; Claude v. Schutt, 211
Iowa 117, 233 N. W. 41 (1930) ; In re Paroni's Estate, 56 Nev. 492, 56 P. (2d) 754
(1936).
41 See Herman's Estate, 90 Pa. Super. 512 (1927).
36
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reasonable to construe the same intention in relation to this
limitation. 42 If one of the named individuals has predeceased the
testator who, despite knowledge of this fact, has not changed his
will, it must be evident that the testator was thinking in terms
of a group or class. 43 Again, if the testator has gone to the
bother of naming the individuals, but has not specifically referred
to those who meet the description of "the children of C," although
he was personally acquainted with each of them, the testator must
have been thinking of a gift to be divided between the individuals
44
on the one hand and the group, as a unit, on the other.
As opposed to these ideas, there are several indicia normally
found in wills which courts treat as properly providing a foundation for establishing a testator's intention with respect to any
given point. It is only right that these same indicia should aid in
the construction of a gift of the type herein considered. In respect
to these elements, however, the problem is again not so much
that the court should rely on such criteria as an aid to determination, but rather that such criteria are susceptible to various
interpretations. Thus, the statement that a will should be construed so as to avoid either full or partial intestacy, where to
do so would not contravene law or public policy, seems to be too
well established to warrant citation of authority. With this precept in mind, at least three courts, upon finding a gift to "A, B,
and the children of C" in the residuary clause of a will, have held
that the testator must have been, at least prima facie, thinking in
terms of a class gift.4 5 The logic of this position is derived from
the fact that, if the gift were not such and if any of the benefi42 Bethel v. Major, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 398, 68 S. W. 631 (1902) ; Lockhart v. Lockhart,
56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 205 (1857) ; William v. Underwood, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.)
100 (1856) ; Dubois v. House, 294 N. W. 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
43 Manier v. Phelps, 15 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 123 (1884) ; Hazard v. Stevens, 36 R. I.
90, 88 A. 980 (1913).
44 Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222 (1866) ; Eyer v. Beck, 70 Mich. 179, 38 N. W. 20
(1888) ; Cross v. O'Cavanagh, 198 Miss. 137, 21 So. (2d) 473 (1942). But see Contra,
McKay v. Zilar, 73 Colo. 529, 216 P. 534 (1923). In Dubois v. House, 294 S. W. 935
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927), the court felt that since the testatrix did not know the
"children of C" very well she must have been thinking of them as a group, rather
than as individuals.
45 Dollander v. Dhaemers, 297 Ill. 274, 130 N. E. 705 (1921); Manler v. Phelps,
15 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 123 (1884) ; Oulton v. Kidder, 128 A. 674 (R. I. 1925).
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ciaries were to predecease the testator, that taker's share would
46
lapse into the decedent's intestate estate.
In that connection, it is interesting to note, and to compare,
the reasoning offered in support of another case where the testator
made only specific gifts and his will lacked a residuary clause. In
that instance, the court felt that since there was no residuary
clause, the testator must have thought that he had made full
disposition of his entire estate by the specific bequests and devises;
ergo, the specific legacy to "A, B, and the children of C" was one
to a class, otherwise there was a potentiality of lapse into intestacy. 47 It has also been deemed not unfair to believe that, if the
testator has failed to indicate any preference among his residuary
beneficiaries, they ought to share equally as a class. 4 81 The thought
is offered, however, that this line of reasoning should merit no
more attention than should be given to any other make-weight
argument.
The element of survivorship provides another criteria which
has sometimes been thought to be of importance. If, for example,
all members of a group are required to survive a certain event
in order to enjoy the gift, that factor has been treated as strong
indicia that the gift is one to a class, and the same thought has
been accepted as being true of the limitation here under consideration.49 Much the same consideration has been made applicable
to a substitutionary gift, i. e. a provision in a will which directs
that, in the event an indicated taker fails to outlive a certain
event, the gift is to go over to another. While such language would
really be no more than a survivorship provision, nevertheless some
cases hold that a gift by way of substitution imports a class gift, 50
46 Page, Wills (3d Ed., 1940), Vol. 4, § 1430.
47 In re Richard's Estate, 150 Misc. 102, 268 N. Y. S. 465 (1934). But see contra,
Whittle v. Whittle, 108 Va. 22, 60 S. E. 748 (1908).
48 Martin v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat. Bk. of Ocala, 125 Fla. 65, 169 So. 582
(1936).
49 Shackleford v. Kauffman, 263 Ky. 676, 93 S. W. (2d) 15 (1936) ; In re Walker's
Estate, 39 Misc. 680, 80 N. Y. S. 653 (1903); Fleck's Estate, 28 Pa. Super. 466
(1905) ; Perdriau v. Wells, 26 S. 0. Eq. (5 Rich.) 20 (1851); Hoxton v. Griffith,
18 Gratt. 574 (Va. 1868). Contra: In re Penney's Estate, 159 Pa. 346, 28 A. 255
(1893).
50 Re Stanhope's Trusts, 27 Beav. 201, 54 Eng. Rep. 78 (1859) ; Perdriau v. Wells,
26 S. C. Eq. (5 Rich.) 20 (1851) ; Hoxton v. Griffith, 18 Gratt. 574 (Va. 1868).
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while others hold in a contrary vein. 5 Added to these cases are
those decisions which hold that a failure to provide for a sub52
stitutionary gift necessarily requires a finding of a class gift.
It is not unreasonable to hold, and it has in fact often been
held, that where a gift is made to persons in a representative
capacity such persons will take as a class. Thus, where a bequest
is made to the "heirs of C," it is thought that C's heirs should
enjoy the same share in the decedent's estate which would, ordinarily, have gone to their ancestor C had he lived and, in that
regard, that each heir of C should stand equally with each other
heir in the decedent's estate. By way of contrast, if a gift is
made to the "children of C," there is no thought of a gift in a
representative capacity unless C has been indicated to be deceased. Following through with this reasoning, if the limitation
is to "A, B, and the heirs of C," the ordinary rule would be
that a gift to two individuals and to a class has resulted. 53 Surprisingly enough, however, if the will reads to "A, B, and the children
of C," the usual holding will be to the same effect, that is a gift
51 Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 (1935); Kling v. Schnellbecker, 107
Iowa 636, 78 N. E. 673 (1899) ; Van Houten v. Hall, 71 N. J. Eq. 626, 64 A. 460
(1906).
52 Carlin v. Helm, 331 Ill. 213, 162 N. E 873 (1928) ; Collins v. Feather's Ex'rs,
52 W. Va. 107, 43 S. E. 323 (1903).
53 The following cases will serve to illustrate the point, although other cases from
the same jurisdictions could be added by way of supplement: Billinslea v.
Abercrombie, 3 Ala. (2 Stew. & P.) 24 (1832) ; Almand v. WVhitaker, 113 Ga. 889,
39 S. E. 395 (1901) ; Henry v. Henry, 378 Ill. 581, 39 N. E. (2d) 18 (1942) ; Prather
v. Watson's Exr., 187 Ky. 709, 220 S. W. 532 (1920) ; Plummer v. Shepherd, 94 Md.
466, 51 A. 173 (1902) ; Perkins v. Stearns, 163 Mass. 247, 39 N. E. 1016 (1895) ;
Cross v. O'Cavanagh, 198 Miss. 137, 21 So. (2d) 473 (1945) ; Ex'rs of Wintermute
v. Ex'rs of Snyder, 3 N. J. Eq. (2 H. W. Green) 489 (1836) In re Jewett's Estate,
5 Misc. 557, 25 N. Y. S. 1109 (1893) ; Bivens v. Phifer, 47 N. C. 436 (1855) ; In re
Ashburner's Estate, 159 Pa. 545, 28 A. 361 (1894) ; In re Swinburne, 16 R. I. 208,
See also
14 A. 850 (1888) ; Farley v. Farley, 121 Tenn. 324, 115 S. W. 921 (1908).
Silsby v. Sawyer, 64 N. H. 580, 15 A. 601 (1886), and Paul v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10 (1868),
where the word "family" was construed to have the same effect. Contra: Myres v.
Myres, 23 How. Pr. 410 (N. Y. 1862) ; Johnston v. Knight, 117 N. C. 122, 23 S. E. 92
(1895) ; In re Cossentine, [1933] Ch. 119, 148 L. T. Rep. 261.
The word "heirs" was construed to mean "children" in McCartney v. Osburn,
118 Ill. 403, 9 N. E. 210 (1886) ; Harris v. Philpot, 40 N. C. (5 Ire. Eq.) 324 (1848) ;
W itehurst v. Pritchard, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 383 (1810) ; Priester's Estate, 23 Pa.
Super. 386 (1903) ; and Oulton v. Kidder, 128 A. 674 (R. I. 1925). The question was
not examined, or was passed over, in Billings v. Deputy, 85 Ind. App. 248, 146 N. E.
219 (1925) ; Harris v. Austin, 125 Me. 127, 131 A. 206 (1925) ; Ward v. Stow, 17
N. C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 509 (1834); and Stowe v. Ward, 10 N. C. (3 Hawks) 604
(1825), by reason of other factors deemed controlling. See also the opposite results
obtained in Osburn's Appeal, 104 Pa. 637 (1883), and in McCartney v. Osburn, 118
Ii. 403, 9 N. E. 210 (1886), wherein the same provision was construed by the courts
of two different states.
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has been made to two individuals and to a class, but there are some
cases which hold that no more than a single class gift has been
54
made.
It should be remembered that if the reference to the parent
"C "is merely for the purpose of specifically identifying the group
of takers,5 5 or if the parent named is alive,5 6 the bequest or devise
could not then be made in a representative capacity and would
probably result in a gift to individuals, except there be other
indications to the contrary. If, for any reason, the bequest to the
"children of C" is not to be deemed to be a representative one,
the normal rule would regard it as a gift to individuals. 7
Notice may also be taken of the fact that, in cases concerning
the limitation at hand, courts are inclined to place considerable
reliance on the degree of relationship which the various takers
bear to the decedent, or to each other, in the attempt to ascertain
whether or not a class gift has been made. It has been held, therefore, that if a gift is made to beneficiaries who are referred to
by the relationship they bear to the testator, and no reference is
made to their parents, the testator must have been thinking of
them as individuals rather than as a group. 58 Conversely, where
54 In
re Daniel, 2 All. E. R. 101, 173 L. T. Rep. 315 (1945); In re Walbran,
[1906] 1 Ch. 64; Frazier v. Dillon, 78 Ga. 474, 3 S. E. 696 (1887) ; Henry v. Thomas,
118 Ind. 23, 20 N. E. 519 (1889); Claude v. Schutt, 211 Iowa 117, 233 N. W. 41
(1930) ; Rushmore v. Rushmore, 59 Hun. 615, 12 N. Y. S. 776 (1891) ; Ferrer v. Pyne,
81 N. Y. 281 (1880) ; Roper v. Roper, 58 N. C. (5 Jones Eq.) 16 (1859); Gilliam v.
Underwood, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 100 (1856) ; Martin v. Gould, 17 N. C. (2 Dev.
Eq.) 305 (1832). See also the dissenting opinion in Whitehurst v. Pritchard, 5 N. C.
(1 Murph.) 383 (1810).
55 Russel v. Welch, 237 Mass. 261, 129 N. E. 422 (1921) ; Leslie v. Wilder, 228
Mass. 343, 117 N. E. 342 (1917).
56 Blackler v. Webb, 2 P. Wm. 383, 24 Eng. Rep. 777 (1726) ; Murphy v. Fox, 334
Ill. App. 7, 78 N. E. (2d) 337 (1948) ; Kling v. Schnellbecker, 107 Iowa 636, 78 N. W.
673 (1899) ; Bryant v. Scott, 21 N. C. (1 Dev. & B. Eq.) 155 (1835) ; Peoples Nat'l
Bk. of Greenville v. Harrison, 198 S. C. 457, 18 S. E. (2d) 1 (1941).
57 Northey v. Strange, 1 P. Wm. 341, 24 Eng. Rep. 416 (1716) ; Kean v. Roe, 2
Harr. 103 (Del. 1835) ; In re Kleeman, 61 Misc. 560, 115 N. Y. S. 982 (1908). The
gift was to "A, B, and the children and grandchildren of C" in these cases. In
Bruce v. Warren, 22 Ohio App. 41, 153 N. E. 273 (1926), the testator had shown his
ability elsewhere to make a representative gift but had not done so as to the limitation at issue.
58 Kean v. Roe, 2 Harr. 103 (Del. 1835) ; Martin v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat. Bk.
of Ocala, 125 Fla. 65, 169 So. 582 (1936) ; Murphy v. Fox, 334 Ill. App. 7, 78 N. E.
(2d) 337 (1948). In each case, the gift was to "A, B, and my nieces and nephews."
See also Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N. W. 1018 (1912), where the
gift was to "my nephews A and B and the children of my sister C." The court
thought that, since all takers were equally related, they shared as a class.
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the decedent refers to a group by the relationship they bear to
C, while naming the individual beneficiaries, it has been held
that the testator meant the group to take by representation and
not in an individual capacity. 59 Stress has been placed, in support of a class gift, on the fact that A, B, and C were all of an
equal degree of relationship to the decedent. 60 When A and B
were not equally related to C, as respects the decedent, it has
been assumed that the decedent intended a distribution between
individuals and the class ;61 although there are cases to the contrary, holding the gift to be either a class gift 62 or one to several
63
individuals.
The wide variety of indicia, noted herein, to which the courts
have looked should serve to convince anyone that there is authority available to sustain the validity of any contention that counsel
might care to press insofar as the limitation here under consideration is concerned. For that matter, it should now be readily
apparent that judicial attempts to resolve the problem as to the
nature of a given limitation amount to no more than a trial-anderror process. The results are indeed haphazard, and this is
59 Dollander v. Dhaemers, 297 Il. 274, 130 N. E. 705 (1921) ; Eyer v. Black, 70
Mich. 179, 38 N. W. 20 (1888). But see cases listed in note 55, ante, and Van
Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N. W. 1018 (1912).
60 In re Alcock, [19451 Ch. 264, 173 L. T. Rep. 4; Haas v. Atkinson, 20 D. C. Rep.
537 (1892) ; McKay v. Zilar, 73 Colo. 529, 216 P. 534 (1923) ; Rohrer v. Burris, 27
Ind. App. 344, 61 N. E. 202 (1901); Justice v. Stringer, 160 Ky. 354, 169 S. W. 836
(1914); Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N. W. 1018 (1912); Clark v.
Lynch, 46 Barb. 68 (N. Y. 1866) ; Ward v. Ottley, 166 Va. 639, 186 S. E. 25 (1936).
To the same effect, although A was only related to the testator by marriage, is the
case of Neil v. Stuart, 102 Kan. 242, 169 P. 1138 (1918). In Perry v. Leslie, 124 Me.
93, 126 A. 340 (1924), it was thought that this factor indicated a gift to two or
more classes. In the case of In re Kleeman, 61 Misc. 560, 115 N. Y. S. 982 (1908),
on the other hand, it was thought that this factor indicated a gift to individuals.
61 Henry v. Henry, 378 Ill. 581, 39 N. E. (2d) 18 (1942) ; Dahmer v. Wensler, 350
Ill. 23, 182 N. E. 799 (1932) ; Lachland's Heirs v. Downing's Ex'rs, 50 Ky. (11 B.
Mon.) 32 (1850); Agricultural Nat'l Bk. of Pittsfield v. Miller, 316 Mass. 288, 55
N. E. (2d) 442 (1944); Smith v. Curtis, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutcher) 345 (1862);
Herman's Estate, 90 Pa. Super. 512 (1927); Risk's Appeal, sub. nom. Stauffer's
Estate, 52 Pa. 269 (1866). Contra: In re Harper, [1914] 1 Ch. 70.
62 In re Cossentine, [1933] Ch. 119, 148 L. T. Rep. 261; Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Doolan, 307 Mass. 233, 29 N. E. (2d) 844 (1940). Both of these cases
are interesting in that the named beneficiaries, the A and B in the formula, were
charities and were allowed to share per capita with the group.
63 Gamier v. Garnier, 265 Pa. 175, 108 A. 595 (1919) ; Perdue v. Starkey's Heirs,
117 Va. 806, 86 S. E. 158 (1915); Whittle v. Whittle, 108 Va. 22, 60 S. E. 748
(1908) ; McMaster v. McMaster, 10 Gratt. 275 (Va. 1853) ; Crow v. Crow, 1 Leigh
74 (Va. 1829).
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true even among the decisions of a single jurisdiction. It is the
natural, and to be expected, result of a method based on weighing
and balancing considerations supposed to lead one to the testator's
intent, where the weighing and balancing has to do only with a
determination of whether sufficient factors are present or not
present which, when assembled, describe a fact after the manner
of a rigid, but established, legal definition. It is the product of
an inquiry as to whether or not all of the elements of Jarman's
definition of a class gift are present. If so, the gift is one to a
class; if not, it is one for the benefit of individuals. There is a
deceptive simplicity in that thought, but any reference to the
cases will make it flagrantly apparent that there is nothing simple
about its application nor anything like accuracy in its eventual
product.
It is most refreshing, then, to find a plan which rejects this
formalism in favor of a more reasoned appraisal; viz., the plan
suggested in the English case of In re Moss. 64 That opinion may
be paraphrased into one short concept about as follows: (1)
whether it is proper to call the provision a class gift or to call it
a gift to several persons of whom the testator thought about collectively is merely an idle bandying about of words; for (2) the
pertinent issue is whether or not the testator wanted the entirety
of the indicated property to go equally to the persons designated.
The real determination to be made is not whether a gift to "A, B,
and the children of C" will fit an established definition of a
class gift; on the contrary, the real issue is, was the decedent
"group-minded."
It is to the latter end that the weighing and
balancing process ought to be applied. By "group-mindedness,"
of course, is meant the thought that the decedent wanted all the
persons indicated to enjoy if they were alive at the time the
gift vested in interest but, if they were not then all alive, the
entirety of the gift was to be divided equally among the survivors.
64 [1899] 2 Ch. 314.
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Those cases which have adopted this course have, as a consequence, found this type of limitation effective to create a class
5
gift.6
II.

DIsTRmunvU

, SHARES

As it shall be established later, there is a need to determine
whether a devise or bequest of the nature herein discussed is a
gift to a class. That need transcends the rather natural desire
of the beneficiaries to learn the quantum of their respective shares.
Despite this, courts seem more concerned with distributive shares
than with the nature of the gift. If, as has been pointed out,
confusion runs rampant in the latter problem, it can only be said
that chaos is the order of the day with regard to the former.
The decisions run the gamut, beginning with one which states:
"It is here to be observed, that the real question is, do they take
individually, or as a class? not, whether they take per capita or
per stirpes." 61 They proceed through the entire scale to the
many which either refuse or neglect to determine the nature of
the bequest or devise and are content to rest the decision on the
mere determination of the method of distribution, that is, per
67
capita or per stirpes.
In attempting to ascertain a decedent's intention respecting
distribution, courts resort to the usual methodology generally applicable to wills but with rather distressing results. As a place
for beginning, courts have generally said that prima facie a per
capita construction would be correct,68 barring expression to the
contrary. The reasons available for a choice between a per capita
or a per stirpes construction 9 are, again, legalisms on the one
65 In re Moss, [1899] 2 Ch. 314, affirmed in Kingsbury v. Walter, [1901] A. C. 187,
84 L. T. Rep. 139; In re Richard's Estate, 150 Misc. 102, 268 N. Y. S. 465 (1934) ;
Manier v. Phelps, 15 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 123 (1884); Oulton v. Kidder, 128 A. 674
(R. I. 1925); Dubois v. House, 294 S. W. 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
See also
Restatement, Property, Vol. 3, § 284.
66 Cole v. Creyon, 10 S. C. Eq. (1 Hills Ch.) 311 at 319 (1833).
67 It is interesting to note that out of 197 cases In which this limitation was at
issue, 83 of them made no express decision on the nature of the gift, the court
merely deciding to distribute per capita or per 8tirpes. See appendices C and D.
68 See Appendix B.
69 For an extensive and definitive analysis of the meaning and effect of per capita
and per 8tirpital distribution, see annotation in 16 A. L. R. 15.
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hand and valid considerations on the other. Much reliance has
been placed on the conclusiveness of certain words and phrases.
"Share and share alike," for example, has generally been construed to preclude anything but a per capita distribution, 70 but
there are decisions which hold the term to import no more than
a prima facie basis for a per capita division. 71 By the same token,
"equally divided" has usually been thought to call for a division
among the various persons composing a group on a per capita
basis, 7 2 yet there is good authority to the effect that this term is
effectively used to indicate a basis for division of the whole between two or more groups so as thereafter to require a per stirpes
73
division within the respective classes.
Other reasons have been advanced to help resolve this issue,
reasons which tend to illustrate technique rather than critique.
There are, of course, the various applications of the doctrine
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. It has been held that if,
elsewhere in the will, the testator has exhibited his, ability to
divide property per stirpes, he would have done so as to the particular clause had he wished to do so. 74 There are also analogous
instances following the same general approach. It has been said,
for example, that if a testator, elsewhere in his will, has expressed
70 In re Rauschenplat's Estate, 212 Cal. 33, 297 P. 882 (1931) ; Conn v. Hardin,
215 Ky. 307, 284 S. W. 1077 (1926) ; Manier v. Phelps, 15 Abb. N. C. 123 (N. Y.
1884). Contra: Dubois v. House, 294 S. W. 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
71 Dollander v. Dhaemers, 297 Ill. 274, 131 N. E. 705 (1921); In re Walker's
Estate, 39 Misc. 680, 80 N. Y. S. 653 (1903).
72 Jackson v. Baker, 207 Ala. 519, 93 So. 469 (1922) ; Kean v. Roe, 2 Harr. 103
(Del. 1835); Martin v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat. Bk. of Ocala, 125 Fla. 65, 169
So. 582 (1936) ; Carlin v. Helm, 331 Ill. 213, 162 N. E. 873 (1928) ; Kling v. Schnellbecker, 107 Iowa 636, 78 N. W. 673 (1899) ; Purnell v. Culbertson, 75 Ky. (12 Bush)
369 (1876) ; Harris v. Austin, 125 Me. 127, 131 A. 206 (1925); Brittain v. Carson,
46 Md. 186 (1876) ; Russel v. Welch, 237 Mass. 261, 129 N. E. 422 (1921) ; Bryant
v. Scott, 21 N. C. (1 Dev. & B. Eq.) 155 (1844). In the case first mentioned, that
of Jackson v. Baker, the mere use of "per capita" was deemed to be conclusive.
The case of Harrell v. Davenport, 58 N. C. (5 Jones Eq.) 4 (1859), held that the
phrase "to share equally with each" of the children of C could not possibly mean
to share with "all" of them.
78 Allen v. Durham, 173 Ga. 811, 161 S. E. 608 (1931) ; Dahmer v. Wensler, 350
Ill. 23, 182 N. E. 799 (1932) ; Fleck's Estate, 28 Pa. Super, 466 (1905); In re
Ashburner's Estate, 159 Pa. 545, 28 A. 361 (1894).
74 Conn v. Hardin, 215 Ky. 307, 28,4 S. W. 1077 (1926) ; Thornton v. Roberts, 30
N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 473 (1879) ; Stokes v. Tilly, 9 N. J. Eq. (1 Stockt.) 130 (1852) ;
In re Kleeman, 61 Misc. 560, 115 N. Y. S. 982 (1908) ; Cheeves v. Bell, 54 N. C.
(1 Jones Eq.) 234 (1854) ; Bruce v. Warren, 22 Ohio App. 41, 153 N. E. 273 (1926);
Crow v. Crow, 1 Leigh 74 (Va. 1829).
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a desire to equalize the shares of A or B with that given to the
whole group composed of "the children of C," the distribution
ought then to be per stirpes.15 By way of contrast, other cases
have resorted to evidence outside the will to defeat the normal
76
presumption of per capita distribution.
Another rationale, but one quite suspect in character, has been
espoused by several cases. It runs to the effect that, wherever the
language of a will is ambiguous, it is only reasonable to presume
that the testator would want to follow the distributive scheme
of the statute of descent. 77 It is no small mystery as to how a
court can justify the existence, let alone the use, of this presumption. From the very fact that a person has executed a will it
would appear that he has indicated a desire to make distribution
of his estate in a manner other than the one provided by the
statute of descent. This is particularly true where one or more
of the persons involved would not be an heir of the decedent or
where the introduction of the statutory scheme into the dispositive
provision would cause a most inequitable distribution of the estate.
75 Randolph v. Bond, 12 Ga. 362 (1852) ; Spivey v. Spivey, 37 N. C. (2 Ire. Eq.)
100 (1841) ; Martin v. Gould, 17 N. C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 305 (1832).
76 In
re Walbran, [1906] 1 Ch. 64; White v. Holland, 92 Ga. 216, 18 S. E. 17
(1893) ; Perry v. Leslie, 124 Me. 93, 126 A. 340 (1924) ; Perkins v. Stearns, 163
Mass. 247, 39 N. E. 1016 (1895).
See also Collins v. Feather's Ex'rs, 52 W. Va.
107, 43 S. E. 323 (1903), which found for a per capita distribution and said extrinsic evidence merited great weight. The court cited Hamlett v. Hamlett, 12
Leigh 350 (Va. 1841), as authority, but that case held for a per stirpes distribution although the reasons are not available as the opinion was lost. See also
Cross v. O'Cavanagh, 198 Miss. 137, 21 So. (2d) 473 (1945), where the court
held for a per stirpe8 distribution because the interested parties had been holding
the property in that manner by reason of prior litigation which had arisen in
another state. The case of Archer v. Munday, 17 S. C. 84 (1881), achieved the
same result because the parties had been holding in that manner for thirty years.
77 Raymond v. Hillhouse, 45 Conn. 457 (1878) ; Allen v. Durham, 173 Ga. 811, 161
S. E. 608 (1931) ; Dollander v. Dhaemers, 297 Ill. 274, 130 N. E. 705 (1921) ; Claude
v. Schutt, 211 Iowa 117, 233 N. W. 41 (1930); Lachland's Heirs v. Downing's
Ex'rs, 50 Ky. (11 B. Mon.) 32 (1850) ; Luke v. Marshall, 5 J. J. Marsh 353 (Ky.
1831) ; Eyer v. Beck, 70 Mich. 179, 38 N. W. 20 (1888) ; Lockhart v. Lockhart, 56
N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 205 (1857); Stow v. Ward, 12 N. C. (1 Dev. L.) 67 (1826) ;
Miller's Estate (No. 2), 26 Pa. Super. 453 (1904) ; Risk's Appeal, sub. nom.
Stauffer's Estate, 52 Pa. 269 (1866); Paul v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10 (1868).
See also
Martin v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat. Bk. of Ocala, 125 Fla. 65, 169 So. 582 (1936),
and Harris v. Austin, 125 Me. 127, 131 A. 206 (1925), which state the rule but find
present a contrary intention. In Auger v. Tatham, 191 Ill. 296, 61 N. E. 77 (1901),
the court felt this presumption was inapplicable because the gift was of a specific
sum to each taker. The author of a note in 19 Cal. L. Rev. 442 deduced that courts
favoring a per stirpes distribution were greatly influenced by the intestacy laws,
whereas those favoring the per capita method believed the testator had drawn his
will to avoid the effect of such statutes.
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Fortunately, there is some satisfaction to be derived from the
knowledge that probably more courts have chosen to repudiate
8
the presumption than to follow it.7
It may also be noted that, while courts are generally able to
declare that a particular method of distribution would be proper,
the reasons are not always consistent. Those courts holding to
the view that the distribution should be on a per capita basis do
so because they think the gift was one to a class,79 to individuals,80
or are unsure of the nature of the gift but certain that the testator
must have intended all potential takers to take a share which
is equal with that of all of the others."' Those courts which have
favored a per stirpital distribution do so because they have determined the gift to be one to several individuals,8 2 to individuals
78 In re Fiske's Estate, 182 Cal. 238, 187 P. 958 (1920) ; Carlin v. Helm, 331 Ill.
213, 162 N. E. 873 (1928) ; Kaufman v. Anderson, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 888, 104 S. W. 340
(1907) ; Purnell v. Culbertson, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 369 (1876) ; In re May's Estate,
197 Mo. App. 555, 196 S. W. 1039 (1917) ; Stokes v. Tilly, 9 N. J. Eq. (1 Stockt.)
130 (1852) ; Johnston v. Knight, 117 N. C. 122, 23 S. E. 92 (1895) ; Bryant v. Scott,
21 N. C. (1 Dev. & B. Eq.) 155 (1835); Ward v. Stow, 17 N. C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 509
(1834) ; Bruce v. Warren, 22 Ohio App. 41, 153 N. E. 273 (1926) ; Priester's Estate,
23 Pa. Super. 386 (1903); Perdriau v. Wells, 26 S. C. (5 Rich.) 20 (1851);
Murchison v. Wallace, 156 Va. 728, 159 S. E. 106 (1931) ; Crow v. Crow, 1 Leigh 74
(Va. 1829); Collins v. Feather's Ex'rs, 52 W. Va. 107, 43 S. E. 323 (1903).
See
also Blackler v. Webb, 2 P. Wm.383, 24 Eng. Rep. 777 (1726).
79 Illustrative cases are In re Alcock, [1945] Ch. 264, 173 L. T. Rep. 4; Re Elliott,
19 Ont. W. N. 168 (1920); McKay v. Zilar, 73 Colo. 529, 216 P. 534 (1923); Carlin
v. Helm, 331 Ill. 213, 162 N. E. 873 (1928); Rohrer v. Burris, 27 Ind. App. 344,
61 N. E. 202 (1901) ; Tomb v. Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P. (2d) 320 (1941) ; Benson
v. Wright, 4 Md. Ch. 278 (1848) ; Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N. W.
1018 (1912) ; Edwards v. Kelly, 83 Miss. 144, 35 So. 418 (1903) ; In re May's Estate,
197 Mo. App. 555, 196 S. W. 1039 (1917) ; Burnet v. Burnet, 30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.)
595 (1879) ; In re Richard's Estate, 150 Misc. 102, 268 N. Y. S. 465 (1934) ; Tillman
v. O'Briant, 220 N. C. 714, 18 S. E. (2d) 131 (1942) ; Oulton v. Kidder, 128 A. 674
(R. I. 1925); Perdriau v. Wells, 26 S. C. Eq. (5 Rich.) 20 (1851); Saunders v.
Saunder's Admr., 109 Va. 191, 63 S. E. 410 (1909).
80 See, for example, In re Allen, 44 L. T. (N. S.) 240 (1881) ; In re Chaplin's
Trusts, 33 L. J. (Ch.) 183 (1863); Tomlin v. Hatfield, 12 Sim. 167, 59 Eng. Rep.
1095 (1841) ; In re Rauschenplat's Estate, 212 Cal. 33, 297 P. 882 (1931) ; Shannon
v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 (1935) ; Kean v. Roe, 2 Harr. 103 (Del. 1835) ;
Blackstone v. Althouse, 278 Ill. 481, 116 N. E. 154 (1917) ; Kling v. Schnellbecker,
107 Iowa 636, 78 N. W. 673 (1899) ; Purnell v. Culbertson, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 369
(1876) ; Agricultural Nat'l Bank of Pittsfield v. Miller, 316 Mass. 288, 55 N. E. (2d)
442 (1944) ; In re Paroni's Estate, 56 Nev. 492, 56 P. (2d) 754 (1936) ; In re
Kleeman, 61 Misc. 560, 115 N. Y. S. 982 (1908) ; Bryant v. Scott, 21 N. C. (1 Dev. &
B. Eq.) 155 (1835) ; Donohoe's Estate, 282 Pa. 254, 127 A. 625 (1925); Peoples Nat.
Bk. of Greenville v. Harrison, 198 S. C. 457, 18 S. E. (2d) 1 (1941); Murchison v.
Wallace, 156 Va. 728, 159 S. E. 106 (1931).
s1 A list of the English and American cases so holding appears in Appendix C.
82 Luke v. Marshall, 5"J. J, Marsh 353 (Ky. 1831) ; Van Houten v. Hall, 71 N. J.
Eq. 626, 64 A. 460 (1906).
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and a class, 83 to two or more classes,8 4 or because that method

seemed to be the correct way to divide the estate.8 5 In those cases
where the court has actually determined whether or not the gift
was to a class, the determination has controlled the method of
distribution. There is authority which suggests that a determination as to the distributive shares would automatically determine
the nature of the gift.8 6 If it is acceptable practice to place the
7
cart before the horse, such authority is sound .
There is, perhaps, some justification for the pessimistic note
taken by one writer who has expressed the belief that even to
enunciate a rule in this field is merely to compound confusion. 8
If, however, the method of distribution is not to be determined
solely because the limitation is construed to be one to individuals,
to a class, or to two or more classes, probably the happiest reason
for making a choice would be based on the degree of relationship
which the takers bear to the testator. It is not entirely unreasonable to presume that the average testator would not wish to
83 In re Walbran, [1906] 1 Ch. 64; Dahmer v. Wensler, 350 Ill. 23, 182 N. E. 799
(1932) ; Beal v. Higgins, 303 Ill. 370, 135 N. E. 759 (1922) ; Palmer v. Jones, -299
Ill. 263, 132 N. E. 567 (1921) ; Dollander v. Dhaemers, 297 Ill. 274, 130 N. E. 705
(1921) ; Claude v. Schutt, 211 Iowa 117, 233 N. W. 41 (1930) ; Shackelford v.
Kauffman, 263 Ky. 676, 93 S. W. (2d) 15 (1936) ; Perry v. Leslie, 124 Me. 93, 126 A.
340 (1924) ; Newlin v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 161 Md. 622, 158 A. 51
(1932) ; Perkins v. Stearns, 163 Mass. 247, 39 N. E. 1016 (1895) ; Cross v. O'Cavanagh,
198 Miss. 137, 21 So. (2d) 473 (1945) ; In re Walker's Estate, 39 Misc. 680, 80
N. Y. S. 653 (1903); Lockhart v. Lockhart, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 205 (1857);
Herman's Estate, 90 Pa. Super. 512 (1927) ; Connor v. Johnson, 11 S. C. Eq. (2
Hills Ch.) 41 (1834); Farley v. Farley, 121 Tenn. 324, 115 S. W. 921 (1908): Paul
v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10 (1868). The foregoing list represents but one case from each of
the jurisdictions mentioned. It could be amplified without difficulty.
84 Selected cases are Davis v. Bennett, 4 DeG., F. & J. 327, 45 Eng. Rep. 1209
(1862); Martin v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat. Bk. of Ocala, 125 Fla. 65, 169 So. 582
(1936); Henry v. Henry, 378 Ill. 581, 39 N. E. (2d) 18 (1942) ; Henry v. Thomas,
118 Ind. 23, 20 N. E. 519 (1889) ; Lachland's Heirs v. Downing's Ex'rs, 50 Ky. (11
B. Mon.) 32 (1850) ; Plummer v. Shepherd, 94 Md. 466, 51 A. 173 (1902) ; In re
M'hill, 149 App. Div. 404, 134 N. Y. S. 467 (1912) ; Roper v. Roper, 58 N. C. (5
Jones Eq.) 16 (1859) ; Roelf's Cousins v, White, 75 Ore. 549, 147 P. 753 (1915) ;
Snipe's Estate, 30 Pa. Super. 145 (1906); Dubois v. House, 294 S. W. 935 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927) ; Hoxton v. Griffith, 18 Gratt. 574 (Va. 1868).
85 These cases are listed in Appendix D.
86 Carey, "Per Capita and Stirpital Division in Illinois," 35 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1941),
states: "In this instance as in others the effect of the rule of division is not alone
to determine the share to be taken but also the class which is to take . .. A per
capita rule would result in the creation of but one class . . ." To the same effect,
see Long, "Class Gifts in North Carolina," 22 N. Car. L. Rev. 297 at 308 (1944).
87 The fallacy of the concept lies in the fact that per capita distribution is equally
proper in gifts to individuals or to a single class; per stirpes may be applicable to
a single class or among several classes.
8 See note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 372 (1931).
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discriminate against his immediate family in favor of persons
more distantly related to him.8 9 There may, of course, be supervening reasons why the decedent would want strangers to his
blood9 ° or more distant relatives 9 ' to share equally with those
nearer to him. Assuming that relationship does have an important
bearing on the mode of distribution, courts have then considerately applied one of several possible canons of construction. If,
for example, A, B, and C are equally related to the decedent, the
presumption is that the decedent intended a distribution per
stirpes between the individuals and the class representing C,92
89 See, for example, Billinslea v. Abercrombie, 3 Ala. (2 Stew. & P.) 24 (1832)
Raymond v. Hillhouse, 45 Conn. 467 (1878) ; Randolph v. Bond, 12 Ga. 362 (1852);
Dahmer v. Wensler, 350 Ill. 23, 182 N. E. 799 (1932) ; Beal v. Higgins, 303 Ill. 370,
135 N. E. 759 (1922) ; Dollander v. Dhaemers, 297 Ill. 274, 130 N. E. 705 (1921) ;
Henry v. Thomas, 118 ind. 23, 20 N. E. 519 (1889) ; Claude v. Schutt, 211 Iowa 117,
233 N. W. 41 (1930); Shackelford v. Kauffman, 263 Ky. 676, 93 S. W. (2d) 15
(1936) ; Agricultural Nat'l Bk. of Pittsfield v. Miller, 316 Mass. 288, 55 N. E. (2d)
442 (1942) ; Eyer v. Beck, 70 Mich. 179, 38 N. W. 20 (1888) ; Cross v. O'Cavanagh,
198 Miss. 137, 21 So. (2d) 473 (1945) ; Ferrer v. Pyne, 81 N. Y. 281 (1880) ; Gilliam
v. Underwood, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 100 (1856) ; In re Ashburner's Estate, 159 Pa.
545, 28 A. 361 (1894).
90
In Kling v. Schnellbecker, 107 Iowa 636, 78 N. W. 673 (1899), all takers were
related to the testator by marriage. Neil v. Stuart, 102 Kan. 242, 169 P. 1138 (1918),
concerned step-nephews who had lived with the testator and were regarded equally
in affection with blood nephews. The case of Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Doolan, 307 Mass. 233, 29 N. E. (2d) 844 (1940), allowed a charity to share with
the children of nieces and nephews. In Smith v. Curtis, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutcher) 345
(1862), relatives by marriage shared with certain of the decedent's collateral
relatives. All of the takers in the case of In re Kleeman, 61 Misc. 560, 115 N. Y. S.
982 (1908), were related to the decedent by marriage. The English case of In re
Cossentine, [1933] Ch. 119, 148 L. T. Rep. 261, permitted a charity to share equally
with collateral relatives.
91 Special factors appear in Carlin v. Helm, 331 Ill. 213, 162 N. E. 873 (1928)
Rohrer v. Burris, 27 Ind. App. 344, 61 N. E. 202 (1901) ; Kaufman v. Anderson,
31 Ky. L. Rep. 888, 104 S. W. 340 (1907) ; In re May's Estate, 197 Mo. App. 555,
196 S. W. 1039 (1917) ; In re Paroni's Estate, 56 Nev. 492, 56 P. (2d) 754 (1936) ;
Stokes v. Tilly, 9 N. J. Eq. (1 Stockt.) 130 (1852); In re Richard's Estate, 150
Misc. 102, 268 N. Y. S. 465 (1934) ; Hazard v. Stevens, 36 iR. I. 90, 88 A. 980 (1913)
Peoples Nat. Bk. of Greenville v. Harrison, 198 S. C. 457, 18 S. E. (2d) 1 (1941);
Will of Waterbury, 163 Wis. 510, 158 N. W. 340 (1916). See also White v. Holland,
92 Ga. 216, 18 S. E. 17 (1893), and Ward v. Ottley, 166 Va. 639, 186 S. E. 25 (1935),
in which the courts digressed from the normal view of their respective jurisdictions
to find a per stirpe8 distribution on the theory that the gifts were made to the
"children of C" for the purpose of disinheriting C, thereby forcing a conclusion that
the gift was by way of representation.
92 Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222 (1866) ; Beal v. Higgins, 303 Ill. 370, 135 N. E.
759 (1922); Palmer v. Jones, 299 I1. 263, 132 N. E. 567 (1921); Dollander v.
Dhaemers, 297 Ill. 274, 130 N. E. 705 (1921); Claude v. Schutt, 211 Iowa 117,
233 N. W. 41 (1930) ; Lachland's Heirs v. Downing's Ex'rs, 50 Ky. (11 B. Mon.)
32 (1850) ; Perry v. Leslie, 124 Me. 93, 126 A. 340 (1924) ; Thornton v. Roberts,
30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 473 (1879) ; Rushmore v. Rushmore, 59 Hun. 615, 12 N. Y. S.
776 (1891) ; Ferrer v. Pyne, 81 N. Y. 281 (1880) ; Clark v. Lynch, 46 Barb. 68 (N. Y.
1866) ; Roper v. Roper, 58 N. C. (5 Jones Eq.) 16 (1859); Jourdan v. Green, 16
N. C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 270 (1828); Osburn's Appeal, 104 Pa. 637 (1883). Contrary
decisions appear in notes 55 and 56. ante. and in note 91.
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but it could be presumed that he intended a distribution per
capita.3 In case C is dead, and A, B , and C's children are equally
related to the decedent, the customary belief is that the children
should take only C's share by representation.9 4 If the indicated
group, in contrast to A and B, the named individuals, is delineated by the relationship to C, the presumption is that they
should take in a representative capacity per stirpes," but even
96
so, there is considerable confusion in cases of that nature.
III.

VESTING, LAPSE AND ALLIED PROBLEMS

There are other considerations which often arise that go beyond the mere determination of whether or not the gift is one
to a class or regarding the quantum of the shares to be enjoyed
by the distributees. Not the least of these relates to the problem
of when the gift vests in transmissibility, that is whether, if a
taker has died before the time for possession in use and enjoyment, the interest passes to his estate. If the gift is to "A, B,
and the children of C" simpliciter, the cases are uniform on
the point that, regardless of the nature of the gift or the quantum
of the distributive share, the beneficiary need only survive the
testator to obtain his interest.97 The same result will usually
93 McKay v. Zilar, 73 Colo. 529, 216 P. 534 (1923) ; Rohrer v. Burris, 27 Ind. App.
344, 61 N. E. 202 (1901); Justice v. Stringer, 160 Ky. 354, 169 S. W. 836 (1914);
Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N. W. 1018 (1912).
94 In re Daniel, 2 All. E. R. 101, 173 L. T. Rep. 315 (1945) ; Fraser v. Dillon,
78 Ga. 474, 3 S. E. 695 (1887) ; Claude v. Schutt, 211 Iowa 117, 233 N. W. 41 (1930) ;
Shackelford v. Kauffman, 263 Ky. 676, 93 S. W. (2d) 15 (1936) ; Eyer v. Beck, 70
Mich. 179, 38 N. W. 20 (1888) ; Roome and Dodd v. Counter, 6 N. J. L. 111, 10 Ann.
Dec. 390 (1822) ; In re Jewett's Estate, 5 Misc. 557, 25 N. Y. S. 1109 (1893) ; Garnier
v. Garnier, 265 Pa. 175, 108 A. 595 (1919). Contra: White v. Holland, 92 Ga. 216,
18 S. E. 17 (1893) ; Smith v. Curtis, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutcher) 345 (1862) ; Perdue v.
Starkey's Heirs, 117 Va. 806, 86 S. E. 158 (1915).
95 Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222 (1866) ; Beal v. Higgins, 303 Ill. 370, 135 N. E.
759 (1922); Dollander v. Dhaemers, 297 Ill. 274, 130 N. E. 705 (1921); Claude v.
Schutt, 211 Iowa 117, 233 N. W. 41 (1930) ; Lachland's Heirs v. Downing's Ex'rs,
50 Ky. (11 B. Mon.) 32 (1850) ; Cross v. O'Cavanagh, 198 Miss. 137, 21 So. (2d)
473 (1945); Clark v. Lynch. 46 Barb. 68 (N. Y. 1866).
96 Kean v. Roe, 2 Harr. 103 (Del. 1835), and Martin v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat.
Bk. of Ocala, 125 Fla. 65, 169 So. 582 (1936), favor per capita, distribution. The
converse is true of Murphy v. Fox, 334 Ill. App. 7, 78 N. E. (2d) 337 (1948), Henry
v. Henry, 378 111. 581, 39 N. E. (2d) 18 (1942), and Herman's Estate, 90 Pa. Super.
512 (1927).
97 Kingsbury v. Walter, [1901] A. C. 187, 84 L. T. Rep. 139; In re Moss, [1899]
2 Ch. 314; In re Allen, sub. nom. Wilson v. Atter, 44 L. T. (N. S.) 240 (1881) ;
In re Chaplin's Trusts, 33 L. J. (Ch.) 183 (1863) ; Re Stanhope's Trusts, 27 Beav.

CONSTRUCTION OF CLASS GIFTS

ensue if the same limitation succeeds a life estate in favor of
some other person 58 On the other hand, considerable difficulty
may arise where the limitation is "to W for life and then to
A, B, and the children of C, or the survivor or survivors of them."
The issue then becomes one as to whether or not the qualifying
survivorship clause applies to A and B or only to the children
of C. The outcome will generally be dependent on whether the
gift is held to be one to a class or among classes, but there are
decisions which rest on the determination of whether the distribution is per stirpes or per capita. 9 If the limitation is to
individuals, all potential takers must survive W to enjoy.' If the
limitation is determined to be one to individuals and to a class,
the survivorship requirement is usually deemed to qualify only
the portion of the gift relating to the class. 2 If the entire gift
is to a class, again all takers must survive W to enjoy.3
A somewhat related issue which has, occasionally, been in
need of resolution concerns the problem of when the class will
close with respect to afterborn members. The cases dealing there201, 54 Eng. Rep. 78 (1859); Amson v. Harris, 19 Beav. 210, 52 Eng. Rep. 330
(1854) ; McKay v. Zilar, 73 Colo. 529, 216 P. 534 (1923) ; Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn.
77, 179 A. 479 (1935) ; Benson v. Wright, 4 Md. Ch. 278 (1848) ; Perkins v. Stearns,
163 Mass. 247, 39 N. E. 1016 (1895) ; Eyer v. Beck, 70 Mich. 179, 38 N. E. 20 (1888) ;
In re Paroni's Estate, 56 Nev. 492, 56 P. (2d) 754 (1936); In re Turner's Will,
208 N. Y. 261, 101 N. E. 905 (1913) ; Henderson v. Womack, 41 N. C. (6 Ire. Eq.)
437 (1849); Paul v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10 (1868) ; Estate of Pierce, 177 Wis. 104, 188
N. W. 78 (1922) ; Will of Waterbury, 163 Wis. 510, 158 N. W. 340 (1916).
98 Lenden v. Blackmore, 10 Sim. 626, 59 Eng. Rep. 759 (1840) ; Palmer v. Jones,
299 Ill. 263, 132 N. E. 567 (1921) ; Blackstone v. Althouse, 278 Ill. 481, 116 N. E. 154
(1917) ; Luke v. Marshall, 5 J. J. Marsh 353 (Ky. 1831) ; Perry v. Leslie, 124 Me. 93,
126 A. 340 (1924) ; Thornton v. Roberts, 30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 473 (1879) ; Smith
v. Curtis, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutcher) 345 (1862); Ex'rs of Wintermute v. Ex'rs of
Snyder, 3 N. J. Eq. (2 H. W. Green) 489 (1836); In re Richard's Estate, 150 Misc.
102, 268 N. Y. S. 465 (1934) ; Manier v. Phelps, 15 Abb. N. C. 123 (N. Y. 1884) ;
Risk's Appeal, sub. nom. Stauffer's Estate, 52 Pa. 269 (1866); Oulton v. Kidder,
128 A. 674 (R. I. 1925); Hazard v. Stevens, 36 R. I. 90, 88 A. 80 (1913); Puryear
v. Edmondson, 51 Tenn. (4 Heisk.) 43 (1871).
99 Porter v. Fox, 6 Sim. 485, 58 Eng. Rep. 676 (1834); Newlin v. Mercantile
Trust Co. of Baltimore, 161 Md. 622, 158 A. 51 (1932).
1 Spencer v. Adams, 211 Mass. 291, 97 N. E. 743 (1912).
2 Cole v. Creyon, 10 S. C. Eq. (1 Hills Ch.) 311 (1933). There is dictum on the
point in Palmer v. Jones, 299 Ill. 263, 132 N. E. 567 (1921). The cases of In re
Myhill, 149 App. Div. 404, 134 N. Y. S. 462 (1912), and In re Walker's Estate, 39
Misc. 680, 80 N. Y. S. 653 (1903), extend the survivorship requirements to A and B.
3 Aspinwall v. Duckworth, 35 Beav. 307, 55 Eng. Rep. 914 (1866) ; Van Houten v.
Hall, 71 N. J. Eq. 626, 64 A. 460 (1906) ; Perdriau v. Wells, 26 S. C. Eq. (5 Rich.i
20 (1851).
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with have consistently chosen to follow the normal rationale of
class gifts and have ordered the class closed to afterborn members
when the time for the first distribution of principal has been
reached. Thus, if the limitation is not dependent on an intervening
life estate or other qualification, children of C born after the
testator's death, unless en ventre sa mere, will not share.4 If,
on the other hand, the limitation rests on an intervening life
estate or some other contingency, all persons born prior to that
time will be entitled to enjoy an interest in the gift. 5
Naturally, if a beneficiary is required to survive the testator
but fails to do so, there is a problem respecting lapse. Barring the
effect of an anti-lapse statute, 6 if the person predeceasing the
testator is A, the answer to the question of whether or not his
share will lapse will be made to depend on whether the gift is
one to a class or not. If the entire limitation is treated as one
to a class, the failure of A to survive the testator will not produce
a lapse for the rest of the beneficiaries will take the entire gift
in equal portions. 7 If the disposition is one to two or more classes,
4 Re Elliott, 19 Ont. W. N. 168 (1920) ; Smith v. Ashurst, 34 Ala. 208 (1859) ;
Newlin v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 161 Md. 622, 158 A. 51 (1932) ; Benson
v. Wright, 4 Md. Ch. 278 (1848) ; Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Doolan, 307
Mass. 233, 29 N. E. (2d) 844 (1940) ; Henderson v. Womack, 41 N. C. (6 Ire. Eq.)
437 (1849). In Gulp v. Lee, 109 N. C. 675, 14 S. E. 74 (1891), a child en ventre sa
mere was allowed to share.
5 Lenden v. Blackmore, 10 Sim. 626, 59 Eng. Rep. 759 (1840) ; Porter v. Fox, 6
Sim. 485, 58 Eng. Rep. 676 (1834) ; Tomb v. Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P. (2d) 320
(1941); Peoples Nat. Bk. of Greenville v. Harrison, 198 S. C. 457, 18 S. E. (2d) 1
(1941), by way of dictum; Cole v. Creyon, 10 S. C. Eq. (1 Hills Ch.) 311 (1833).
In Roper v. Roper, 58 N. 0. (5 Jones Eq.) 16 (1859), the gift was to "A, B, and the
children of C," which C "now or may hereafter have." Although a present distribution was decreed, the beneficiaries had to post a forthcoming bond for the
benefit of after-born children.
6 See generally, Cooley, "Lapse Statutes and Their Effect on Gifts to Classes,"
22 Va. L. Rev. 373 (1936).
7 Kingsbury v. Walter, [19011 A. C. 187, 84 L. T. Rep. 139; In re Moss, [1899) 2
Ch. 314; Aspinwall v. Duckworth, 35 Beav. 307, 55 Eng. Rep. 914 (1866) ; Re Stanhope's Trusts, 27 Beav. 201, 54 Eng. Rep. 78 (1859) ; Re Elliott, 19 Ont. W. N. 168
(1920) ; Smith v. Curtis, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutcher) 345 (1862) ; In re Richard's
Estate, 150 Misc. 102, 268 N. Y. S. 465 (1934) ; Manier v. Phelps, 15 Abb. N. C. 123
(N. Y. 1884) ; Hazard v. Stevens, 36 R. I. 90, 88 A. 980 (1913). See also Will of
Waterbury, 163 Wis. 510, 158 N. W. 340 (1916), where the court refused to determine whether the limitation was one to a class but held that, for purpose of lapse,
they would treat A's interest as if it were a class gift. In Burnet v. Burnet, 30
N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 595 at 599 (1879), the court stated: "The established rule is,
that where a bequest or devise is made to a certain person, and to the children of a
certain other person, the donees take per capita and not per stirpes, or as a class
each taking an equal share." The court then came to the extraordinary conclusion
that if, by some reason, a "lapse" would occur, the will was inoperative to the
extent of the failure.
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the death of A prior to the death of the donor also does not cause
a lapse.8 On the other hand, where the gift is one to individuals, 9
or to an individual and a class,'" and A predeceases the decedent,
there is a lapse in his share. The same construction will be
applicable, of course, to the instances where C dies childless"
or the child of 0 dies before the testator. It should be noted,
however, that the effect of the local anti-lapse statute may be
2
sufficient to save a beneficiary's share for his issue.1
Additional factors which arise only occasionally are, when
in issue, of tremendous importance to the litigants. None of
the cases under consideration have raised any issue regarding
taxation, but there is no doubt that the tax consequences of a
limitation of the kind in question could pose a major problem
today. Other difficulties may be noted in respect to the question
of whether or not a debtor is truly an actual beneficiary so as to
be possessed of a vested interest subject to levy 8 or one which
could be made available to an assignee.'" What, also, of the
problems which could arise because of the failure of an intervening supporting estate? Suppose, for example, a widow should
renounce the will and thereby terminate her life estate. In one
case where that very thing occurred, the court accelerated the
8 In re Myhill, 149 App. Div. 404, 134 N. Y. S. 467 (1912) ; In re Walker's Estate,
39 Misc. 680, 80 N. Y. S. 653 (1903).
9 In re Alien, sub. nom. Wilson v. Atter, 44 L. T. (N. S.) 240 (1881); In re
Chaplin's Trusts, 33 L. J. (Ch.) 183 (1863) ; Garnier v. Garnier, 265 Pa. 175, 108 A.
595 (1919). In Perry v. Leslie, 124 Me. 93, 126 A. 340 (1924), counsel conceded that
the surviving children of A were entitled to take A's share so the court found it
unnecessary to discuss the possible lapse of A's share.
1o Luke v. Marshall, 5 J. J. Marsh 353 (Ky. 1831); Henderson v. Womack, 41
N. C. (6 Ire. Eq.) 437 (1849) ; Minter's Appeal, 40 Pa. 111 (1861) ; Estate of Pierce,
177 Wis. 104, 188 N. W. 78 (1922).
11 Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 A- 479 (1935); In re Paroni's Estate, 56
Nev. 492, 56 P. (2d) 754 (1936) ; In re Turner's Will, 208 N. Y. 261, 101 N. E. 905
(1913) ; Dupont v. Hutchinson, 31 S. C. Eq. (10 Rich.) 1 (1858).
12 In re Paroni's Estate, 56 Nev. 492, 56 P. (2d) 745 (1936); Henderson v.
Womack, 41 N. C. (6 Ire. Eq.) 437 (1849); Minter's Appeal, 40 Pa. 111 (1861).
The court, in Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 (1935), indicated that had
the deceased beneficiary left issue who survived the testator the gift would have
been saved for them under the local statute.
13 Puryear v. Edmondson, 51 Tenn. (4 Heisk.) 43 (1871).
14 The assignee of A was successful in Ex'rs of Wintermute v. Ex'rs of Snyder,
3 N. J. Eq. (2 H. W. Green) 489 (1836).
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remainder and closed the class to any afterborn children of C. 15
Naturally, the specter of technical defects has also arisen. In one
case, where A served as a witness to the will, although the gift
was called one to a class, the will was held inoperative insofar
as A's share was concerned. 16 A similar problem has been found
to exist in those instances where the testator, by codicil, has
eliminated A from any provision in the will. In such a case, if the
gift is to individuals, A's share will lapse ;17 but if to a class, it
will not. 1 8 This mere enumeration of the sundry problems which
have arisen, or could arise, where a bequest or devise of the
type at issue is involved goes far to establish the necessity for
resolving the true nature of the gift. If it were not so, there
could be no adequate explanation for many an arrived-at conclusion.
In all of the decisions, it should be a matter of no small surprise that only once did the rule against perpetuities become
an issue. The English case of Porter v. Fox'19 involved an estate
which was given, by way of remainder after a life estate, "for
the benefit of his grandchildren and his nephew, Thomas Owen,
and to be distributed as each reached 25, but if any grandchild
die under 25 over to the others." It was first held that the
grandchildren constituted a class but the gift to them was void
for remoteness. The court then thought that Thomas was not
part of that class. It was of the opinion, however, that since the
share he would enjoy was made dependent on the size of the
class, his gift too was void for remoteness. The decision is in
accord with authority on class gifts and should act as a red flag
20
of caution to the draftsman.
Tomb v. Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P. (2d) 320 (1941).
Burnet v. Burnet, 30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 595 (1879).
Gamier v. Garnier, 265 Pa. 175, 108 A. 595 (1919).
Saunders v. Saunder's Admr., 109 Va. 191, 63 S. E. 410 (1909).
19 6 Sir. 485, 58 Eng. Rep. 676 (1834).
20 In general, see Leach, "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes,"
51 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1938).
15
16
17
is
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IV.

SUGGESTIONS AND CONcLUSIONS

The absence of any clear trend of decision in this area of
the law today 2 ' prompts the making of some suggestions both to
counsel and to the courts. For the attention of the former, it
might be said that the legal fraternity all too often neglects to
recognize that theorization properly lies in the ambit of prevention rather than in the effectuation of a cure. The most significant
practical aspect of the law of future interests lies not in litigation
to clarify a trust or a will but rather in the accurate draftsmanship
of such documents. Persons who study the drafting of wills should
have an interest in their subject which transcends the "unwitty
diversities" of legal technique. Nevertheless, an intensive and
protracted study of legal technique is fully warranted for it is
not simple of comprehension nor minor in consequence.
There is some cause for alarm to be derived from the knowledge that, with depressing regularity, drafters of wills either are
ignorant of or apt to overlook pitfalls, much to the subsequent
chagrin of interested persons. A predictable error is, quite often,
later condemned as having arisen out of some unintelligible
feudal dogma of the kind to be found in property law, but persons
so claiming are inclined to gloss over their own failings with the
suggestion that the law of property, and particularly the law
of future interests, teems with legal technicalities and verbal
distinctions which cannot be justified in logic nor be regarded
as predictable in operation. There is no denying that this segment
of the law is a highly elaborate field, providing a delightful head
start for the experienced tactitioner but affording almost insuperable obstacles to the general practitioner who has occasion
to probe into it only rarely. 22 It is imperative, then, that one
21 If there is any trend at all, it would appear to be one in favor of finding a
gift to be one to a single class. From that point on, the normal consequences, both
with regard to distribution and the other factors mentioned, will be those herein
noted as being inherent in a class gift. The cases are listed in Appendix B.
22 If it is solace to the practitioner who has stubbed his toe, it might be noted
that even the most eminent jurists sometimes stumble clumsily when plodding
through this very esoteric field. See, for example, the opinion of Cardozo, J., in
Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919). For the classic example of
utter confusion, see the opinions in the case of Speigal's Estate v. Commissioner,
335 U. S. 701, 69 S. Ct. 301, 93 L. Ed. 330 (1948).
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about to draft a will of more than simple form should have a
sound grounding in the theory and application of the law relating
to future interests.
Assuming even an ordinary understanding of the problems
confronting him, the nemesis of the ordinary draftsman is apt to
rest in imperspicuity. It is proverbial that clarity of expression
lies in conciseness; yet, in many instances, simplicity and terseness of phraseology is merely the product of immaturity of concept. A will free of superfluous phraseology, unassailable in tenor,
one compact yet comprehensive, is not only a thing of esthetic
satisfaction, it is also a monument to the drafter's ability. It is
a matter of no small moment that, even in ordinary usage, language is susceptible to various interpretations. A necessary corollary of this statement is that one who desires to insure that the
wording chosen will convey the meaning intended must use words
in their ordinary and accepted fashion or else must clarify his
personal usage.
Since a will is usually an attempt by one generation to indicate certain desires to a succeeding generation, it is most important that the language used in wills should rise above the
personal idiom or local colloquialisms. The competent draftsman,
therefore, will so fully and clearly set forth the testator's intention
that, regardless of when or by whom the will is read, the reader
will comprehend its full import with ease. On the other hand, the
incompetent draftsman who relies on form books and stylized language will almost inevitably misuse both, leaving his reader confused and perplexed. There is, therefore, some justification for
the attitude expressed by many that form books generally, or
the stare decisis application of particular phraseology, are evils
much to be eschewed. In that respect, let it here be noted that
it would be a poor draftsman, indeed, who would draw a bequest
or devise to "A, B, and the children of C," regardless of the
fact that such a clause has an established primary meaning in
the eyes of courts.
It should then be observed that the suggestions to be made
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respecting the nature and application of the limitation herein discussed have only a negative effect on the drafter's duties. If the
testator indicates a desire to make this sort of bequest or devise,
the draftsman, aware of the pitfalls, ought to probe further and
ascertain just what gift was in mind. It would be best to make
individual gifts to each person in whom the testator has displayed
an interest; or, if the testator insists upon a single gift to the
whole named group, the gift should be made with adequate provision requiring survivorship and against lapse. It may be that
the testator wishes to include, as potential takers, persons who
may be born after the execution of the will but prior to the time
for distribution of the estate. If this is true, it would be advisable
to make individual gifts to A and B, separate and distinct from
the one made to the children of C. By so doing, a majority of
the problems otherwise present will be eliminated. Particularly
would this be true where the testator wants the children of C, as
a unit, to take a share equal to that which either A or B is to
enjoy. On the other hand, where the intention is that A or B
are to take a no larger share than that to which each child of
C is to be entitled, and that if A, B, or any such child predeceases the testator the survivors are to enjoy his share pro rata,
the drafter ought to fully and clearly state these facts. In short,
the bequest or devise should be spelled out in detail so as (1) to
indicate whether it was intended to be a class gift or one to
individuals; (2) to delineate the survivorship requirements, if
any; and (3) to establish the type of distribution, whether per
capita or per stirpes, which was intended.
Assuming that inadequate forethought has been given by
counsel to the drafting of a will, there yet remains the disposition
which a court ought to make of a limitation of the type here under
consideration. Certainly, in so far as a court is concerned, there
is considerable desirability in establishing a uniform meaning
with respect to such gifts, a meaning which could be applied as
providing at least a prima facie construction. The establishment
of a primary meaning would go far toward easing the burdens
of a court as it could be utilized to provide the solution for several
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enigmas. It could, for example, determine the takers and the
quantum of the share to be distributable to each. It could resolve
the vexing problems apt to ensue because of a possible lapse or
by reason of the rule against perpetuities. Furthermore, the
rights of creditors, assignees, and the taxing authorities would
be clarified. There is, however, a proper inquiry which will need
resolution prior to any attempt to establish a primary meaning
and that is one as to whether or not a limitation of this nature is
one susceptible to stabilization under a canon of construction.
Common law jurists had a tendency to weave an elaborate
web of theory about their rules of construction with the ultimate
result of so over-embellishing a concept that it ceased to possess
practical value. In fact, it has not been unknown for a rule of
construction to achieve such rigidity that it has been made to
override the testator's manifest intent. This, of course, has not
happened without protest,2 3 and the inevitable reaction. Here
is the foundation for the judicial attitude that it is wholly unreasonable to attempt to use one man's blunder as a thesaurus for
aid in clarifying another person's nonsense. In the law of wills,
therefore, it has become the fashion to disregard those canons
of caution referred to as rules of construction to follow the will-o'the wisp denominated the "testator's intention."
Now it is very delightful for a judge to announce that he
will do as much as is necessary, and no more, to carry out the
intent of the testator, but often that statement merely introduces
an extended circumlocution. It goes almost without saying that,
in those instances where the testator has fully expressed a desire,
his wish should be carried out so far as it is consistent with public
policy and applicable law. If a decedent actually formulated an
intention in some respect it is hardly conceivable that he would
have failed to give adequate expression to that intention within
the body of his will. When, therefore, a judge seeks to ascertain
what a testator's intention may have been in some respect, his
23 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827), 590n, once wrote: "The
refusal to put upon the words used by a man in penning a deed or will the meaning which it is all the while acknowledged he put upon them himself, is an enormity,
an act of barefaced injustice, unknown everywhere but in English Jurisprudence."
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first query should be as to whether that decedent has given actual
consideration to the problem and has, in fact, formulated and
expressed an opinion thereon. If so, of course, all subsequent exploration of the issue must be confined to that which is contained
24
within the four corners of the document.
Unfortunately, in a large number of cases where the construction of a will is in issue before the court, the problem to be
resolved arises out of a situation not unlike the one considered
in this article, to-wit: the occurrence of a contingency which never
entered the testator's contemplation. With the rules of construction held in disrepute, there is nothing for a court to do except
hazard a guess at the testator's intention in the light of the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. It very
often happens that a judge, in the first instance, will form an
opinion as to what the decedent ought, in justice, to have done;
that is, what the judge himself would have done under the same
circumstances. Then the judge endeavors to find reasons to
establish that that which the testator "should" have done, he
has done.2
Surely this is an erroneous process. A court may
well inquire what a will says. What a court thinks the will should
say, should not possess any bearing whatever.
When a person dies intestate, although he has formulated
no express opinion respecting the devolution of his property, the
law properly presupposes that the average person, had he given
thought to the problem, would have wanted his property to devolve
in a manner compatible with the statute of descent. If this were
not true, he would have done something to indicate a contrary
intent. Why, then, should it not be considered proper, where a
24 The right to make use of extrinsic evidence as an aid in the construction of
wills is a much mooted issue. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the
methods of interpretation at length. Exposition of this fascinating subject may be
found in Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 9, § 2458 et seq.; Kales, Estate, Future Interests
and Illegal Conditions and Restraints in Illinois, 2d Ed., § 122; Wigram, Extrinsic
Evidence in the Interpretation of Wills, Sanger's 5th Ed., and Hawkins, "On the
Principles of Legal Interpretation, With Reference Especially to the Interpretation
of Wills," 2 Jur. Soc. 298, reprinted in Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence,
Appendix C.
25 For a rather candid and disarmingly frank admission of this inclination on the
part of the judiciary, see the opinion of Carr, J., in Crow v. Crow, 1 Leigh 74 at 76
(Va. 1829).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

testator has failed to form an opinion for lack of thought and
thus has made no provision for an eventuality which has occurred,
to establish flexible, if not statutory, rules in much the same
way as has been done in case of the analogous situation concerning intestate devolution?
It is probably a truism that no two persons have identical relations, friends, interests, or assets. The necessary conclusion to
be drawn from that fact is that no two testamentary dispositions
will be identical. Accepting such premise, courts quite often syllogistically reason that it would be fruitless to attempt to ascertain the nature of one man's error from the light cast by another's
confusion. The irrationality of the reasoning lies in the ignorance
of what ought to be a more widely recognized fact; namely, that
despite actual differences in estates,- interests, and so on, there
are only a comparatively few provisions, possible or probable,
which a person could frame for the disposition of his effects. The
wording employed in dispositive provisions of wills or trusts,
therefore, will tend to become repetitious when numerous documents of this character are examined. If so, what better place
is there for the application of rules of construction than to establish and clarify oft-used expressions?
Assuming that rules of construction are not an evil per se
and that they may even prove to be of value in a limited field
of inquiry, there still remains the question of whether prior
authority should have a controlling effect, for rules of construction
themselves are often no more than the direct result of recognizing
the authority of precedent. In desperation, precedent is sometimes summarily dismissed by a court to avoid its serious abuse.
Like scriptural quotes, precedent, especially when abstracted from
context, is equally applicable to the proof of concepts which may
be poles apart. It is the indiscriminate use of precedent, or the
act of forcing precedent on a court with the allegation that it is
of compelling effect, which has helped many courts to peer at
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precedent in particular, and rules of construction generally, with
a jaundiced eye.
Precedent may prove to be of questionable
value in any lawsuit. It would, however, be an intelligent thing
to do to ascertain when precedent should be deemed persuasive
and when not, and then to use it accordingly.
Where the phraseology at issue is unique, that is it is peculiar
to the context of a certain document and is unlikely to appear
in another analogous form again, the authority of prior decisions
construing the same words which were used in another vein can
hardly have any direct bearing on the present interpretive problem. It would be most improper to insist that prior texts should
have controlling effect when they bear no relationship to the text
under consideration. At the other extreme, is the case involving
the use of language of a general nature. Here again, precedent
should not be absolutely determinative, but, by way of contrast,
the citation of authority would be proper as an indication of the
weight which could be given conflicting considerations. It is not
intended to convey the implication that the better rule is necessarily to be determined by counting the number of authorities any
more than that the weight of evidence is to be established by a
counting of the witnesses. Precedent is valuable as an aid to
clarification of general terms in the sense that (1) it may be indicative of the manner in which other jurists, skilled in the art
of interpretation, have conducted themselves in analogous situations; (2) it provides a guide or standard to the emphasis attributable to relevant factors; and (3), it suggests the sundry
considerations and contentions to be disposed of in any given
situation.
There is at least one situation where precedent should be of
considerable persuasive value in the process of providing construction for general terms used in an instrument. Where certain
phrases or words have been ruled on repeatedly and have reap26 The court concerned with the case of In re Montgomery's Estate, 2 N. Y. S.
(2d) 406 at 418 (1938), after examining the canons of construction at length, noted
that several of them supported the decision and then stated: "In frankness it may
be added, however, that this interpretation would not have been varied had the
contrary been the fact."

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

peared in similar context repeatedly, then precedent ought to be
invaluable as a guide, standard, or counsel of caution for the
court. In fact, in such instances, precedent might be looked on as
a lexicon delineating a primary meaning for the constantly recurring phrase or word.
Let it be emphasized, however, that the rationale for establishing certainty of meaning respecting a gift to "A, B, and the
children of C" is not for the purpose of aiding the draftsman.
Quite the contrary, what has been said has been intended as an
aid to a court faced with an issue posed by a decedent who, in
fact, never contemplated the effect to be given to the words he
chose to use. 27 This thought is further buttressed by noting that,
in several cases, courts have chosen to rely to a certain extent on
the ability, or lack of ability, of the testator in things legal. 28
In the absence of a clear expression to the contrary, a devise
or bequest to "A, B, and the children of C" should be construed
to be a gift to a single class with distribution to be made per
27 It has been suggested that the doctrine of stare decisis, which promotes predictability, is unnecessary since the competent draftsman will fully clarify his
intent by an adequate expression of the same without relying on established legal
meanings. The careless or ignorant draftsman, on the other hand, will no doubt
misuse a word or phrase having an established legal meaning. Unfortunately, that
logic is hardly an answer for the situation which has arisen where the draftsman's
mind has not worked at all. As yet, a majority of persons are skeptical of a court's
ability to read a decedent's mind in any event, and would be outraged if a court
should purport to find an intention where the decedent's mind has never worked.
It would seem, then, that the only orderly way to resolve the dilemma, one relating
to the meaning to be given to words used in respect to situations which the draftsman did not anticipate, would be to place a meaning on such terms which a court
should accept as prima facie correct unless evidence to the contrary is educed.
28 In Billings v. Deputy, 85 Ind. App. 248, 146 N. E. 219 (1925), the only reason
given for the decision was that the obvious ignorance and lack of legal training on
the part of the testator forced the conclusion that he could have had no other
intention. In Bunner v. Storm, 1 Sandf. Ch. 357 (N. Y. 1844), the court came to a
conclusion obviously opposed to the testator's intention because his lack of legal
training had caused him to misuse his terms. A similar lack of legal training may
be noted in Carlin v. Helm, 331 Ill. 213, 162 N. E. 873 (1928), in Miller's Estate
(No. 2), 26 Pa. Super. 453 (1904), and in Oulton v. Kidder, 128 A. 674 (R. I. 1925).
Probably the most unforgivable cases in this field are those wherein the court felt
impelled to reach a conclusion because the draftsman was said to be a lawyer who
knew the law: In re Ritchard's Estate, 150 Misc. 102, 268 N. Y. S. 465 (1934) ;
Peoples Nat. Bk. of Greenville v. Harrison, 198 S. C. 457, 18 S. E. (2d) 1 (1941).
The last mentioned case is particularly interesting for the decedent was, at one
time, an associate justice of the supreme court of the state who had drafted his own
will. The court summarily dispensed with the idea that he could have had any
other meaning than the one they chose to find since he had been such an eminent
member of the bar. That may be so, but his eternal monument is the decision,
running to several pages, explaining an intention he certainly must have had, since
he knew the law so well, but which he was incapable of expressing clearly!
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capita.2 9 The ease of judicial administration alone would be sufficient reason for adopting such a construction, but other reasons
could bear slight mention. In the first instance, it is submitted
that those courts which have refused to decree per stirpes, upon
a suggested analogy to the statute of descent, are correct 0 The
fact that a decedent has drawn a will should alone be sufficient to
establish he is uninterested in having his property devolve after
the manner of intestacy. Perhaps an even more compelling reason
is to be found in the fact that a large number of the decisions
considered herein have concerned persons who, ordinarily, would
have been unable to enjoy any portion of the decedent's estate
if the laws of intestacy were truly to apply.
Secondly, the fact that A and B were named by their individual names whereas the children of C were not, can hardly be
said affirmatively to establish that either A or B was more highly
regarded than any one of the children of C. If anything, the
presumption ought to be that A and B were regarded no more
highly than such children. It seems to be inescapable logic that
where several persons have been indicated, in one fashion or
another, to share in the same fund, that no one of those persons
enjoys greater favor with the donor than any of the others. If
the converse were true, it would be difficult to conceive why such
a person was not given a gift separate and distinct from the
amalgam of the other beneficiaries.
Lastly, it is most improper to assume that merely because
there is a distinction between the relationship which A or the
children of C bear to the decedent, that the decedent would wish
them to enjoy in a direct ratio to such relationship. Aside from
the economic fact that d son may be lumped with the children of
another son for the reason that, although the testator wishes
to remember his son, the son may be financially able to the point
29 In a contrary vein, see Carey, "Per Capita and Stirpital Division in Illinois,"
35 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1941), and Long, "Class Gifts in North Carolina," 22 N. Car. L.
Rev. 297 (1944).
30 There is a valid distinction to be drawn between the desire to apply the distributive scheme of a statute of descent to a testate disposition, and the validity of
applying the same theory, one which gives rise to the necessity for a statute of
descent, to the creation of a rule of construction respecting an intestate disposition.
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where he would need a lesser amount than would the grandchildren who may have lost their prime source of support, there
is the fact that grandchildren may, in fact, be loved equally with
children by the grandparent.3 1 If this be true, and who can doubt
it, the original premise for a contrary result would bear even
less investigation in a case where A and B were no more than
friends of the decedent.
At any rate, it should have been made apparent that the
reasons for finding a limitation of the type here considered to be
one to a class are sound in character without the necessity of
placing undue reliance on either words, whims, or wile.
APPENDIX A
For the convenience of the reader, the entire list of cases dealing with
class gift problems of the type under consideration is presented at this
point in geographic arrangement by jurisdictions with internal reference
to the holding in each case. The cases marked with an asterisk (*)represent decisions wherein the court reached a decision contrary to the general
trend in the particular jurisdiction because of peculiarities in the will
requiring that result rather than because of a desire to reverse the trend.
Cases marked "per stirpes" include those wherein the gift was held to be
to individuals and to a class on a per stirpital arrangement.
cases achieved a per capita result unless specially noted.

All other

Per capita treatment has been given in Northey v. Strange,
1 P. Wm.341, 24 Eng. Rep. 416 (1716); Blackler v. Webb, 2 P. Win.
384, 24 Eng. Rep. 777 (1726); Lugar v. Harman, 1 Cox 250, 29 Eng.
Rep. 1151 (1786); Butler v. Stratton, 3 Brown C. C. 367, 29 Eng. Rep.
587 (1791); Williams v. Yates, Cooper Pr. Cas. 177, 47 Eng. Rep. 454
(1837); Lenden v. Blackmore, 10 Sim. 626, 59 Eng. Rep. 759 (1840);
Dowding v. Smith, 3 Beav. 541, 49 Eng. Rep. 213 (1841); Paine v. Wagner, 12 Sim. 184, 59 Eng. Rep. 1102 (1841); Tomlin v. Hatfield, 12 Sim.
167, 59 Eng. Rep. 1095 (1841) ; Amson v. Harris, 19 Beav. 210, 52 Eng.
ENGLAND:

Rep. 330 (1854); Tyndale v. Wilkinson, 23 Beav. 74, 53 Eng. Rep. 29

(1856); In re Chaplin's Trusts, 33 L. J. (Ch.) 183 (1863) ; In re Harper,
[1914] 1 Ch. 70; In re Cossentine, [1933] Ch. 119, 148 L. T. Rep. 261.
31 This is ancient history. In Gen., 48:5, the patriarch Jacob, speaking to his son
Joseph, said: "And now thy two sons, Ephraim and Manesseh, which were born
unto thee in the land of Egypt before I came unto thee into Egypt, are mine; as
Reuben and Simeon, they shall be mine."
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The gift has been treated to be one per capita to individuals and to a class
in Porter v. Fox, 6 Sim. 485, 58 Eng. Rep. 676 (1834), but to be per
capita to individuals in In re Allen, sub nom. Wilson v. Atter, 44 L. T.
(N. S.) 240 (1881), and per capita to a class in Re Stanhope's Trusts, 27
Beav. 201, 54 Eng. Rep. 78 (1859) ; Aspinwall v. Duckworth, 35 Beav. 307,
55 Eng. Rep. 914 (1866); In re Moss [1899] 2 Ch. 314; Kingsbury v.
Walter, [1901] A. C. 187, 84 L. T. Rep. 139; Kekewich v. Baker, 88 L. T.
(N. S.) 130 (1903), and in In re Alcock, [1945] Ch. 264, 173 L. T. Rep. 4.
Per stirpital treatment occurred in Davis v. Bennett, 4 DeG., F. & J. 327,
45 Eng. Rep. 1209 (1862); In re Prosser, [1929] W. N. 85; and *In re
Daniel, 2 All E. Rep. 101, 173 L. T. Rep. 315 (1945). The case of In re
Walbran, [1906] 1 Ch. 64, is the only one to treat the gifts as being per
stirpes among classes.
CANADA: The single Canadian case, that of Re Elliott, 19 Ont. W. N.
168 (1920), involved a gift treated as being per capita to a class.
Billinslea v. Abercrombie, 3 Ala. (2 Stew. & P.) 24 (1832),
per stirpes; Howard v. Howard's Adm'rs, 30 Ala. 391 (1857), per capita;
Smith v. Ashurst, 34 Ala. 208 (1859), and Jackson v. Baker, 207 Ala.
519, 93 So. 469 (1922), per capita to a class.
ALABAMA:

CALIFORNIA: All cases treat the gift as one per capita among individuals.

See In re Morrison's Estate, 138 Cal. 401, 71 P. 453 (1903); Estate of
Murphy, 157 Cal. 63, 106 P. 230 (1909); In re Fiske's Estate, 182 Cal.
238, 187 P. 598 (1920), and In re Rauschenplat's Estate, 212 Cal. 33,
297 P. 882 (1931).
COLORADO: The single case of McKay v. Zilar, 73 Colo. 529, 216 P. 534
(1923), found a per capita gift to a class.
CONECTICUT: The early cases of Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222 (1866),
Talcott v. Talcott, 39 Conn. 186 (1872), and Raymond v. Hillhouse, 45
Conn. 467 (1878), led to a per stirpes result. In Shannon v. Eno, 120
Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 (1935), the gift was held to be one per capita among
individuals.
DELAWARE: Kean v. Roe, 2 Harr. 103 (Dela. 1835), per capita among
individuals.
DisTRicT OF COLUMBIA: The only case in the District, that of Haas v.
Atkinson, 20 D. C. Rep. 537 (1892), found a per stirpes gift among
classes.
Martin v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat. Bk. of Ocala, 125 Fla. 65,
169 So. 582 (1930), per capita to a class.

FLORITDA:

Randolph v. Bond, 12 Ga. 363 (1853) ; Fraser v. Dillon, 78 Ga.
474, 3 S. E. 695 (1887) ; White v. Holland, 92 Ga. 216, 18 S. E. 17 (1893) ;
GEORGIA:
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and Allen v. Durham, 173 Ga. 811, 161 S. E. 608 (1931), per stirpes.
*Almand v. Whitaker, 113 Ga. 889, 39 S. E. 395 (1901), per capita.
ILLiNOIS: Per capita to a class was found in Pitney v. Brown, 44 Ill.

363 (1867), and McCartney v. Osburn, 118 Ill. 403, 8 N. E. 210 (1866),
but in Auger v. Tatham, 191 Ill. 296, 61 N. E. 77 (1901), and Blackstone
v. Althouse, 278 Ill. 481, 116 N. E. 154 (1917), the gift was treated as
being one per capita among individuals. A per stirpital division among
classes was found proper in Dollander v. Dhaemers, 297 Ill. 274, 130 N. E.
705 (1921) ; Palmer v. Jones, 299 Ill. 263, 132 N. E. 567 (1921) ; Beal v.
Higgins, 303 Ill. 370, 135 N. E. 759 (1922) ; Dahmer v. Wensler, 350 Ill.
23, 182 N. E. 799 (1932) ; Henry v. Henry, 378 Ill. 581, 39 N. E. (2d) 18
(1942) ; and Murphy v. Fox, 334 Ill. App. 7, 78 N. E. (2d) 337 (1948).
The case of *Carlin v. Helm, 331 Ill. 213, 162 N. E. 873 (1928), reached
a result of per capita to a class for special reasons.
INDIANA: Henry v. Thomas, 118 Ind. 23, 20 N. E. 519 (1889), and Billings v. Deputy, 85 Ind. App. 248, 146 N. E. 219 (1925), found a per
stirpes gift among classes. Rohrer v. Burris, 27 Ind. App. 344, 61 N. E.
202 (1901), treated the gift as per capita to a class.

Per capita to individuals, Kling v. Schnellbecker, 107 Iowa 636,
78 N. W. 673 (1899), but per stirpes among classes in In re Whittaker's
Estate, 175 Iowa 718, 157 N. W. 135 (1911), and Claude v. Schutt, 211
Iowa 117, 233 N. W. 41 (1930).
IowA:

KANsAs: Neil v. Stuart, 102 Kan. 242, 169 P. 1138 (1918), and Tomb v.
Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P. (2d) 320 (1941) : per capita to a class.
Per stirpes among classes was found in Luke v. Marshall,
5 J. J. Marsh 353 (1831) ; Lachland's Heirs v. Downing's Ex'rs, 50 Ky.
(11 B. Mon.) 32 (1850); Bethel v. Major, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 398, 68 S. W.
637 (1902); Prather v. Watson's Ex'rs, 187 Ky. 709, 220 S. W. 532
(1920); and Shackelford v. Kauffman, 263 Ky. 676, 93 S. W. (2d) 15
(1936). Per capita results were attained in Purnell v. Culbertson, 75
Ky. (12 Bush) 369 (1876); Armstrong v. Crutchfield's Ex'rs, 150 Ky.
641, 150 S. W. 835 (1912) ; and Justice v. Stringer, 160 Ky. 354, 169 S.
W. 836 (1914). See also *Kaufman v. Anderson, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 888,
104 S. W. 340 (1907), and *Conn v. Harden, 215 Ky. 307, 284 S. W.
1077 (1926).
KENTUCKY:

MAINE: Although the gift in Perry v. Leslie, 124 Me. 93, 126 A. 340
(1924), was found to be one per stirpes among classes, the case of Harris
v. Austin, 125 Me. 127, 131 A. 206 (1925), treated a similar gift as one
per capita.
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Maddox v. State to use of Swann, 4 Har. & J. 436 (Md.
1815); Benson v. Wright, 4 Md. Ch. 278 (1848) ; Brittain v. Carson, 46
Md. 186 (1876) ; Courtenay v. Courtenay, 138 Md. 205, 113 A. 717 (1921),
per capita. Newlin v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 161 Md. 622,
158 A. 51 (1932), treated the gift as one per capita among an individual
and a class. But see Plummer v. Shepherd, 94 Md. 466, 51 A. 173 (1902),
where the gift was held to be one per stirpes among classes.
MARYLAND:

Balcom v. Haynes, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 204 (1867),
per stirpes; Perkins v. Stearns, 163 Mass. 247, 39 N. E. 1016 (1895), per
stirpes among classes. Per capita results were attained in Hill v. Brown,
120 Mass. 135 (1876); Hardy v. Roach, 190 Mass. 223, 76 N. E. 720
(1906); Spencer v. Adams, 211 Mass. 291, 97 N. E. 743 (1912) ; Leslie v.
Wilder, 228 Mass. 343, 117 N. E. 342 (1917); Russel v. Welch, 237 Mass.
261, 129 N. E. 422 (1921); and in Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Doolan, 307 Mass. 233, 29 N. E. (2d) 844 (1940). But see *Agricultural
Nat'l Bk. of Pittsfield v. Miller, 316 Mass. 288, 55 N. E. (2d) 442 (1944),
for a recent per stirpital holding.
MASSACHUSETTS:

Eyer v. Beck, 70 Mich. 178, 38 N. W. 20 (1888), per stirpes;
Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N. W. 1018 (1912), per capita
to a class.
MICHIGAN:

Mississippi: Nichols v. Denny, 37 Miss. 59 (1859), and Edwards v. Kelley,
83 Miss. 144, 35 So. 418 (1903), per capita. But see *Cross v. O'Cavanagh, 198 Miss. 137, 21 So. (2d) 473 (1945), treating the gift to be
one per stirpes among classes for special reasons.
In re May's Estate, 197 Mo. App. 555, 196 S. W. 1039 (1917),
per capita.
NEVADA: In re Paroni's Estate, 56 Nev. 492, 56 P. (2d) 754 (1936), per
capita among individuals.
NEW HAMPSHIRE: Silsby v. Sawyer, 64 N. H. 580, 15 A. 601 (1886), per
stirpes.
NEW JERSEY: Roome and Dodd v. Counter, 6 N. J. L. 111, 10 Ann. Dec.
390 (1822), per stirpes. Van Houten v. Hall, 71 N. J. Eq. 626, 64 A. 460
(1906), per stirpes among classes. Ex'rs of Wintermute v. Ex'rs of
Snyder, 3 N. J. Eq. (2 H. W. Green) 489 (1836); Stokes v. Tilly, 9 N. J.
Eq. (1 Stockt.) 130 (1852) ; Bailey v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 102 A.
7 (N. J. 1917), per capita. In Smith v. Curtis, 29 N. J. L. (5 Dutcher)
345 (1862); Fisher v. Skillman's Ex'rs, 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Green)
229 (1867); Thornton v. Roberts, 30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 473 (1879);
and Burnet v. Burnet, 30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 595 (1879), the gift was
one per capita to a class.
MISSOURI:
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Nuw YORK: Per capita gifts were found in Collins v. Hoxie, 9 Paige 81
(N. Y. 1841) ; Bunner v. Storm, 1 Sand. Ch. 357 (1844) ; Myres v. Myres,
23 How. Pr. 410 (N. Y. 1862). Per stirpital results were attained in
Clark v. Lynch, 46 Barb. 68 (N. Y. 1866) ; Ferrer v. Pyne, 81 N. Y. 281
(1880); Rushmore v. Rushmore, 59 Hun. 615, 12 N. Y. S. 776 (1891);
In re Jewett's Estate, 5 Misc. 557, 25 N. Y. S. 1109 (1893) ; In re Walker's
Estate, 39 Misc. 680, 80 N. Y. S. 653 (1903); In re Slocum's Will, 94
N. Y. S. 588 (1905); In re Myhill, 149 App. Div. 404, 134 N. Y. S. 462
(1912); and in In re Diefenbacher's Estate, 165 Misc. 86, 300 N. Y. S.
370 (1937). Gifts per capita to a class were found in Lee v. Lee, 39 Barb.
172, 16 Abb. Pr. 127 (N. Y. 1863) ; Manier v. Phelps, 15 Abb. N. C. (N.
Y.) 123 (1884); In re Turner's Will, 208 N. Y. 261, 101 N. E. 905
(1913); In re Moody's Will, 122 Misc. 541, 204 N. Y. S. 391 (1924);
In re Buttner's Will, 125 Misc. 224, 210 N. Y. S. 729 (1925) ; and in In
re Richard's Estate, 150 Misc. 102, 268 N. Y. S. 465 (1934). In the case
of In re Kleeman, 61 Misc. 560, 115 N. Y. S. 982 (1908), the gift was
treated as being one per capita among individuals.
NORTH CAROLINA: Whitehurst v. Pritchard, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 383
(1810) ; Stowe v. Ward, 10 N. C. (3 Hawks) 604 (1825) ; Ward v. Stow,
17 N. C. (2 Dec. Eq.) 509 (1834); Bryant v. Scott, 21 N. C. (1 Dev. &
B. Eq.) 155 (1835); Harris v. Philpot, 40 N. C. (5 Ire. Eq.) 324 (1848) ;
Cheeves v. Bell, 54 N. C. (1 Jones Eq.) 234 (1854); Paterson v. McMasters, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 208 (1857); Harrel v. Davenport, 58
N. C. (5 Jones Eq.) 4 (1859), were cases in which the gift was treated
as being per capita. In Waller v. Forsythe, 62 N. C. (Phill. Eq.) 353
(1868); Culp v. Lee, 109 N. C. 675, 14 S. E. 74 (1891); Johnston v.
Knight, 117 N. C. 122, 23 S. E. 92 (1895), and in Tillman v. O'Briant, 220
N. C. 714, 18 S. E. (2d) 131 (1942), the gift was deemed to be one per
capita to a class. Straight per stirpital treatment was accorded in Henderson v. Womack, 41 N. C. (6 Ire. Eq.) 437 (1849) ; Biven v. Phifer, 47
N. C. 436 (1855); Pardue v. Givens, 54 N. C. (1 Jones Eq.) 307 (1854) ;
Gilliam v. Underwood, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 100 (1856), and Lockhart
v. Lockhart, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 205 (1857). Stow v. Ward, 12 N. C.
(1 Dev. L.) 67 (1826); Jourdan v. Green, 16 N. C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 270
(1828); Ricks v. Williams, 16 N. C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 10 (1826); Martin v.
Gould, 17 N. C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 305 (1832); Spivey v. Spivey, 37 N. C.
(2 Ire. Eq.) 100 (1841); and Harper v. Sudderth, 62 N. C. (Phill. Eq.)
279 (1867), treated the gift as being one per stirpes among classes. The
finding of a gift per stirpes among classes in *Roper v. Roper, 58 N. C.
(5 Jones Eq.) 16 (1859), was based on special factors.
OHio: Bruce v. Warren, 22 Ohio App. 41, 153 N. E. 273 (1926), per
capita to individuals.
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OREGON: Roelf's Cousins v. White, 75 Ore. 549, 147 P. 753 (1915), per
stirpes among classes.
PENNSYLVANIA: Although straight per stirpital treatment was given to
the gift in In re Ashburner's Estate, 159 Pa. 545, 28 A. 361 (1894), the
cases of Fissel's Appeal, 77 Pa. 55 (1856) ; Minter's Appeal, 40 Pa. St.
111 (1861) ; Risk's Appeal, sub nom. Stauffer's Estate, 52 Pa. St. 269
(1866) ; Osburn's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 637 (1883) ; In re Green's Estate,
140 Pa. 253, 21 A. 317 (1891); Miller's Estate (No. 2), 26 Pa. Super. 453
(1904); Fleck's Estate, 28 Pa. Super. 466 (1905) ; Sipe's Estate, 30 Pa.
Super. 145 (1906); and Herman's Estate, 90 Pa. Super. 512 (1927),
found the gift to be one per stirpes among classes. A per capita gift
among individuals was found in In re Penny's Estate, 159 Pa. 346, 28 A.
255 (1893) ; Garnier v. Garnier, 265 Pa. 175, 108 A. 595 (1919) ; and in
Donohoe's Estate, 282 Pa. 254, 127 A. 625 (1925). Per capita treatment
was given in Priester's Estate, 23 Pa. Super. 386 (1903).
RHODE ISLAND: In re Swinburne, 16 R. I. 208, 14 A. 850 (1888), per
stirpes. Guild v. Allen, 28 R. I. 430, 67 A. 855 (1907), and Perry v.
Brown, 34 R. I. 203, 83 A. 8 (1912), per capita. Hazard v. Stevens, 36
R. I. 90, 88 A. 980 (1913), and Oulton v. Kidder, 128 A. 674 (R. I. 1925),
per capita to a class.
SOUTH CAROLINA: Cole v. Creyon, 10 S. C. Eq. (1 Hills Ch.) 311 (1933),
and Connor v. Johnson, 11 S. C. Eq. (2 Hills Ch.) 41 (1834), per stirpes
among classes. Archer v. Munday, 17 S. C. 84 (1881), per stirpes. In
Dupont v. Hutchinson, 31 S. C. Eq. (10 Rich.) 1 (1858), the gift was per
capita, but in Perdriau v. Wells, 26 S. C. Eq. (5 Rich.) 20 (1851), it was
treated as being per capita to a class. See also *Peoples Nat. Bk. of Greenville v. Harrison, 198 S. C. 457, 18 S. E. (2d) 1 (1941).
TENNESSEE: Puryear v. Edmondson, 51 Tenn. (4 Heisk.) 43 (1871), and
Kimbro v. Johnston, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea) 78 (1885), per capita. The holding in *Farley v. Farley, 121 Tenn. 324, 115 S. W. 921 (1908), treating
the gift as per stirpes among classes, is based on special factors.
TEXAS: Paul v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10 (1868); Ladd v. Whitledge, 205 S. W.
463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), and Dubois v. House, 294 S. W. 935 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927), per stirpes among classes.
VIRGINIA: A per stirpital result was obtained in Hamlett v. Hamlett, 12
Leigh 350 (Va. 1841), and so too in *Ward v. Ottley, 166 Va. 639, 186
S. E. 25 (1936), on the special facts there involved. The case of *Hoxton
v. Griffith, 18 Gratt. 574 (Va. 1868), finding the gift to be per stirpes
among classes, is also of exceptional character. A per capita gift among
individuals was found in Crow v. Crow, 1 Leigh 74 (Va. 1829) ; McMaster
v. McMaster, 10 Gratt. 275 (Va. 1853); Whittle v. Whittle, 108 Va. 22,
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60 S. E. 748 (1908) ; Perdue v. Starkey's Heirs, 117 Va. 806, 86 S. E.
158 (1915); and in Murchison v. Wallace, 156 Va. 728, 159 S. E. 106
(1931), but in Saunders v. Saunder's Adm'r, 109 Va. 191, 63 S. E. 410
(1909), a similar gift was held to be one per capita to a class.
WEST VIRGINIA: Collins v. Feather's Ex'rs, 52 W. Va. 107, 43 S. E. 323
(1903), per stirpes.
Will of Waterbury, 163 Wis. 510, 158 N. W. 340 (1916), and
In re Asby's Wills, 232 Wis. 481, 287 N. W. 734 (1939), per capita;
Estate of Pierce, 177 Wis. 104, 188 N. W. 78 (1922), per stirpes among
classes.
WISCONSIN:

APPENDIX B
The following cases have accepted the premise that a gift to a class
is normally to be presumed in the absence of anything to the contrary:
ENGLAND: In re Alcock, (1945] Ch. 264, 173 L. T. Rep. 4; In re Cossentine, [1933] Ch. 119, 148 L. T. Rep. 261; In re Dale, [1931] 1 Ch. 357;
Kekewich v. Barker, 88 L. T. (N. S.) 130 (1903); Kingsbury v. Walter,
[1901] A. C. 187, 84 L. T. Rep. 139; In re Moss [1899] 2 Ch. 314; Aspinwall v. Duckworth, 35 Beav. 307, 55 Eng. Rep. 914 (1866) ; Re Stanhope's
Trusts, 27 Beav. 201, 54 Eng. Rep. 78 (1859) ; Tyndale v. Wilkinson, 23
Beav. 74, 53 Eng. Rep. 29 (1856) ; Amson v. Harris, 19 Beav. 210, 52 Eng.
Rep. 330 (1854); Lenden v. Blackmore, 10 Sim. 626, 59 Eng. Rep. 759
(1840) ; Butler v. Stratton, 3 Brown C. C. 367, 29 Eng. Rep. 587 (1791) ;
Lugar v. Harman, 1 Cox 250, 29 Eng. Rep. 1151 (1786) ; Blackler v. Webb,
2 P. Wm. 384, 24 Eng. Rep. 777 (1726). See also Re Elliott, 19 Ont.
W. N. 168 (1920).
Smith v. Ashurst, 34 Ala. 208 (1859) ; McKay v. Zilar,
73 Colo. 529, 216 P. 534 (1923) ; Martin v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat. Bk.
of Ocala, 125 Fla. 65, 169 So. 582 (1936) ; Almand v. Whitaker, 113 Ga. 889,
39 S. E. 395 (1901); White v. Holland, 92 Ga. 216, 18 S. E. 17 (1893) ;
Murphy v. Fox, 334 Ill. App. 7, 78 N. E. (2d) 337 (1948) ; Carlin v. Helm,
331 Ill. 213, 162 N. E. 783 (1928) ; Dollander v. Dhaemers, 297 fll. 274,
130 N. E. 705 (1921) ; Blackstone v. Althouse, 278 Ill. 481, 116 N. E. 154
(1917) ; McCartney v. Osburn, 118 Ill. 403, 9 N. E. 210 (1886) ; Tomb v.
Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P. (2d) 320 (1941); Niel v. Stuart, 102 Kan.
242, 169 P. 1138 (1918); Shackelford v. Kauffman, 263 Ky. 676, 93 S. W.
(2d) 15 (1936); Kaufman v. Anderson, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 888, 104 S. W.
340 (1907); Courtenay v. Courtenay, 138 Md. 205, 113 A. 717 (1921);
Britton v. Carson, 46 Md. 186 (1876) ; Benson v. Wright, 4 Md. Ch. 278
(1848) ; Maddox v. State for use of Swann, 4 Har. & J. 436 (Md. 1815) ;
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Doolan, 307 Mass. 233, 29 N. E. (2d)
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844 (1940) ; Leslie v. Wilder, 228 Mass. 343, 117 N. E. 342 (1917) ; Nichols
v. Denny, 37 Miss. 59 (1859) ; In re May's Estate, 197 Mo. App. 555, 196
S. W. 1039 (1917); Bailey v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 102 A. 7 (N. J.
Eq. 1917) ; Burnet v. Burnet, 30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 595 (1879) ; Thornton
v. Roberts, 30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 473 (1879) ; Fisher v. Skillman's Ex'rs,
18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Green) 229 (1867) ; Smith v. Curtis, 29 N. J. L.
(5 Dutcher) 345 (1862) ; In re Richard's Estate, 150 Misc. 102, 268 N. Y.
S. 465 (1934); In re Buttner's Will, 125 Misc. 224, 210 N. Y. S. 729
(1925), mod. in other respects 215 App. Div. 62, 213 N. Y. S. 268 (1925),
and 243 N. Y. 1, 152 N. E. 447 (1926) ; In re Moody's Will, 122 Misc.
541, 204 N. Y. S. 391 (1924) ; In re Turner's Will, 208 N. Y. 261, 101 N. E.
905 (1913) ; In re Kleeman, 61 Misc. 560, 115 N. Y. S. 982 (1908) ; Manier
v. Phelps, 15 Abb. N. C. 123 (N. Y. 1884); Lee v. Lee, 39 Barb. 172, 16
Abb. P. R. 127 (N. Y. 1863); Myres v. Myres, 23 How. Pr. 410 (N. Y.
1862) ; Bunner v. Storm, 1 Sandf. Ch. 357 (N. Y. 1844); Collins v. Hoxie,
9 Paige 81 (N. Y. 1841) ; Tillman v. O'Briant, 220 N. C. 714, 18 S. E. (2d)
131 (1942) ; Johnson v. Knight, 117 N. C. 122, 23 S. E. 92 (1895) ; Culp v.
Lee, 109 N. C. 675, 14 S. E. 74 (1891); Waller v. Forsythe, 62 N. C.
(Phill. Eq.) 353 (1868); Roper v. Roper, 58 N. C. (5 Jones Eq.) 16
(1859) ; Harrell v. Davenport, 58 N. C. (5 Jones Eq.) 4 (1859) ; Patterson
v. McMasters, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 208 (1857); Cheeves v. Bell, 54
N. C. (1 Jones Eq.) 234 (1854); Harris v. Philpot, 40 N. C. (5 Ire. Eq.)
324 (1848) ; Spivey v. Spivey, 37 N. C. (2 Ire. Eq.) 100 (1841) ; Bryant
v. Scott, 21 N. C. (1 Dev. & B. Eq.) 155 (1835); Ward v. Stow, 17 N. C.
(2 Dev. Eq.) 509 (1834); Martin v. Gould, 17 N. C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 305
(1832) ; 'Stowe v. Ward, 10 N. C. (3 Hawks) 604 (1825) ; Whitehurst v.
Pritchard, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 383 (1810); Garnier v. Garnier, 265 Pa.
175, 108 A. 595 (1919) ; In re Ashburner's Estate, 159 Pa. 545, 28 A. 361
(1894); Osburn's Appeal, 104 Pa. 637 (1883); Oulton v. Kidder, 128
A. 674 (R. I. 1925) ; Hazard v. Stevens, 36 R. I. 90, 88 A. 980 (1913) ;
Perry v. Brown, 34 R. I. 203, 83 A. 8 (1912) ; Guild v. Allen, 28 R. I.
430, 67 A. 855 (1907); Peoples Nat. Bk. of Greenville v. Harrison, 198
S. C. 457, 18 S. E. (2d) 1 (1941); Dupont v. Hutchinson, 31 S. C. Eq.
(10 Rich.) 1 (1858) ; Perdriau v. Wells, 36 S. C. Eq. (5 Rich.) 20 (1851) ;
Connor v. Johnson, 11 S. C. Eq. (2 Hills Ch.) 41 (1834) ; Cole v. Creyon,
10 S. C. Eq. (1 Hills Ch.) 311 (1833); Kimbro v. Johnston, 83 Tenn.
(15 Lea) 78 (1885); Puryear v. Edmondson, 51 Tenn. (4 Heisk.) 43
(1871) ; Saunders v. Saunder's Adm., 109 Va. 191, 63 S. E. 410 (1909) ;
Collins v. Feather's Ex'rs, 52 W. Va. 107, 43 S. E. 323 (1903) ; In re
Asby's Will, 232 Wis. 481, 287 N. W. 734 (1939).
Textual emphasis on the point appears in Hawkins, Construction of
Wills, 3d Ed., 1925, p. 148; Jarman, Wills, 7th Eng. Ed., 1930, Vol. 3,
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p. 1687; Page, Wills, 3d Ed., 1941, Vol. 3, § 1083, Simes, Future Interests,
Vol. 2, § 431; Underhill, Wills, Vol. 2, § 561; Woerner, Administration,
3d Ed., 1923, Vol. 3, § 422. See also Restatement, Property, Vol. 3, § 284,
and annotations in 16 A. L. R. 15; 31 A. L. R. 804; 78 A. L. R. 1385; 126
A. L. R. 157, and 28 R. C. L., Wills, § 242.

APPENDIX C
Judicial uncertainty as to the precise nature of the gift, displayed in
the following cases, was resolved in favor of a per capita method of distribution:
In re Cossentine, [1933] Ch. 119, 148 L. T. Rep. 261; In re
Harper, [1914] 1 Ch. 70; Tyndale v. Wilkinson, 23 Beav. 74, 53 Eng.
Rep. 29 (1856) ; Amson v. Harris, 19 Beav. 210, 52 Eng. Rep. 330 (1854) ;
Paine v. Wagner, 12 Sim. 184, 59 Eng. Rep. 1102 (1841); Dowding v.
Smith, 3 Beav. 541, 49 Eng. Rep. 213 (1841); Lenden v. Blackmore, 10
Sim. 626, 59 Eng. Rep. 759 (1840); Williams v. Yates, Cooper Pr. Cas.
177, 47 Eng. Rep. 454 (1837) ; Butler v. Stratton, 3 Brown C. C. 367, 29
Eng. Rep. 587 (1791) ; Lugar v. Harman, 1 Cox 250, 29 Eng. Rep. 1151
(1786); Blackler v. Webb, 2 P. Wm. 383, 24 Eng. Rep. 777 (1726);
Northey v. Strange, 1 P. Wm. 341, 24 Eng. Rep. 416 (1716).
ENGLAND:

Jackson v. Baker, 207 Ala. 519, 93 So. 469 (1922) ; Smith
v. Ashurst, 34 Ala. 208 (1859); Howard v. Howard's Adm'rs, 30 Ala.
391 (1857) ; Almand v. Whitaker, 113 Ga. 889, 39 S. E. 395 (1901) ; Conn
v. Hardin, 215 Ky. 307, 284 S. W. 1077 (1926) ; Justice v. Stringer, 160
Ky. 354, 169 S. W. 836 (1914); Armstrong v. Crutehfield's Ex'rs, 150
Ky. 641, 150 S. W. 835 (1912); Kaufman v. Anderson, 31 Ky. L. Rep.
888, 104 S. W. 340 (1907); Harris v. Austin, 125 Me. 127, 131 A. 206
(1925) ; Courtenay v. Courtenay, 138 Md. 204, 113 A. 717 (1921) ; Brittain
v. Carson, 46 Md. 186 (1876) ; Maddox v. State for use of Swann, 4 Har.
& J. 436 (Md. 1815); Spencer v. Adams, 211 Mass. 291, 97 N. E. 743
(1912); Hardy v. Roach, 190 Mass. 223, 76 N. E. 720 (1906); Hill v.
Brown, 120 Mass. 135 (1876); Nichols v. Denny, 37 Miss. 59 (1859);
Bailey v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 102 A. 7 (N. J. Eq. 1917) ; Thornton
v. Roberts, 30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 473 (1879); Fisher v. Skillman's Ex'rs,
18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Green) 229 (1867); Stokes v. Tilly, 9 N. J. Eq.
(1 Stockt.) 130 (1852) ; In re Moody's Will, 122 Misc. 541, 204 N. Y. S.
391 (1924); Myres v. Myres, 23 How. Pr. 410 (N. Y. 1862) ; Collins v.
Hoxie, 9 Paige 81 (N. Y. 1841); Johnston v. Knight, 117 N. C. 122, 23
S. E. 92 (1895) ; Waller v. Forsythe, 62 N. C. (Phill. Eq.) 353 (1868) ;
Harrell v. Davenport, 58 N. C. (5 Jones Eq.) 4 (1859); Patterson v.
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McMasters, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 208 (1857) ; Harris v. Philpot, 40 N. C.
(5 Ire. Eq.) 324 (1848) ; Whitehurst v. Pritchard, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 383
(1810) ; Bruce v. Warren, 22 Ohio App. 41, 153 N. E. 273 (1926) ; Priester's Estate, 23 Pa. Super. 386 (1903) ; Perry v. Brown, 34 R. I. 203, 83
A. 8 (1912) ; Guild v. Allen, 28 R. I. 430, 67 A. 855 (1907); Dupont v.
Hutchinson, 31 S. C. Eq. (10 Rich.) 1 (1858); Puryear v. Edmondson,
51 Tenn. (4 Heisk.) 43 (1871); Collins v. Feather's Ex'rs, 52 W. Va.
107, 43 S. E. 323 (1903) ; In re Asby's Will, 232 Wis. 481, 287 N. W. 734
(1939) ; Will of Waterbury, 163 Wis. 510, 158 N. W. 340 (1916).
APPENDIX D
In the absence of special factors, or a finding directed to that end,
the per stirpital method of distribution was selected for application in the
following cases:
Billinslea v. Abercrombie, 3 Ala. (2 Stew. & P.) 24 (1832) ; Raymond v.
Hillhouse, 45 Conn. 467 (1878) ; Talcott v. Talcott, 39 Conn. 186 (1872) ;
Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222 (1866) ; Allen v. Durham, 173 Ga. 811, 161
S. W. 608 (1931); White v. Holland, 92 Ga. 216, 18 S. E. 17 (1893);
Fraser v. Dillon, 78 Ga. 474, 3 S. E. 695 (1887) ; Randolph v. Bond, 12
Ga. 362 (1852) ; Murphy v. Fox, 334 Ill. App. 7, 78 N. E. (2d) 337 (1948) ;
Billings v. Deputy, 85 Ind. App. 248, 146 N. E. 219 (1925) ; Eyer v. Beck,
70 Mich. 179, 38 N. W. 20 (1888); Silsby v. Sawyer, 64 N. H. 580, 15 A.
601 (1886) ; Roome and Dodd v. Counter, 6 N. J. L. 111, 10 Ann. Dec. 390
(1822) ; In re Diefenbacher's Estate, 165 Misc. 86, 300 N. Y. S. 370
(1937); In re Slocum's Will, 94 N. Y. S. 588 (1905); In re Jewett's
Estate, 5 Misc. 557, 25 N. Y. S. 1109 (1893) ; Ferrer v. Pyne, 81 N. Y.
281 (1880) ; Harper v. Sudderth, 62 N. C. (Phill. Eq.) 279 (1867); Pardue v. Givens, 54 N. C. (1 Jones Eq.) 307 (1854); Bivens v. Phifer, 47
N. C. 436 (1855) ; Ricks v. Williams, 16 N. C.. (1 Dev. Eq.) 10 (1826) ;
Stow v. Ward, 12 N. C. (1 Dev. L.) 67 (1826) ; In re Green's Estate,
140 Pa. 253, 21 A. 317 (1891) ; Minter's Appeal, 40 Pa. 111 (1861) ; In re
Swinburne, 16 R. I. 208, 14 A. 850 (1888); Archer v. Munday, 17 S. C.
84 (1881) ; Ward v. Ottley, 166 Va. 639, 186. S. E. 25 (1936) ; Hamlett v.
Hamlett, 12 Leigh 350 (Va. 1841) ; Estate of Pierce, 177 Wis. 104, 188
N. W. 78 (1922). See also In re Daniel, 2 All E. R. 101, 173 L. T. Rep.
315 (1945) ; In re Prosser, [1929] W. N. 85.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE PROPOSED ILLINOIS JuDiciAL ARTICLE

At a time when the population of Illinois totalled less than 55,000,
the framers of the first state constitution drafted a judicial article which
vested the judicial power of the state in a supreme court composed of a
chief justice and three associates, which judges were to be selected by the
legislature and were to serve during good behavior.' The framers left the
duty of providing all necessary inferior nisi prius courts to the general
assembly which was also directed to appoint a "competent number of
justices of the peace" to serve in each county. 2 The judicial department
thus fabricated to serve the frontier conditions which then prevailed
proved adequate, particularly since the new constitution authorized an
increase in the number of reviewing judges whenever conditions should so
require.' Such local problems as did arise were met, from time to time,
by legislative exercise of the reserved power to create inferior tribunals
4
when and where needed.
Within the next thirty years, however, the population of the state
increased some sixteen fold.5 For that matter, the political complexion of
both the state and the nation had also changed. Those who drafted the
1848 constitution, therefore, responding to the new conditions, fixed a
revised judicial department upon the state which embodied ideas that
dominate the political scene today. Broadly speaking, the principal
change produced by the second constitution came with the introduction of
the concept of popular election for all state as well as for many local
officials. Members of the judiciary were to be selected in the same manner
and were to serve for stated terms.' Other factors operated to produce a
reduction in the size of the supreme court. 7 It was limited to three mem1 Ill. Const. 1818, Art. IV, §§ 1, 3, and 4.

2 Ibid., §§ 1 and 8.
3 Ibid., § 3.

4 The legislature, for example, created courts of county commissioners by Act
of March 22, 1819; established probate courts under Laws 1828, p. 37; created
an extra circuit court for the area north of the Illinois River by Laws 1828, p. 38;
set up a municipal court for Chicago under Laws 1837, p. 75; a mayor's court
for Springfield by Laws 1839, p. 12, § 8; a county court for Cook County, and for
other counties, pursuant to Laws 1845, pp. 74 and 275; as well as produced a
substantial revision, including an increase in the size of the supreme court, through
the medium of Laws 1841, p. 173.
5 Encyclo. Americana, Vol. 14, p. 682, gives the 1820 census as 55,211 and the
1850 census as 851,470.
6 Ill. Const. 1848, Art. V, §§ 3, 7 and 17. See also Verlie, Illinois Constitutions
(Ill. State Hist. Coll., Springfield, 1919), Vol. XIII, p. xxiii.
7Verlie, op. cit., p. xxiii, cites an early instance of state supreme court packing for political purposes.
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bers whose individual salaries were set at $1,200 per year with the proviso
that the judges should be ineligible for other public office for the space of
one year after their terms had expired.
Actually, the overall size of the judiciary was increased for the 1848
constitution established a series of circuit courts to sit in some nine designated judicial circuits conducting at least two terms each year and empowered to exercise original jurisdiction "in all cases at law and equity"
and in cases of "appeals from all inferior courts." 8 These courts were
staffed by elected circuit judges chosen for a six-year term and paid the
constitutionally limited wage of $1,000 per annum. 9 In addition, county
courts were authorized for each county, also to be staffed by elected judges
to be chosen locally for a four-year term of office. These courts were to
deal with probate matters, such civil jurisdiction as the legislature might
prescribe, and to handle those criminal cases which the legislature might
designate so long as the punishment was by fine only, and then not to
exceed one hundred dollars.' 0 Other concepts, such as one calling for the
use of the staggered term," another prescribing qualifications for judicial
office, 12 and a third setting a date for judicial elections independent of the
one used for the election of other state officials, 13 were then introduced and
still prevail.
Again, the constitutional system so devised could have proved to be an
excellent one, at least for the times, but its framers erred in failing to look
far enough into the future. Scarcely a decade later, the population had
doubled and, with the advent of the Civil War, industrial and social change
progressed amazingly. Inflationary trends turned fixed salaries, especially
those fixed at a parsimonious level, into a source of extreme hardship.
Abortive attempts, in 1862, to secure constitutional revision failed because
of partisan influences,' 4 but the failure merely served to emphasize the
objectionable features of the 1848 system. As the population grew,' 5 and
the volume of business increased, the flood of litigation swelled to almost
overwhelming proportions but the general assembly could, constitutionally,
do nothing to increase the number of courts nor add needed members to
the staff of the three-man supreme court.
Ill. Const. 1848, Art. V,
9 Ibid., § 10.
8

§§ 7 and 8.

Ibid., §§ 16, 17 and 18.
11 Ibid., § 4. The section also served to develop the concept that the judge with
10

the oldest commission should act as chief justice of the supreme court.
12 Ibid., § 11.
13 Ibid., § 13-15.
14 See King, Melville Weston Fuller--Chief Justice of the United States 18881910 (Macmillan Company, New York, 1950), pp. 48-52.
15 It stood at 2,539,891 in the 1870 census: Encyclo. Americana, Vol. 14, p. 682-
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By 1870, with the adoption of the present constitution, some degree
of relief was attained, but the solution then devised amounted to little
more than an increase in the number of courts and in the size of the
judiciary, for the integral structure of the judicial department, fashioned
under the 1848 constitution, remained about the same. True, intermediate
appellate courts were authorized, 16 probate courts were to be set up in certain counties, i" police magistrates were added at the lower level, i8 and Cook
County was split off as a single circuit with its own judicial scheme, 19 but
this meant little more than an internal parcelling out of the judicial function into smaller units and among more hands without furnishing any true
revision. The vice of the elective system was retained under pressure for
more, and ever more, popular control of government.
In the years since 1870, there has been little chance to revise the state
constitution and only a few amendments have been made to it. Nevertheless, as early as 1893, there was a feeling developing that a thorough reexamination of the judicial articles was especially imperative. 20 When it
became apparent that it was hopeless to expect any substantial degree of
revision, energy was directed toward the securing of the passage of single
changes. The complexity produced by attempting to govern a city as large
as Chicago had come to be by the turn of the century generated the "Home
Rule" amendment of 1904. It led to the creation of the Municipal Court
22
of Chicago,21 which in turn became the model for other municipal courts,
but beyond this there has been no substantial change in the form of the
judicial department of the state since it received its shape over one hundred years ago.

23

At the present time, the judicial organization is composed of one
supreme court staffed by seven men; four appellate courts, one of which is
divided internally into three divisions; a series of circuit courts arranged
in some seventeen circuits extending throughout the state exclusive of
Cook County, presided over by some fifty-five circuit judges; twenty-eight
city courts located in as many strategic cities of substantial size; one hundred and two county courts, each staffed by a single judge; thirteen probate courts; and an untold number of justices of the peace and police
16 Il. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 11.
17 Ibid., § 20.
18 Ibid., § 21.

19 Ibid., §§ 23 and 26.
20 See Verlie, op. cit., p. xxxi.
21 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 34.
22

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 442 et seq., represents an exercise, by

the legislature, of the power to create courts "in and for cities and incorporated
towns" given by Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 1.
23 In the meantime, the population has expanded from the 851,470 of the 1850
census to a figure of around 8,750,000 in 1950.
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magistrates. 24 In addition, Cook County is served by a circuit court composed of twenty judges and a superior court, possessing concurrent jurisdiction, with a staff of twenty-eight, some of which judges serve in the
Criminal Court of Cook County or in the Family Court branch of the
Circuit Court. There is also a Municipal Court of Chicago, possessed of
thirty-six associate judges and a chief justice, and the nearby suburb of
Evanston has its municipal court presided over by two judges.
Naturally, with such a wide distribution of judicial power among so
many judges, with an attendant overlapping of jurisdiction in many instances among the trial courts, but with no efficient way of making the
parts work in harmony with or supplement one another, the cry has again
arisen for a true revision of at least this one aspect of the state constitution. Bar association committees, heretofore working independently, have
now been merged into a Joint Committee of the Illinois State and Chicago
Bar Associations.2 5 That group, after extended executive sessions lasting
many days, has now reported its proposed draft of a new judicial article
to replace present Article VI of the 1870 Constitution. The draft has received the approval of the managing boards of the two professional associations, is presently being discussed in conferences sponsored by the law
schools located within the state,, and will probably be submitted for legislative action at the next session of the General Assembly.
Before that time, every lawyer and law student in the state should
become familiar with its provisions and formulate his own opinion as to
the wisdom and the legality of the proposal. The practicing lawyer has,
from his experience at the bar, already formed an impression as to the
need and desirability for change. In the interest of wholesome development in the fundamental law of the state, it is planned, in subsequent
issues, to provide an explanation of, and appropriate comment on, the
sections of the proposed judicial article and its accompanying schedule. 26
W.

F.

ZACHARIAS

MODERNIZING THE LAW OiF PERPErUITIES

Mastery over the rule against perpetuities as a mathematical proposition represents only a beginning for the draftsman of complicated wills
and trusts. The creation of interests which will be absolutely certain not
24
25

See Directory of the Judiciary Department, 344 Ill. App. ill, et seq.
Announcement of the formation of the joint committee appears in 39 Il1. B. J.

625.
26The schedule, designed to integrate the revision Into the existing judicial
organization without causing too much disruption, is reserved for publication at
a later time. Persons desiring copies of the full text of the proposed article and
the schedule should communicate with Mr. Barnabas F. Sears, Chairman of the
joint committee, 111 Downer Street, Aurora, Illinois, or Professor Rubin G. Cohn,
Secretary, College of Law, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.
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to violate the mathematical confines of the rule yet which will serve the
purposes of his client offers an additional task requiring a general consciousness of perpetuities and their pitfalls.' As the rule demands absolute certainty that interests created must vest, if at all, within the stated
period, 2 that certainty is actually a theoretical one which must be established at the time the instrument is to take effect. Even though events
which transpire do, in actuality, justify an assumption that the unlikely
will not occur, i. e. that the gift will not vest beyond the period of perpetuities, nevertheless, it is an axiom of perpetuities law that probabilities
are not to be considered, 3 even in cases where vesting in fact occurs within
the time allowed.4 The policy of the rule, one favoring certainty of title,
is not open to challenge, but it deserves re-examination when applied to
certain "hard" cases, for the principle of absolute certainty has been
rigorously applied in cases where the facts were such that they all but
5
compelled a vesting within the required period.
1 Carey and Schuyler, Illinois Law of Future Interests (Burdette Smith Co.,
Chicago, 1941), § 472, pp. 580-1.
2 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1942), 4th Ed.,
§§ 201 and 214. The necessity for this certainty is emphasized by Gray's wellknown statement of the rule, appearing in § 201, that no "interest is good unless
it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest."
3 Gray, op. cit., § 214. For a criticism of the "might-have-been rule," see Leach,
"Perpetuities in Perspective," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952), particularly pp. 728,
747.
4 This almost universally applied common law principle was reversed in Pennsylvania by the passage of the Estates Act of 1947, Pa. Laws 1947, Act. No. 39.
Section 4 thereof provides, in part, that upon "the expiration of the period allowed
by the common law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than
possible events, any interest not then vested and any interest in members of a
class the membership of which is then subject to increase shall be void . .
The committee which sponsored this act commented that the provision in question
was "intended to disturb the common law rule as little as possible, but to make
actualities at the end of the period, rather than possibilities as of the creation
of the interest, govern, and to provide a more equitable disposition of void gifts.
By regarding actualities at the end of the period, the unrealistic results based on
purely theoretical possibilities are avoided. The possibility test seems peculiarly
inappropriate in most Pennsylvania cases because by the time the courts do decide
upon the validity of the remainders, possibilities have become actualities. This
results because (1) the modern tendency is to uphold valid life estates even
though the ultimate remainder seems obviously void, and (2) the court refuses
to decide on the validity of future estates until the termination of the valid life
estate. See Quigley's Est., 198 A. 85, 329 Pa. 281, on both points." Purdon's Pa.
State. Ann., Title 20, § 301.4(b), and comment thereon at p. 475.
See also
comment in 48 Mich. L. Rev. 1158 (1950), particularly p. 1166.
5 Thus a gift to such of a woman's children who shall reach the age of twentyfive would be too remote, even though the named woman be then eighty years
old. The possibility that she may have more children prevents the use of the
lives of existing children as the measuring rod and, although medical science
recognizes that birth of more children to such a person would be a physical impossibility, yet the law conclusively presumes that a possibility exists: Jee v.
Audley, 1 Cox 324 (Ch. 1787).
This principle has been accepted in Illinois:
Kane v. Schofield, 332 Ill. App. 505 at 522, 76 N. E. (2d) 216 at 224 (1947).
See
also Gray, op. cit., § 215, and annotation in 146 A. L. R. 794 (1943).
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The principle in question, one proclaiming that a possibility of vesting within the period will not suffice, was nicely illustrated some years ago
by the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Johnson v. Preston.6 The
testator there gave certain lands to his executor, to have and to hold for a
term of years "from and after the date of the probate of this will."
It
was held that the gift to the executor was void for remoteness as it might
not vest, i. e. the will might not be probated, within the period of the
perpetuities rule. That view was later affirmed in Ryan v. Beshk 7 where
property was given in remainder to four named persons if living at the
time of distribution, but if any should die before that time, the share of
the one so dying should go "to his or her executor or administrator to be
applied" as if such decedent had owned the property. It was held that,
all remainders being contingent, the gifts over to the personal representatives were too remote.
Although these cases may be said to be technically correct, they may
be criticized. It is possible that a will may not be probated until a remote
time s but violation of the rule is so unlikely that the requirement of
prospective certainty will operate harshly in such case. Especially in
Illinois will this type of violation be unusual, for the Illinois Probate Act
has been framed so as to promote the speedy settlement of decedent's
estates. 9 The lack of cases of the type mentioned may indicate that the
Johnson and Ryan decisions have operated to teach the lesson and, until
1948, the avoidance of this particular pitfall does not appear to have
caused any undue warping of estate plans.
With the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1948, however, alert lawyers soon pointed out that a bequest or devise in trust to an estate could
6 226 Ill. 447, 80 N. E. 1001 (1907).
7 339 Ill. 45, 170 N. E. 699 (1930).
There is, however, authority to the contrary for in Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 A. 585 (1893), the court held a
gift to vest fourteen years after settlement of the testator's estate to be valid.
In view of the executor's fiduciary duty to settle the estate promptly, the court
found that the time of administration could not last for so long as seven years
after the testator's decease.
8 Gray, op. cit., § 214.3, note 1, cites a case where the will was not proved for
sixty-three years.
9 Under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 212, a person having possession of
the will must deliver it to the clerk of the probate court immediately upon death
of the testator and the court is empowered to compel production of the will on its
own motion. The destruction or secreting of a will is made a criminal offense by
Section 213. The executor, according to Section 214, has a duty to institute
proceedings for probate of the will within 30 days after he has been notified of
his appointment. His failure to file an inventory within the required period fixed
by Section 323, or to make proper accounting, is not only ground for his removal
under Section 430(g) but may justify commitment to jail pursuant to Section 457.
In addition, one who, without good cause, fails to close an estate within two
years after issuance of letters to him is charged, according to Section 462, with
interest at ten per cent. per anum on the fair market value of all personal estate
which has come into his control. It might be noted that counterparts of these
provisions were in force when the case of Johnson v. Preston was decided.
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be a useful device in qualifying the gift for a "marital deduction" permitted in connection with the federal estate tax. 10 The validity of such a
bequest or devise has, therefore, assumed new importance. While the
law allows a deduction of that property included in the gross estate which
passes to the surviving spouse, at least to the extent of one-half of the
"adjusted gross estate,"11 a disposition which passes only a life interest
or a "terminable" interest to the spouse will not qualify for the deduction. 12 On the other hand, a gift in trust for the benefit of the surviving
spouse for life, with power in the life-tenant beneficiary to appoint to
herself, or to her estate, will qualify.' 3 If, as has been pointed out, such
an appointment would be held to be a nullity under local perpetuities
law, 14 the total gift to the spouse would then constitute no more than a life
estate or other "terminable" interest, 15 hence would be inadequate for
purpose of the deduction. Until recently, then, before a draftsman could
qualify such a gift for the marital deduction, it was necessary for him to
draft a provision which would comply both with the rule against perpetuities and with the provisions of the federal estate tax law.
The hitherto relatively dormant decisions in the Johnson and Ryan
cases have, therefore, suddenly been projected into the limelight, for the
doctrine there laid down could affect many a testamentary gift planned
by one who wished to give a limited interest to the surviving spouse for
life but who also desired to take advantage of the marital deduction.
What had, previously, been only an occasional inconvenience, now assumes
the proportions of a regular addition to the burdens laid on the draftsman.
Fortunately, for Illinois, the potential size of the problem induced
the legislature, at its last session, to enact a bill which is now listed as
Section 153a of the Conveyances Act. It declares that the "vesting of
any limitation of property, whether created in the exercise of a power of
appointment or in any other manner, shall not be regarded as deferred
for purposes of the rule against perpetuities merely because the limitation
is made to the estate of a person or to a personal representative, or to a
trustee under a will, or to take effect on the probate of a will. The provisions of the Act shall apply only to limitations created after the effective
10 See Casner, "Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948--The Regulations," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 99 (1949), particularly pp. 101-2.
1126 U. S. C. A., § 812(e) (1) (A), and § 812(e) (1) (H).
12 Ibid., § 812(e) (1) (B).
13 Ibid., § 812(e) (1)(F). A "non-appointive" trust may also qualify for the
marital deductions: Reg. 105, § 81.47a (b) (2). See generally, Lasser, Estate Tax
Handbook (Matthew Bender Co., Albany, New York, 1951), pp. 602 and 617.
14 See notes 6 and 7, ante.
15 Casner, "Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948-The Regulations,"
63 Harv. L. Rev. 99 (1949), particularly pp. 101-2.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

date hereof.' 16 It is the gist of the new section that the mere theoretical
possibility of too-remote vesting should not serve to invalidate the planned
disposition of an estate, but the statute should not be read in too broad a
fashion. The words indicating that the vesting should not be regarded as
deferred "merely because the limitation is made to the estate of a person,"
would also support the negative inference that other events could cause the
vesting to be regarded as a tardy one. In the absence of such events,
however, there is no room for judicial discretion for the statute is expressed in the form of a command.
One relying on the new statute should note that the four kinds of disposition mentioned are really no more than formal variations of the same
thing, i. e. a gift to the estate of a person. Being of limited scope, in that
it withholds the common law requirement of advance theoretical certainty
of vesting in the one specialized case, the statute does not specifically
lengthen the period of perpetuities. The language thereof might serve,
however, to support the inference that the answer to the question as to
whether or not the common law period of perpetuities has been exceeded
is to be ascertained retrospectively, as a matter of fact, 17 rather than
prospectively as a matter of theory.' 8
It should also be noted that the basic policy of the rule against perpetuities, one designed to prevent the tying up of property for too long a
time after the donor's death, is not seriously compromised, if it is compromised at all. In the case of a grant to "A for life with remainder to
such person, including A's personal representatives, as A shall by will
appoint," there is the admitted possibility that the estate might not be
settled, nor letters taken out, for more than twenty-one years after A's
death. In such event, an appointment to A's personal representative would,
when read back into the instrument creating the power, admittedly violate
the common law rule as applied in the Johnson and Ryan cases. Under the
new statute, however, the appointed interest will not be regarded as deferred and void merely because of the form of the limitation. Although
title may, under the statute, remain uncertain and unmarketable for the
period of perpetuities, since vesting will be contingent upon settlement of
A's estate, nevertheless this delay in vesting is clearly within the policy
of the rule. It is further apparent, under Illinois law,19 that the uncer16 I1.
Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 153a. The legislation was drafted and
proposed by the Committee on Trust Law, Chicago Bar Association, of which
Daniel M. Schuyler was chairman.
17 The broader provision to be found in Pennsylvania, note 4 ante, is specific on
the point.
18 Constitutional problems relating to retroactive application of statutes concerning property have been avoided by making the Illinois provision apply solely
to limitations created after the effective date of the new statute.
19 See note 9. anto
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tainty may be readily dispelled by persons interested in the title, for the
Probate Act provides that any person may petition to have the will probated. 21 If the statute be construed to permit a limitation which in fact
vests at a time more remote than the period of perpetuities, then the policy
of the rule is somewhat compromised; but such cases would be extremely
rare.
On the whole, it would seem that, except to those who might wish to
cling to outworn "landmarks of the law" merely for the sake of perpetuating the lore with which they are familiar, the new statute provides a
great convenience for those engaged in the drafting of marital deduction
trusts. It offers a convenience, in fact, which, regardless of any subsequent change in the tax law which stimulated its adoption, should continue
to be a useful and reasonable provision entirely consistent with the general
policy of the law relating to perpetuities.
R. K. LARSON

20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 215.
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAw-FORMER JEOPARDY-WHETHEtR WITHDRAWAL OF THE
SUBMISSION AND FURTHER INTERROGATION OF A JUROR AS TO
CATIONS CONSTITUTES A. BAR TO SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION

His

QUALIFIWHEN THE

SAME JUROR. Is AGAIN IMPANELED AND SWORN-In the recent case of
Maddox v. State,' the Supreme Court of Indiana was asked to adjudicate
upon the validity of a plea of former jeopardy filed by the defendant after
a juror, who had been re-interrogated as to his competency following a
withdrawal of the submission of the cause to the jury, was re-impaneled
'-Ind.-,

102 N. E.

(2d) 225 (1951).

Draper, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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and the jury again sworn. It appeared therein that, after the' jury had
been impaneled and sworn and the prosecuting attorney had begun his
opening address, one of the jurors indicated to the court his reluctance to
continue by reason of his newly-discovered relationship to one of the
defendants. Upon inquiry, counsel for the defense stated he neither
waived nor committed himself at that time with regard to the juror's
revelation. However, when the prosecuting attorney, by court instruction,
proceeded with his opening statement, counsel for the defense objected
that the defendant could not have a fair and impartial trial. The court
then, upon the prosecuting attorney's motion and over the defense objection, allowed the withdrawal of the submission of the cause "for the sole
. purpose of determining the qualifications of the said juror to
serve. "2 The juror was then found to be satisfactory to the prosecuting
attorney, although no questions were asked of him by either party, and
the jury was again sworn. Defendant thereupon filed an affirmative plea
of double jeopardy, to which the prosecution filed a reply. The trial
proceeded, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and judgment being
entered thereupon, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. That
court, one judge dissenting, reversed the judgment with instruction to
sustain the plea and discharge the defendant from further prosecution.
It held that jeopardy attached when the jury was impaneled and sworn,3
so that if, thereafter, the jury was discharged without the defendant's
consent and in the absence of legal necessity for so doing, the defendant
could not again be placed in jeopardy for the same offence. 4 That result
was said to be dictated by the fact that the submission had been withdrawn without the defendant's consent and without legal necessity, for the
juror in question was not further examined but was immediately re-accepted without other questioning.
The majority opinion proceeded upon the theory that it was too
late, after the jury had been accepted and sworn to try the cause, to
examine the jurors further as to their competency, or to peremptorily
challenge any of them, unless a motion to set aside the submission was
first interposed. 5 As a cause is to be submitted to a jury as a whole, it
would obviously be necessary to set the submission aside before re-exInd. - at -, 102 N. E. (2d) 225 at 227.
People v. Watson, 394 Ill. 177, 68 N. E. (2d) 265 (1946), cert. den. 329 U. S.
769, 67 S. Ct. 130, 91 L. Ed. 662 (1946); Armentrout v. State, 214 Ind. 273, 15
N. R. (2d) 363 (1938). In general, see 22 0. J. S., Criminal Law, § 241, p. 375.
4 The general rule, as stated in 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 258, p. 394, is that
. . . if the jury are discharged without accused's consent for a reason legally
insufficient and without an absolute necessity for it, the discharge Is equivalent
to an acquittal, and may be pleaded as a bar to a subsequent indictment." See
also People v. Simos, 345 Ill. 226, 178 N. E. 188 (1931).
5 Kurtz v. State, 145 Ind. 119, 42 N. E. 1102 (1896).
2-
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amining any juror as to his qualifications in order that the jury would be
in the same condition it was before being sworn to serve as a jury. The
defendant's original objection was, therefore, improper and his failure to
request a withdrawal of the submission might well have operated to waive
his objection.6 When it appeared, however, that there was no legal necessity for the discharge of the jury and the discharge was produced over his
specific objection, 7 the court reasoned that the defendant had been exposed
to jeopardy before the submission was withdrawn, hence was entitled to
the benefit of his plea.
In considering any case wherein a jury has been impaneled and sworn
and a juror is thereafter withdrawn and another substituted,8 two classes
of cases may be immediately eliminated; those where the incompetence of
the juror is such as to render the verdict a nullity,9 and those cases where,
by legislative fiat, the court is allowed to substitute a juror without reference to a withdrawal of the submission of the cause, 10 or where it has
been provided that challenges, both for cause and peremptory, may be
taken after the jury has been impaneled and sworn."
An investigation of the instant problem discloses that the only extensive treatment thereof has been made by the Supreme Court of Indiana.
6 This would undoubtedly seem to be the rule in Indiana, for failure to use due
diligence in urging objections to the competency of a juror, as well as failure of
the complaining party to avail himself of such objections at the proper time, after
they have come to his knowledge, would create an implied waiver of the error:
Adams v. State, 99 Ind. 244 (1884); Maden v. Emmons, 83 Ind. 331 (1882);
Kingen v. State, 46 Ind. 132 (1874). But see Tatum v. State, 206 Ga. 171, 56 S. E.
(2d) 518 (1949), and Guykowski v. People, 2 Ill. 476 (1838).
The better rule
would seem to be that a failure to use due diligence in ascertaining a juror's
incompetency, while interrogating him on his voir dire, would constitute a
waiver or estoppel as to such incompetency, except where the incompetency of
the juror would be such as to render the verdict reversible on review: Stone v.
People, 3 Ill. 326 (1840). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 78, § 2, specifies the
qualifications for jury service in Illinois.
7 In Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U. S. 199, 37 S. Ct. 107, 61 L. Ed. 244 (1916),
the Supreme Court of the United States, on an analogous situation, found no
violation of due process but only an irregularity brought about by an overzealous regard for the defendant's constitutional rights.

8 In jurisdictions providing for the use of alternate jurors, the problem is not
apt to arise: People v. Badenthal, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 404, 48 P. (2d) 82 (1935) ;
State v. Henderson, 182 Ore. 147, 184 P. (2d) 393 (1947), rehearing denied 182
Ore. 147, 186 P. (2d) 519 (1947).
9 The effect of the procedure upon the constitution of the jury, as followed in
the trial court, is not determinative in these cases, since procedural error would
be considered subservient to the effort of the trial judge to prevent a void verdict
from being rendered, it being impossible for either party to waive the juror's incompetency: Stone v. People, 3 Ill. 326 (1840); People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277,
27 N. E. 539 (1886) ; Manning v. State, 155 Tenn. 266, 292 S. W. 451 (1927).
10 State v. Hasledahl, 2 N. D. 521, 52 N. W. 315 (1892); State v. Davis, 31
W. Va. 390, 7 S. E. 24 (1888).
11 Nevada v. Pritchard, 16 Nev. 101 (1881).
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That court, in the cases of Kurtz v. State12 and Gillespie v. State,13 had
occasion to lay the foundation for the decision in the instant case. The
first of these cases established the rule that it would first be necessary
to set aside the submission before further questioning a juror as to his
competency. The second merely applied the reasoning so expounded,
ruling that the discharge of a juror, upon the peremptory challenge of the
prosecuting attorney following a withdrawal of the submission, was such
an implied admission that the juror was competent that there could have
been no legal necessity for his removal. 14 The Indiana doctrine, then,
appears to be that after the jury is impaneled and sworn, a juror whose
competency then becomes suspect cannot be interrogated on this subject
unless a motion to set aside the submission is first interposed and allowed.
If such a motion is granted, however, it is allowed at the peril of the
prosecution for, if no legal necessity such as would justify the removal of
the juror is thereafter shown, the withdrawal of the submission is the
equivalent of an acquittal. 15 This, at first blush, may seem to be logical
but the propriety of that view is extremely questionable, for the trial
judge is faced with what is, in effect, an almost insurmountable difficulty.
Cases from other jurisdictions are substantially in accord with the
reasoning of the Indiana court as to what constitutes legal necessity authorizing the withdrawal and substitution of a juror, but there the similarity of reasoning ceases. In Deberry v. State,'1 6 the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, in commenting upon the substitution of a juror, said that the
discharge of a juror 17 does not break up the entire panel, but that the
other jurors remain a part thereof and are not again subject to challenge
nor are they to be resworn. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in State
v. Duvall,'1 in sustaining the trial court's action in overruling the defendant's motion to reswear the original eleven jurors after a juror had
been substituted, said that ". . . the motion necessarily implied an acceptance of the eleven jurors, and we agree . . . that the reswearing of

said jurors would have been idle and useless ceremony."'

9

The Arkansas

12 145 Ind. 119, 42 N. E. 1102 (1896).

13 168 Ind. 298, 80 N. E. 829 (1907).
14 The reasoning evidently proceeded upon the theory that a peremptory chal-

lenge would not have been necessary had the prosecuting attorney been able to
show legal cause for removal.
15The reasoning, somewhat doubtfully, presupposes that withdrawal of the submission amounts to a discharge of the jury. No other reported case, however,
has expressly so held.
16 99 Tenn. 207, 42 S. W. 31 (1897).
17 A plea of double jeopardy has been held good in similar situations:

Tomas-

son v. State, 112 Tenn. 596, 79 S. W. 802 (1903); Ward v. State, 20 Tenn. (1
Humph.) 253 (1839). See also O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 333
(1872).
18 135 La. 710, 65 So. 904 (1914).
19 135 La. 710 at 728, 65 So. 904 at 911.
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case of Martin v. State20 seems to be in accord with the last mentioned21
cases for the prosecution was there allowed to challenge a juror for cause,
after the jury had been impaneled and sworn, and another juror was
then substituted.
One of two possible solutions to the problem may be drawn from these
cases: either the substitution of the juror was done without the withdrawal
from the jury of the submission of the cause, or the submission was withdrawn but it did not operate to effect a discharge of the jury as a whole.
If the former is correct, the problem of substitution is substantially minimized. The court will then merely judicially ascertain, 22 without interference with the constitution of the jury, whether or not legal necessity
for discharge of the juror exists and, if it is found to exist, the juror will
merely be removed and another substituted, only the substitute juror then
being sworn. 23 The latter alternative would seem to be more in accord
with sound legalistic reasoning, and represents the course which probably
ought to be adopted, for the cause was submitted to the jury as a whole,
hence should be withdrawn from it before further re-examination of the
juror. 24

The mere fact of the withdrawal of the submission of the cause

should not, however, be deemed to represent a discharge of the jury,
except in those cases where the withdrawal occurs in the absence of legal
necessity. Since the discharge of the jury is normally considered a breakdown of its body, impeaching the organized identity thereof, 25 it would
seem that the events which transpired in the instant case did not constitute
a discharge of the jury. In fact, the defendant was tried by the identical
jurors whom he had voluntarily accepted and who had been sworn to try
the case; the organized identity of that body was not impeached ;26 there
was not even a separation. At most, an irregularity occurred, 27 which was
20 163 Ark. 103, 259 S. W. 6 (1924).
21 This procedure, however, represents an anomalous situation since, in the
absence of a statute to the contrary, the character of juror can scarcely be said
to attach while the right to challenge remains. State v. Hasledahl, 2 N. D. 521,
52 N. W. 315 (1892); Nevada v. Pritchard, 16 Nev. 101 (1881).
22 That the discharge of a juror and substitution of another may not be done
upon the ex parte order of the court without a judicial hearing at which defend-

ant and his counsel are present, see Upchurch v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. Rep. 624, 38
S. W. 206 (1896).
23 The converse would obviously be that, if the discharge of the juror was not
from legal necessity, a breakdown of the jury would have occurred, equivalent

to an acquittal.

Kurtz v. State, 145 Ind. 119, 42 N. E. 1102 (1896).
25 Lewis v. State, 121 Ala. 1, 25 So. 1017 (1899).
26 In
Lewis v. State, 121 Ala. 1, 25 So. 1017 (1899), after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court told one juror to stand aside but afterwards ordered
him to resume his place in the box. Held: no double jeopardy, but at most an
unprejudicial irregularity.
27 Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U. S. 199, 37 S. Ct. 107, 61 L. Ed. 244 (1916).
24
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brought about by an error which did not prejudice the defendant in the
slightest. It would seem, then, that the plea of double jeopardy should
have been rejected.
Keeping within the bounds of established legal reasoning, yet with a
view to solving a practical problem which could be common to any trial
court, and without desiring to violate the defendant's constitutional right
to be placed but once in jeopardy, 2 the solution would seem to be that if,
after the jury is impaneled and sworn, there arises some question as to the
competency or qualifications of a juror, a preliminary hearing should be
held by the court to determine if legal cause exists for the removal of the
juror. If such legal cause is found, the court should entertain a motion,
if such be made, or should, upon its own motion, withdraw the submission
of the cause from the jury, with a view to permitting a challenge of the
juror on his renewed voir dire examination. If, upon the granting of the
motion to withdraw the submission, a challenge is not forthcoming from
either party, the court should, in order to prevent a re-impaneling and
re-swearing of the same juror, discharge the juror and substitute another
in his stead on the court's own motion. 29 In that way, it would be possible
to obviate any claim that there was no legal necessity for setting the submission aside. That method would also prevent possible recourse to a plea
of double jeopardy for legal cause for the nullification of the first purported trial would then exist.
R. K. HOFFMAN
DIVORCE--ALIMONY,

ALLOWANCES AND

DISPOSITION

OF PROPERTY-

WHEHER OR NOT THE ANNULMENT OF A SECOND MARRIAGE OPERATES TO

REvIvE AN EARLIER OBLIGATION TO PAY ALIMONY-Litigation in the case

entitled Sutton v. Leib' provided the federal judiciary with an opportunity
to determine several important legal questions bearing on the effect to be
given to a remarriage and the subsequent annulment thereof on a prior
decree directing the payment of alimony. Plaintiff and defendant therein
had been lawfully married in Illinois in 1925 but had been divorced in
Illinois, in 1939, under a decree which provided for the payment of alimony in monthly installments, to plaintiff by defendant, for "so long as
plaintiff shall remain unmarried."
Subsequent to the divorce, plaintiff

established a residence in New York but, in 1944, had married one Henzel
while in Nevada.

That marriage occurred on the same day that Henzel

See, for example, Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 10.
50 C. J. S., Juries, § 249, pp. 1006-7.
1- U. S. -, 72 S. Ct. 398, 96 L. Ed. (adv.) 352 (1952), reversing 188 F. (2d)
766 (1951), which had affirmed 91 F. Supp. 937 (1950), but on other grounds.
Frankfurter, J., wrote a concurring opinion.
28

29
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had been awarded an uncontested divorce in the last-mentioned state.
Henzel and the plaintiff immediately returned to New York and the defendant, plaintiff's first husband, upon learning of the marriage, ceased
making payments under the alimony decree. Shortly after plaintiff and
Henzel had returned to New York, Henzel's first wife filed a suit against
him for separate maintenance and charged that the Nevada divorce he
had obtained was null and void. Plaintiff thereupon promptly left Henzel
and instituted her annulment action on the ground that, as Henzel's first
marriage had remained valid in New York, her marriage to him was void
ab initio. The New York court, in due time, treating the Nevada divorce
as invalid, granted an annulment of the Nevada marriage of plaintiff and
Henzel. Plaintiff then brought action in a federal district court located
in Illinois, relying on diversity of citizenship, to recover the allegedly
accrued payments of alimony for the period from the date when defendant
ceased making regular payments to a date in 1947 when plaintiff had
validly married still another person.
The trial court entered a summary judgment for defendant on the
basis of a purported settlement and release.2 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the result but upon the
ground that the validity of the Nevada remarriage turned on the validity,
in Nevada, of the antecedent Nevada divorce which Henzel had obtained
from his New York wife. It assumed that, in the absence of direct attack
thereon, the Nevada decree was valid and binding in the state where it
was rendered,3 hence required recognition of the subsequent marriage
under the established rule that a marriage is to be deemed valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law of the state where the contract of marriage takes place have been complied with. 4 On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court reversed on the basis that the lower courts
had failed to accord the proper degree of full faith and credit to the New
York annulment decree. It remanded the case so as to give the lower federal court an opportunity to determine the state of the Illinois law as to the
effect to be given to an annulment of a purported second marriage upon
an earlier decree providing for the payment of alimony as long as the
alimony recipient remained unmarried. It is presumed that the case is,
therefore, still pending to await a determination of that issue.
The problem so presented should be of interest not only in Illinois
2 See 91 F. Supp. 937 (1950).
The trial court recognized the possibility of a
full faith and credit problem relating to the effect to be given to the Nevada
divorce and the New York annulment, but did not deem it necessary to decide the

question.

3 Note, In particular, 188 F. (2d) 766 at 768.
4

Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 121.
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but also in other states which have, by statute,5 incorporated the tenor of
the instant decree regarding cessation of the obligation to pay alimony
upon remarriage into all divorce decrees, at least by implication if not by
express language. 6 It would seem to be clear that, in any decree pronounced subsequent to the enactment of such a statute and where there
is no question of the validity of the remarriage, the alimony obligation
ceases with the remarriage. In fact, Illinois courts have held it to be
mandatory that alimony should cease, 7 even though the parties may have
contracted otherwise,8 for the local statute has been said to be no more
than a codification of prior cases on the subject.9 Assuming such to be the
case, it would appear that a solution to the problem of the effect to be
given to an annulment of a later marriage ought also to be found in prior
cases, if any such exist, on the theory that they, too, have been codified
into statutory form.
The precise question appears to have been presented to the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District in the case of Lehmann v. Lehmann.10 In that case, the parties had been divorced in 1915 under an
Illinois decree providing that, in the event that plaintiff should remarry,
payments of alimony for her support should cease. Three months later,
plaintiff contracted a marriage with one Quintard in New Jersey. She
cohabited with Quintard for a period of about fifteen months in New York
and in Maine and then returned to Illinois where she sued to annul her
marriage to Quintard on the ground that it had been contracted in violation of an Illinois statute which then forbade remarriage within one
year following a divorce." The marriage was duly annulled by the Illinois court. Lehmann, upon learning of the remarriage, had ceased making
alimony payments to plaintiff in the belief that her remarriage had brought
an end to his obligation. Following the annulment, plaintiff sued to force
Lehmann to pay her the regular alimony payments called for by the
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19, for example, directs that a party shall
not be entitled to alimony and maintenance after remarriage. The statute was

not enacted until after the first divorce decree in the Sutton case: Laws 1933,
p. 490. Comparable statutes may be found in Deering, Cal. Civ. Code 1949, § 139;
Colo. Stat. Ann., Ch. 56, § 8; Nev. Comp. Laws 1939, § 9463: New Jersey Stat.
Ann., Tit. 2:50-38, and Thompson, Cons. Laws N. Y., Civil Practice Act, § 1159.
6 Adler v. Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N. E. (2d) 504 (1940), cert. den. 311 U. S.
670, 61 S. Ct. 29, 85 L. Ed. 430 (1941).
7 Banck v. Banck, 322 I1. App. 369, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 (1944).
8 Miller v. Miller, 317 Iil. App. 447, 46 N. E. (2d) 102 (1943).
9 Banck v. Banck, 322 Ill. App. 369 at 376, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 at 581.
10 225 Il1. App. 513 (1922).
11 Laws 1905, p. 194, repealed by Laws 1923, p. 327, provided in substance that
in every case in which a divorce had been granted neither party should marry
again within one year from the time when the decree was granted, and that if
either of the parties did remarry within such one-year period, such marriage should
"be held absolutely void." See note to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 2.
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divorce decree. The trial court found that while the Quintard ceremony
may have been valid in New Jersey it was clearly void in Illinois, was
actually no marriage, that petitioner had not remarried within the meaning of the terms used in the divorce decree, and that she had not forfeited
her right to alimony payments. The Appellate Court, admitting that
plaintiff's marriage would not have been valid under Illinois law, treated
the marriage as valid in New Jersey,1 2 as well as valid in New York and
Maine where plaintiff had resided with Quintard, and was a remarriage as
contemplated by the words of the divorce decree. It noted that, if plaintiff were to be allowed to recover alimony for the period she had cohabited with Quintard, she could have continued to so cohabit with him
while being also entitled to receive the regular periodic alimony payments
under the decree. In that regard, it quoted from the Illinois case of
Stillman v. Stillman,13 where it had been said that it was "unreasonable
that she should have the equivalent of an obligation of support by way
of alimony from a former husband, and an obligation from a present
husband for an adequate support at the same time." According to that
court, it was "her privilege to abandon the provision the decree of the
court made for her support under the sanctions of the law, for another
provision for maintenance which she would obtain by a second marriage."
When she had done so, however, the law would "require her to abide by her
election. '14 The law of Illinois, at that time, seemed to be established on
the point that an annulment of a remarriage would not operate to revive
the earlier alimony obligation.
Some seven years later, the New York Court of Appeals, in the case
of Schleicher v. Schleicher,1 5 dealt with much the same type of problem.
The parties there had been married in 1908, separated in 1923, and had
been divorced under a Nevada proceeding in 1924. The separation agreement had provided that the husband would pay a stated sum to his wife
for her support and maintenance until she remarried. She did, in 1924,
marry one Hannum, but this later marriage was annulled in New York,
in 1927, by reason of Hannum's insanity. Here, also, the former husband
had stopped making the stipulated payments of support money, a form of
alimony, upon his former wife's remarriage. The plaintiff, following the
annulment, contended that her right to payment had been revived when
the second marriage was declared void ab initio. The court so held,
although it divided over the point of the extent of the former husband's
12 The provisions of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
Vol. 1, Ch. 89, § 19, appeared to have been inapplicable.
13 99 Ill. 196 (1881).
14 99 Ill. 196 at 202.
15 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E. 501 (1929). Kellogg, J., wrote a concurring opinion,
concurred in by O'Brien, J.
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obligation. Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority, indicated that the
particular marriage was voidable, not void, in its inception but that the
annulment, when decreed, put an end to the marriage from the beginning.
Nevertheless, the majority felt that while the plaintiff should be allowed
to recover support for the period after the marriage had been annulled,
nothing should be granted for the period during which she had been
supported by her second husband. Principal reliance was placed on two
English cases. 16 It was the opinion of the minority that since the marriage was void from the beginning, under the doctrine of relation back,
classed by the majority as an inapplicable legal fiction, the plaintiff should
be entitled to recover for the entire period during which her first husband had failed to pay.
Except for these two cases, there would appear to be nothing in the
American reports on the particular question, for the recent Louisiana
case of Keeney v. Keeney, 7 based on a similar fact question, turns on the
fact that, in that state, alimony is considered more in the nature of a
pension than a perpetuation of the husband's duty to support his former
wife, hence is to be deemed cut off even though the remarriage should be
later annulled. Some uncertainty may have been engendered in the law
of Illinois, however, by the later Illinois case of People ex rel. Byrnes v.
Retirement Board,' also decided by the Appellate Court for the First
District, as it seems to have adopted the New York rule. The case arose
when a fireman's widow applied to the retirement board to be reinstated
on the pension roll following the annulment of her second marriage. The
Appellate Court, approving views expressed in the Schleicher case, decided that the annulment put an end to the remarriage from the beginning,
rather than from the time of its dissolution, as would be the case in the
event of a divorce. Finding that the remarriage had been effaced as if it
had never been, the court ordered the widow restored to the pension roll
"on the footing of its nullity,"19 but declared that since this was a pension, it had no authority to direct the payment of the pension for the
period of time during which the widow had been living with, and had
been supported by, her second husband.
It is worthy of note that the court treated the Byrnes case as being
one of first impression, for it appears to have approved a contrary foreign
decision without knowledge of the fact that there might have been a prior
16 Matter of Wombell's Settlement, [19221 L. R. 2 Ch. 298, and In re Garnett,
(1905] L. J. 74 Ch. Div. 570.
17211 La. 585, 30 So. 549 (1947).
18 272 Ill. App. 59 (1933).
19 272 Ill. App. 59 at 67.
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Illinois case in point. 20 It might, however, be said that the Byrnes case,
approving the New York view, is not really controlling on the point here
under consideration as it deals with a pension question. If so, anything
there decided would be dicta for the purpose of the instant problem,
leaving the Lehmann case, never specifically overruled, to stand as the
current Illinois view as to alimony matters. Technical distinctions do
exist between these two Illinois cases for, in the first, the court ruled on
the effect to be given to an annulment of a remarriage in relation to the
obligation to pay alimony, a substitute for the husband's legally imposed
obligation to support his former wife, while in the second case it passed
upon the effect to be given a similar annulment as it related to the granting of a pension to the widow of a civil servant. When it is remembered
that such a pension is a "bounty of the government, which it has the
right to give, withhold, distribute, or recall at its discretion, "21 the basis
for distinction is made more apparent.
Even if no distinction existed, it could be said that the Byrnes case
should not be followed for it erroneously rests on a decision which itself
is based on error. Judge Cardozo, in the Schleicher case, had expressed
the opinion that his views were justified by cases in which bequests of
income were to be paid until remarriage. He referred to the English cases
of Matter of Wombell's Settlement2 2 and In

re Garnett.23

Again, an

examination of these two cases would reveal that they are not authority
for the position taken. They were, rather, cases in which it was decided
that if a father should make a settlement of a sum of money upon his son,
or upon his daughter's intended spouse, to be delivered upon the celebration of the marriage, such settlement could be recovered in the event the
marriage should subsequently be annulled. The obvious failure of consideration for such a settlement would justify that result, but the instant
problem involves no elements of contractual consideration nor the failure
thereof.
On the basis of applicable case law alone, then, it would appear that
the Illinois Appellate Court decision in the Lehmann case should control
the rights of the parties in the Sutton case. If a new, and authoritative,
Illinois decision on the point should be necessary, in preference to having
20 Examination of the brief filed by counsel for the retirement board reveals
that the case of Lehman v. Lehman, 225 Ill. App. 513 (1922), was not cited, nor
was the theory of that case explored. Counsel relied principally on the claim
that the right to be restored to the pension rolls had been taken away by statute
when the widow remarried and that there was nothing in the statute to authorize
a restoration to the pension rolls.
21 See Black, Law Diet., 4th Ed., citing Pecoy v. City of Chicago, 265 Ill. 78, 106
N. E. 435 (1914).
22 [19221 L. R. 2 Ch. 298.
23 [1905] L. J. 74 Ch. Div. 570.
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the state of the Illinois law determined by a federal court, a simple method
is available to that end.2 4 It would seem, however, that, as stated in the
Stillman case, the plaintiff had the "privilege to abandon the provision
the decree of the court made for her support under the sanctions of the
law for another provision for maintenance which she would obtain by a
second marriage. "25 Having exercised the privilege, she should be required to abide by her election.
The decision of the Supreme Court, however, appears to have opened
the door to the creation of still further ambiguities in law. It is well
known that "migratory" divorce has proved to be a plague to the courts.
There is now added a threatened plague stemming from the "migratory"
annulment. If jurisdiction to annul a marriage were limited to the state
where the marriage was celebrated, only the courts of one state would be
concerned with the problem and, until annulment had occurred there,
other courts would be free to act on the basis of the record. It must be
admitted that courts have, without giving too much thought to the matter,
directly or inferentially, recognized a jurisdiction in the court of domicile
to annul a marriage celebrated elsewhere, treating the question as being
identical with that involved in a divorce proceeding,2 6 but to be dealt with
27
according to the law of the forum rather than by the lex loci cantractus.
There has, however, been a respectable dissent on the ground that the
analogy is not sound.2"
Annulment, like divorce, is designed to operate on a status, hence is
a proceeding in rem and would require that the court should have jurisdiction over the res. It is conceivable that an aggrieved spouse could, by
change of domicile, move the status of marriage, an admittedly valid and
24 Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in the instant case, offered
the thought that the Court of Appeals should hold the case in abeyance until
the parties requested a declaratory judgment from the Illinois Supreme Court.
A second suggested method would be to dismiss the case on the basis that the
necessary jurisdictional amount is lacking. Even under the view most favorable
to the plaintiff, she would be entitled to back alimony only from September, 1947,
the date of the New York annulment, to November, 1947, the date of her marriage
to Sutton. The amount thereof would be inadequate in a diversity of citizenship case: Howard v. Jennings, 141 F. (2d) 193 (1944).
Suit could then be left
to state court action.
25 99 Ill. 196 at 202.
26 See annotation in 128 A. L. R. at 64-5, and Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366, 82 N. E.
850, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996 (1907); Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 35, 44 Am. Rep. 81
(1882), writ of error dismissed 107 U. S. 319, 27 L. Ed. 499, 2 S. Ct. 312 (1883).
27 Anonymous v. Anonymous, - Del. -, 85 A. (2d) 706 (1952).
28 Goodrich, "Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 806 (1919),
contains an excellent theoretical treatment of the question. See also Dodd,
"Annulment of Marriage," 23 Ill. L. Rev. 75 (1928).
Walker, J., in his dissent in
Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 35 (1882), at pp. 49-50, indicated that a foreign court
would lack the power "to construe and give authoritative judgment against the
validity of contracts made under our laws" and suggested that an Illinois court
would "not be bound by the decree of nullity."
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existing thing in law, into another state for the purpose of bringing that
status before a court sitting there in order to secure its destruction by
divorce. It is, likewise, theoretically possible to accomplish the same thing
with respect to a voidable marriage for purpose of annulment inasmuch as
it could be said that, until annulment has been granted, a "thing" exists,
even though in imperfect fashion. Where, however, the charge is made
that the purported marriage is void, and has been so from the beginning,
one might well ask what "thing" there is to be carried across state lines
into the adjoining jurisdiction to be there dealt with? Actually, the only
"thing" in existence, the only "thing" to be destroyed, is a purported
public record of a marriage and that is to be found at the place of celebration and there only. By analogy to a suit to nullify the effect of a
forged but recorded deed to land, the annulment proceeding, in the last
mentioned instances at least, should be deemed local rather than transitory
in character.

29

To compound the confusion, the United States Supreme Court has
now declared that when the domiciliary state, possessing no more than
control over the parties, has pronounced a decree of annulment relating to
an allegedly void marriage occurring in a sister state, which marriage
might well have been declared valid at the place of celebration had the
annulment proceeding been there instituted, other states must give full
faith and credit to the annulment decree. If bound to recognize the uncancelled public record of the one state, yet forced to apply the annulment
decree of the other, a third state would stand in much the same position
as the proverbial innocent bystander, to-wit: sure to get hurt but unable
to do much about it.
A. GELLER
RELEASE--CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIN-WHETHER OR NOT RELEASE,
GIVEN TO ONE TORT FEASOR COVERING STATUTORY LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH, OPERATES TO RELEASE ANOTHER FROM CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING
FROM VIOLATION OF "DRAM SHOP" STATUTE-The Appellate Court for the

Fourth District, in the case of McClure v. Lence,' was faced with the

problem as to whether or not a release given to one for a cause of action
resting on the Wrongful Death Act

2

would operate to bar a subsequent

29 In O'Brien v. Eustice, 298 Ill. App. 510, 19 N. E. (2d) 137 (1939), it was
indicated that it would be necessary to add the proper public official as a party

defendant if the purpose of the annulment proceeding was to secure nullification
of the public record of the purported marriage. The implication of that holding
would be that, if such public official were the official of another state, it would
be necessary to begin suit at the place of his official residence, otherwise it
would be impossible to obtain jurisdiction over him.
1345 Ill. App. 158, 102 N. E. (2d) 546 (1951).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 1 et seq.
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suit, for the same injury, against another based on the Illinois Liquor
Control Act.3 The case was one in which several minors, patrons of the
defendant's tavern, had allegedly there become intoxicated. After leaving
the tavern, the car in which they rode, driven by one of the minors, became
stalled on a railroad crossing, was struck by an approaching train, and
three of the passengers were killed. The legal representatives of the deceased automobile passengers gave full and binding releases to the railroad
in question and thereafter sued the tavern keeper for damages arising from
a violation of the liquor control law. 4 The defendant, among other things,
5
pleaded the releases given the railroad as a special defense, but that
defense, on motion, was stricken on the theory that the causes were distinct
and arose under different statutes. Judgment was given in favor of the
several plaintiffs after trial but, on appeal by defendant, the Appellate
Court reversed and remanded the cause with a direction to overrule the
motion to strike the special defense relating to the releases.
While the foundations for the proposition that a release given to one
joint tort feasor should operate to release the others are in some state of
confusion, 6 the doctrine is, nevertheless, a practically unanimous one in
the United States. 7 There is, however, much confusion over the problem
of who should be treated as joint tort feasors for this purpose and the
conflict is apparent in the Illinois cases on the subject. The earliest and
foundation case in this state would appear to be that of Chapin v. Chicago
& Eastern Illinois Railroad Company.8 Counsel for the plaintiff therein
had contended that a release given to one of the parties did not bar action
against the defendant as they were not joint tort feasors. The court,
holding for the defendant, stated: "Whether they were joint tort feasors
or not, we do not deem it important in the view we take of the case. It is
9
enough if they were both liable for the same injury." While the words
quoted were probably dicta, since the plaintiff's injuries had been caused
in a collision between two railroad trains and the two carriers would be
joint tort feasors under any construction given to the phrase "joint tort
feasors," at least one later Illinois case has followed the reasoning there
expressed where the several causes, although arising at different periods
3

Ibid., Ch. 43,

§ 94

et

seq.

Ibid., Ch. 43, § 135, provides for a civil remedy for damages caused by an intoxicated person.
5 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(4), lists a release as being one of the affirmative
defenses there mentioned.
6 See opinion of Rutledge, J., in McKenna v. Austin, 134 F. (2d) 659 (1943).
7 Welty v. Laurent, 285 Ill. App. 13, 1 N. E. (2d) 577 (1936). See also annotation
in 104 A. L. R. 847.
8 18 Ill. App. 47 (1885).
4

9 18 Il1. App. 47 at 50.
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of time, were related and rested on common law principles of negligence
so as to be within the classification of a "joint" tort.10 The doctrine has
also been applied by the Appellate Court for the Second District, in
Manthei v. Heimerdinger," to a case involving a release given to one for a
cause resting on common law negligence producing personal injury but
deemed to operate as a bar to a suit against a tavern keeper, based on a
violation of the liquor control law, for conduct leading up to the injury.
The court there cited the Chapin case in support of the idea that it is
relatively unimportant whether the parties are technically joint tort feasors
so long as they are liable for the same indivisible injury arising out of a
single accident.
Another line of Illinois cases, however, beginning with the decision in
Scharfenstein v. Forest City Knitting Company,'1 2 would indicate that it is
necessary, for the principle of release to operate, that the parties be, in
fact, "joint" tort feasors. The plaintiff there had released a railroad from
its liability to him predicated on the Federal Employer's Liability Act and
had thereafter sued a corporation which had negligently permitted its
agents to pile dirt on the railroad tracks. The case may be weakened
somewhat by the fact that the instrument was probably no more than a
covenant not to sue, but the court did say that, even if it could be construed to be a release, the plaintiff's cause of action, resting on a distinct
tort, would not be barred. That view has been followed in other cases,
including one in which a covenant not to sue for wrongful death has been
13
treated as inadequate to bar a suit based on the "Dram Shop" statute.
In those cases, the court has looked for, and found, a distinct basis for
liability as to each of the parties involved.
Faced with these conflicting decisions, the Appellate Court in the
instant case chose to follow the first of these views. As the Chapin case
has never been overruled, and as those cases which seem to be contrary do
not reject the theory thereof but ignore it, the result attained would seem
10 In Guth v. Vaughan, 231 I1. App. 143 (1923), for example, the plaintiff was
injured in an automobile accident but the injuries were aggravated by the mal-

practice of a physician. A release given to the automobile driver was held to bar
an action against the physician. The case of Aiken v. Insull, 122 F. (2d) 746 (1941),
certiorari denied 315 U. S. 806, 62 S. Ct. 638, 86 L. Ed. 1205 (1942), states that the
Illinois law is that tort feasors are released if "they were both liable for the same
injury." It cites Chapin v. C. & E. I. R. R. Co., 18 Ill. App. 47 (1885), as authority.
11332 Ill. App. 335, 75 N. E. (2d) 132 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEW 358.

12 253 Ill. App. 190 (1929).
13 Herberger v. Anderson Motor Service Co., 268 Ill. App. 403 (1932); Hyba v.
Horneman, Inc., 302 Il1. App. 143, 23 N. E. (2d) 564 (1939). The last mentioned
case held that a covenant not to sue for a wrongful death did not bar a subsequent
suit by the administrator based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 94 et seq.
See also -Meyers v. Y. M. C. A. of Quincy, Illinois, 316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N. E. (2d)
755 (1942).
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to be the sounder one. If it is the purpose of the law of torts to assure no
more than compensation to one who has been injured by the acts of others,
then one who has received full compensation from one of the several
wrongdoers, or who has entered into a contract from which it may be
presumed that he has received full compensation, should have no right to
further judicial action for the purpose of the law has been satisfied. The
amount of recovery should not, ordinarily, be made to depend on the
fortuitous circumstance that in one case the bases for the suit rest on
different statutes and in the other on different common law theories of
liability. The fact that a death has ensued should not, alone, be enough to
change the outcome which would have been attained had the victim survived and given a release of his common law cause of action for personal
injuries. 14 The same should be true as to a release given on a cause resting
on the "Dram Shop" statute for, although the statute creates a separate
and distinct right of action unknown to the common law, 15 the right of
recovery rests on the fact of injury and not merely on the sale of liquor.
If the legislature had intended that the statute should serve to provide
the basis for an additional recovery, even though full compensation has
already been received from another whose acts concurred in producing the
death or injury, it should have expressly so stated. In the absence of such
a statement, a court should not presume that the statute derogates against
the common law doctrine that a person should have but one recovery for a
single injury.
W. J. MOORE

14 Holton v. Daley, 106 Ill. 131 (1883); Crane v. Chicago & Western Indiana
R. R. Co., 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 222 (1908). The reasoning of these cases appears
to have been overlooked in Hyba v. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N. E. (2d)
564 (1939), where the two statutory claims grew out of the same wrongful act.
It is true, however, that the case involved only a covenant not to sue, hence there
could be no presumption of full satisfaction.
15 O'Connor v. Rathje, 368 Ill. 83, 12 N. E. (2d) 878 (1937).
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AuToMOBILES--INJURIES

FROM

OPERATION,

OR

WHETHER OR NOT OWNER OF PARKED AUTOMOBILE
IGNITION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INJURIES

USE

Or HIGHWAY-

WHO LEAVES KEY IN

INFLICTED BY THIB' WHO STEALS

CAR-The Appellate Court for the Third District of Illinois, in the case of
Cockrell v. Sullivan,' considered whether or not an automobile owner who
fails to comply with the Illinois Motor Vehicle Act 2 by pdrmitting his car
to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition,
and removing the key, is civilly liable for injuries inflicted on another by.
a thief fleeing therein. Plaintiff therein, basing her property damage suit
on defendant's violation of the statute mentioned and under pleadings
drawn to exploit views expressed in an earlier Illinois case, obtained a
verdict and judgment in her favor. On appeal therefrom, the judgment
was reversed when the court in question refused to follow the decision of
the majority of the Appellate Court for the First District in the case of
Ostergard v. Frisch.3
Since the holding in the instant case is directly contrary to the result
attained in the Ostergard case, it is desirable to review the bases for the
earlier decision. That case had relied on views expressed in the Massachusetts case of Malloy v. Newman4 and a holding of a court of the District of
Columbia in Schaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc.,5 which cases took the view that
a violation of a statute of the kind in question was negligence as a matter
of law, making it unnecessary to inquire into the element of proximate
causation. The first of these cases, however, was overruled not long after
the decision in the Ostergard case when the Massachusetts court, in
Galbraithv. Levin,6 rejected the concept that a penal violation of a statute
regulating motor vehicles was to be deemed negligence per se and the conclusive proximate cause of an injury. The last expression on the point
emanating from Massachusetts accords, in substance or effect, with similar
holdings in New York,7 Minnesota, s and Louisiana. It would also appear
to coincide with the available legislative history relating to the Illinois
statute, a history tending to indicate that the underlying legislative purpose
1344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N. E. (2d) 878 (1951).

2111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 951/, § 189(a).
3333 Il1. App. 359, 77 N. E. (2d) 537 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAw
lWZiEw 225. Niemeyer, P. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
4 310 Mass. 269, 37 N. E. (2d) 1001 (1941).
579 U. S. App. D. C. 207, 144 F. (2d) 532 (1944).
6 323 Mass. 255, 81 N. E. (2d) 560 (1948).
7 Wolfson v. Harrington, 295 N. Y. 667, 65 N. E. (2d) 101 (1946).
8 Anderson v. Thiesen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N. W. (2d) 272 (1950).
9 Maggiore v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Service, 150 So. 394 (La. App. 1933).
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was one toward traffic regulation rather than to design an anti-theft
10
measure.
It is understood that the Appellate Court for the First District will
have an opportunity to reconsider the holding in the Ostergard case when
it passes on the appeal taken in the case of Ney v. Yellow Cab Company."
It may, and probably should, overrule its earlier holding in the light of the
instant decision and the changes which have occurred in the precedents
previously relied on. If so, the law of Illinois on the point will once again
become uniform throughout the state. If it does not, and prefers to reason
from the premise that the injured person should be permitted to recover
from the most accessible of the persons involved, even though that person's
conduct can hardly be said to amount to actionable negligence within
customary concepts relating to negligence and proximate cause, there
would be every reason to support the issuance of a certificate of importance
so as to get the problem before the Illinois Supreme Court for a conclusive
settlement of the issue.
BURGLARY INVOLVED IN

OFFENSES

AND

RESPONSIBILITY

THEREFOR -

ELEMENTS

THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF BURGLAR TOOLS-

The recent case of People v. Taylor' afforded the Illinois Supreme Court

with its first opportunity to construe a section of the Illinois Criminal
Code enacted over seventy-five years ago. The case was one in which the
defendant, found strolling at night in a neighborhood where a series of
burglaries had been recently committed, was stopped by police officers for
questioning and, upon search, was found to have in his possession certain

tools which could have been used to break and enter. 2 Defendant was
thereupon arrested and indicted on a charge of violating a statute making
it unlawful to have possession of tools of that character with the felonious
intent to break and enter. 3 Upon trial before a court acting without a jury,
defendant admitted that he had been convicted of burglary over seventeen
years prior to the trial, had served a term therefor, and had been out of
regular employment for the past two years. He explained, however, that
he had been using the tools on a temporary job and was returning home
10 See Legislative Reference Notes re H. B. No. 474, 1919, p. 623, and re Uniform
Traffic Act, 1935. It should be noted that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 95 ,
§ 189(a), is not identical with the proposed Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on
Highways, 11 U. L. A., § 52, p. 50, although it embodies some of the ideas expressed
in the uniform statute.
11 Case No. 45580, Appellate Court for the First District, now pending on appeal.
1410 Ill. 469, 102 N. F). (2d) 529 (1951).
2 The tools consisted of a screw driver, a pair of pliers with the handles filed

down so they could be used as a pry, and a pencil flashlight, the glass lens of which
was covered with black tape so that it could throw only a pin-point beam of light.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 87.
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therefrom at the time of his apprehension. The defendant's evidence was
corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses. The prosecution relied
principally on evidence that the tools in question were of the type used by
burglars. Upon conviction and sentence for violation of the statute, defendant prosecuted a writ of error to review the judgment and convinced
the Supreme Court, as a matter of law, that the judgment should be
reversed without remandment.
Noting that the statute had not been considered in any prior proceeding coming before it, the court indicated the necessary elements of the
crime in question to be (1) the adaptation and design of the tool or
implement for breaking and entering, (2) the possession thereof by one
with knowledge of its character, and (3) the intent to use or employ such
tool or implement in breaking and entering.4 The first and second of these
elements were said to be apparent from the evidence in the case. The first
because it was not necessary that the tools be peculiar to the trade of
burglary, for even common and lawful tools, adaptable for legitimate use,
would suffice if possessed with an intent to use them unlawfully for the
purpose of burglary ;5 the second because the articles were found on the
defendant's person. The difficult point came in relation to the third
element, the one dealing with the intent.
In that regard, the court pointed out that an intent to break into a
particular building was not necessary as an intent to utilize the tools in
any burglarious entry would be sufficient. 6 In the absence of direct evidence on the point, it was said that circumstantial evidence would be
admissible, 7 and that no distinction would be made between direct and
circumstantial evidence insofar as the weight and effect thereof was concerned. 8 By way of illustrating the types of circumstantial evidence which
might be sufficient to support a conviction, the court designated such
matters as the fact that the defendant had been a burglar by occupation for
many years;9 had been known to be associated with burglars;1O had
resisted arrest or attempted to flee ;11 or had been apprehended with the
tools secreted in his clothing, 12 any of which might tend to establish the
4 The court quoted from 12 C. J. S., Burglary, § 69, p. 754. It cites People v.
Dorington, 221 Mich. 571, 191 N. W. 831 (1923).
5 State v. Widenski, 50 R. 1. 148, 146 A. 407 (1929).
6 9 Am. Jur., Burglary, § 86, p. 281, quoting from Commonwealth v. Tivnon, 74
Mass. (8 Gray) 375, 69 Am. Dec. 248 (1857).
7 On the point of the use of circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the presence
of intent, see People v. Weiss, 367 Ill. 580, 12 N. E. (2d) 652 (1938).
8 People v. Buskievich, 330 Ill. 532, 162 N. E. 196 (1928).
9 People v. Jefferson, 161 Mich. 621, 126 N. W. 829 (1910).
10 People v. Howard, 73 Mich. 10, 40 N. W. 789 (1888).
11 State v. Vick, 213 N. C. 235, 195 S. E. 779 (1938).
12 People v. Donovan, 216 Mich. 231, 184 N. W. 863 (1921).
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intent element. It found, however, that the defendant in the instant ease
met none of these tests hence it could not be said, as a matter of law, that
he had intended to use the tools in a burglary. The prior conviction for
burglary was ruled out on the ground that there had been no showing of
any continuation of felonious habits or association with criminals following
defendant's release from the penitentiary. 1a As defendant had not resisted arrest, had carried the tools in normal fashion, and had an appropriate explanation for his presence on the scene, it was held the evidence
was insufficient to meet the burden of proof in relation to intent, hence the
conviction had to be reversed.
The opinion, by placing stress on the fact that it would usually be
necessary to place reliance on circumstantial evidence to support a conviction for violation of the statute in question, appears to have adopted
something of the rationale used by the Supreme Court of Michigan in the
case of People v. Howard. 14 That court wrote that the intent, "being something entirely within the mind" of a defendant, would typically have to
be established without his admission or confession and entirely from circumstances, hence there "should ... be accorded the people [prosecution]

more than usual latitude in the proof looking towards intent. "15 While
this view may be said to be the majority one among those states which have
had occasion to construe similar statutes, it would appear to be too liberal
in character. Admitted that circumstantial evidence must usually be used
in such cases, it is believed that the evidence should point more directly
toward a plan to commit a present crime of burglary than could be inferred
from such things as the fact that a given defendant had associated with
burglars or had previously been convicted of burglary. While the instant
case eliminates the right to use the latter form of evidence, particularly
when the earlier conviction is remote in point of time, it loses some of its
validity by appearing to endorse the first of these forms of proof.

DIVORCE-ALIMONY,
WHETHER

ALLOWANCES,

AND

DISPOSITION

OF

PROPERTY-

COURT HAS AUTHORITY UNDER STATUTE TO DIRECT A CONVEY-

ANCE OF REALTY IN SATISFACTION OF ALIMONY IN

GRoss-The Supreme

Court of Illinois, in MeGaughy v. McGaugly,' recently had occasion to
rule on the 1949 amendment to Section 18 of the Divorce Act, 2 one whereby
13 Any inference to be drawn from the possession of a "peep flashlight" was said
to be rebutted by defendant's testimony that it was needed by one, such as himself,
when doing close work while afflicted with poor eyesight.
14 73 Mich. 10, 40 N. W. 789 (1888).

15 73 Mich. 10 at 12, 40 N. W. 789 at 791.
1410 Il1. 596, 102 N. E. (2d) 806 (1952).
2 Laws 1949, p. 729; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 18.
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the legislature provided that real or personal property may be awarded
by the court as alimony to wife or husband. The trial court there had
entered a decree granting plaintiff a divorce and awarding her one-half of
the defendant's real property, consisting of a substantial farm, as alimony
in gross. Of the total acreage, a major portion had been conveyed to the
defendant by his mother but the remainder had been purchased by the
defendant with money derived from farming operations. A mortgage on
the property had been substantially reduced during the period of ownership but a balance still remained due thereon. The plaintiff's allegations
tended to show that this reduction had been accomplished by the joint
efforts of both plaintiff and defendant in farming the realty. The scope
of the plaintiff's assistance in working on the farm, in addition to the
usual household duties, included such things as the cultivation of the
fields. This fact appears to have influenced the trial court to award the
plaintiff one-half of the realty as alimony in gross. On direct appeal to
the Supreme Court as a freehold was involved, the defendant relied heavily
on the fact that the property had come almost entirely from his mother
and upon expert testimony offered at the trial to the effect that the property could not profitably be farmed if divided. The Supreme Court,
despite the 1949 amendment, reversed the alimony ruling and remanded
the cause with directions to enter a decree awarding the plaintiff such
periodic alimony for her support as the chancellor should deem fair and
equitable, but it denied the court authority to order a division of the real
property.
Before the enactment of the 1949 amendment, courts only ordered a
conveyance of realty in divorce actions, from one spouse to the other, where
special equities were pleaded and proven by the party seeking such conveyance. The award of realty, in these instances, was made not on the basis
of the statutory divorce jurisdiction of the court but rather upon the basis
of the court's inherent equity powers. Language, typical of the decisions
prior to the amendment, is to be found in Anderson v. Anderson3 wherein
the court, although refusing to order a conveyance, said: "Where, however,
the wife has from equitable considerations, other and additional interests
in her husband's property than such as attach to her status as wife ... for
example . . . if the real estate represents joint earning, work, or savings of
the parties, the court may properly, when dissolving the marriage relation,
4
decree that the wife shall be vested with title in fee to such real estate."
The case of Shekerjian v. Shekerjian,5 one in which the court awarded a
3 380 Ill. 435, 44 N. E. (2d) 54 (1942).
4 380 Il. 435 at 440, 44 N. E. (2d) 54 at 57.

5346 Ill. 101, 178 N. E. 365 (1931). The wife there had aided the husband's
business constantly and had helped in the accumulation of the estate for a period
of over twenty years.
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conveyance of realty, applies the theories expressed in the Anderson case
and furnishes an excellent illustration of the prior practice on the subject.
It is to be noted that, in no decision before the 1949 amendment, did
the courts successfully award realty as alimony in gross, except by agreement of the parties, without finding facts similar to those outlined in the
quotation from the Anderson case. 6 In fact, where awards were granted
and sustained, they were based upon a showing of an equitable interest in
the land not dissimilar to the interest which would be required to move
equity to act to order a conveyance in situations other than those involving
a dissolution of a marriage. It would seem, therefore, that the legislature,
when enacting the 1949 amendment to the Divorce Act, had in mind the
thought that the said amendment should give courts the power, in divorce
actions, to make an award of realty as alimony, subject to the court's
discretion, without the necessity of finding the existence of special equitable
interests. The Supreme Court, however, in the instant decision, based its
reversal of the trial court award of realty as alimony in gross upon the fact
7
that insufficient equities had been shown to exist on behalf of the plaintiff.
As the language of the court is so completely in accord with the law
stated in the Anderson case, one can only be led to the conclusion that the
amendment will have no effect whatever, despite the action of the legislature, on the nature of the pleading and proof required to move the court
to award a conveyance of realty in a divorce action. The emphasis on what
would constitute a proper exercise of judicial discretion in such matters
would seem to outweigh the legislative policy in providing for a complete
settlement of all matters between the divorced spouses.

HABEAS

CORPUS--JURISDICTION,

PROCEEDINGS, AND RELIEF--WHETHER

THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT WILL EXERCISE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER

HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS WHEN THE ORIGINAL PETITION PRESENTS AN
ISSUE OF FACT--In the recent case of People ex rel. Jones v. Robinson,1

the Illinois Supreme Court was confronted with an original petition for
6 See, for example, Byerly v. Byerly, 363 Ill. 517, 2 N. E. (2d) 898 (1936); Lipe
v. Lipe, 327 Ill. 39, 158 N. E. 411 (1927) ; Walz v. Walz, 325 Ill. 553, 156 N. E. 828
(1927); Meighen v. Meighen, 307 Ill. 306, 138 N. E. 613 (1923).
7 The court in the instant case said: "The record fails to disclose any special
circumstances, equities or reasons for splitting up the defendant's farm . . . The
ordinary and better method of awarding alimony is by periodic allowances, payable
at such intervals as may best suit the convenience of the husband and meet the
demands of his wife." 410 Ill. 596 at 610, 102 N. E. (2d) 806 at 812. Italics added.
8 By way of contrast, see the decision in Glassman v. Glassman, - Ohio App. -,
103 N. E. (2d) 781 (1951), which affirmed a division of real property by way of
alimony made pursuant to a statute comparable to the provision referred to in
note 2, ante.
1409 Ill. 553, 101 N. E. (2d) 100 (1951).
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habeas corpus wherein the facts in support thereof were placed in issue.
The relator, a prisoner in the state penitentiary, after having been released
to Tennessee authorities, was subsequently arrested and returned to the
Illinois penitentiary at which time he presented an original petition to the
Supreme Court 2 seeking liberty on the ground that his prior release, on a
warrant of extradition issued upon the demand of the Governor of
Tennessee, had operated as a waiver of any further jurisdiction by the
Illinois authorities over his person.3 The allegation relating to the petitioner's release to the Tennessee authorities was expressly denied in respondent's amended return, and the basis for the writ was thus factually
put in issue. The Supreme Court, on the record then before it, thereupon
dismissed the petition and remanded the relator to the custody of the
warden, holding that it would not exercise original jurisdiction where the
original petition for habeas corpus and the return created an issue of fact
which would have to be decided before the relator's right to release could
be determined.
While, on its face, the result might appear to be a reasonable one,
considerable difficulty is experienced to find the basis for it as no Illinois
precedent can be found, except by way of dictum, 4 and the constitutional
provision would tend to indicate that an opposite result should have been
reached. In view of the mandatory character of the language of the
present constitution, and especially considering the fact that it superseded
the permissive language which appeared in the 1848 Constitution, 5 it would
seem that the Supreme Court has been denied any discretion in the matter
of acceptance or refusal of jurisdiction in any of those cases which the
present constitution places within the sphere of the original jurisdiction of
that tribunal. Notwithstanding this, the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the mandatory "shall have jurisdiction" does
not deprive it of a discretion in such matters and that original cases must
still conform to certain requirements before it will take jurisdiction in such
matters. 6 Along that line, the court has always considered the presence of
2 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 2, declares: "The supreme court... shall have origihabeas corpus, and appellate jurisdiction in
nal jurisdiction in cases relating to...
all other cases."
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 65, § 22. See also People ex rel. Barrett v.
Bartley, 383 Ill. 437, 50 N. E. (2d) 517 (1943).
4 People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432, 81 N. E. (2d) 495 (1948).
5 Ill. Const. 1848, Art. V, § 5.
6 Original jurisdiction in revenue cases is refused unless the controversy involves
a public interest, is between a taxing authority and a taxpayer, and involves the
collectability of the tax: North Chicago Hebrew Congregation v. Board of Appeals,
358 Ill. 549, 193 N. E. 519 (1934). Original jurisdiction in mandamus is taken only
if the public interest in involved, People ex rel. Kocourek v. City of Chicago, 193
Ill. 507, 62 N. E. 179 (1901), and not even then if a fact issue is presented: People
ex rel. Damron v. McCormick. 106 Ill. 184 (1883).
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a disputed fact question in an original proceeding to be one of those
characteristics which will operate to deprive it of its power to determine
the case.

7

Because the court has failed to elaborate on the point, it can only be
supposed that the rule is an arbitrary one designed for the court's convenience alone, especially since the hearing on a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is essentially a summary one, to be conducted by the court without
a jury, and there is no likelihood that the court would experience difficulties of the type which probably would be encountered if trial by jury were
necessary.8 The court said it was "foreclosed from determining the issue
of fact" raised by the case before it.9 That statement is without logical
support, other than in the court's own self-imposed limitations, for the
court does take testimony and receive other evidence, through the medium
of a commissioner, when it hears original proceedings for disbarment or
for contempt of court. 10 True, there is no express statutory provision for
the appointment of a commissioner to take testimony in reference to
original petitions for habeas corpus, but the court has the power to appoint
commissioners, if needed, under its authority to make and adopt appro12
priate rules," and it has used the services of commissioners in the past.
There is no doubt that the circuit courts of the state are vested with an
equivalent jurisdiction in habeas corpus matters,' 3 for the original jurisdiction of the Illinois Supreme Court is not exclusive, but any argument
based on that fact would fail to sustain the position taken by the court.
Under the constitution, it is the relator who is given the right to select the
tribunal in which he will institute his proceeding. Considering the nature
and the importance of the writ of habeas corpus, it would seem to be the
right of the relator to have his case heard, not dismissed, and the arguments offered by the court to sustain its position are weak indeed. If the
7 See

cases cited in notes 4 and 6, ante.
8 39 C. J. S., Habeas Corpus, § 101, pp. 682-3. The summary character of the

proceeding is emphasized in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 65, § 19.
9 409 Ill. 553 at 556, 101 N. E. (2d) 100 at 101.
10 See, for example, In re MeCallum, 391 Ili. 400, 64 N. E. (2d) 310 (1946), and
People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 I1. 462, 176 N. E. (2d) 901 (1931).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol 2, Ch. 110, §§ 126 and 259.59.
12 It is true that the authority of the Illinois Supreme Court to utilize the services
of commissioners to draft opinions in cases pending before it on review, a practice
which existed from 1927 to 1933, was based on Laws 1927, p. 392, and the several
renewals thereof. No similar statutory authority exists for the appointment of
commissioners in other cases. Denial of the right to trial by jury, and to the
utilization of the services of commissioners, in habeas corpus proceedings instituted
in federal courts rests on 28 U. S. C. A. § 2243, formerly 28 U. S. C. A. § 461:
O'Keith v. Johnston, 129 F. (2d) 889 (1942), cert. den. 317 U. S. 680, 63 S. Ct. 161,
87 L. Ed. 546 (1942).
13 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 12; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 65, § 2.
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court believes that it is truly powerless to act in the matter without the
aid of enabling legislation, it should exercise its constitutional function by
reporting that fact to the Governor so that he might incorporate the
14
necessary recommendation in his message to the legislature.

LIMITATION
PALITY,

OF

ACTIONS-LIMITATIONS

OR PUBLIC OFPICERS-WHETHER

AS

AGAINST

STATE,

MUNICI-

TIME LIMITATION PROVISIONS OF

PROBATE ACT RELATING TO FILING OF CLAIMS ARE BINDING ON STATE--In

the recent case of In re Bird's Estate,' the Illinois Supreme Court was
faced with the problem of whether a nunc pro tunc order would be proper
where the records of a probate court were entirely silent as to an allegedly
lost claim. The decedent there had received public assistance from the
2
Illinois Public Aid Commission pursuant to the Old Age Pension Act.
After the nine-month period for filing claims against decedent's estate had
expired,3 the commission petitioned for leave to file a claim nunc pro tunc
as a lost record. The probate court allowed the petition and it was upheld
by the circuit court. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, by reason of
the fact that the public revenue was involved, that court also held the
nunc pro tunc order proper.
The power of courts to restore records which have been lost, even
though the court docket is silent on the subject, is supported by the case of
Hickey v. Hickey.4 If the instant case decided nothing more than that it
would be lacking in significance. The more important matter therein
relates to the discussion of the question as to whether or not a state agency
is bound by the time-limitation provision of the Probate Act. The court
treated the issue as one involving the question of whether or not the
particular statutory section amounts to a general statute of limitation
which would be inapplicable to the state unless expressly declared to be
applicable.5 While recognizing an apparent conflict, at least in phraseology,
among its former decisions, the court held the case of Durflinger v. Arnold,6
based on an earlier statute, to be controlling. That case had reached the
conclusion that the provision was not a general statute of limitation as it
did not totally bar claims against a decedent's estate but did, for example,
14 Il1. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 31, and Art. V, § 7.
1 Sub. nor. Illinois Public Aid Commission v. Sanderson, 410 Ill. 390, 102 N. E.
(2d) 329 (1951).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 440-1, et seq. Section 440--4 thereof
authorizes the filing of a claim to recover the amount expended for old age
assistance.
3 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 204.
4 295 Ill. App. 67, 14 N. E. (2d) 688 (1938).
5 Clare v. Bell, 378 Ill. 128, 37 N. E. (2d) 812 (1941).
6 329 Ill. 93, 160 N. E. 172 (1928).
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allow the assertion of claims, after the expiration of the nine-month period,
against heirs and distributees or against after-discovered and non-inventoried assets. Such being the case, the court indicated that the timelimitation provision in question was to be deemed no different than other
substantive rules of law, applicable alike to the sovereign state and to
private individuals.7 It may be noted, therefore, that the enactment of the
present Probate Act has done nothing to change the law on the point.
MASTER AND SERVANT-THE RELATION-WHETHER OR NOT CONDONATION OF EMPLOYEE'S VIOLATION OF
FOR SAME

DuTY

PREVENTS SUBSEQUENT DISCHARGE

MIscoNDUcT-The question of an employer's right to discharge

an employee for violations of duty, said to have been condoned with the
employer waiving his right to discharge for such acts, was before the
Appellate Court for the First District in the case of Schaffer v. Park City
Bowl, Inc.' Plaintiff there had been hired for one year to manage a
skating rink on a written contract calling for a set wage plus a percentage
of the profits. Two months after plaintiff entered upon his duties complaints reached the defendant from the patrons of the rink concerning the
alleged wrongful acts. The defendant's officers thereupon spoke to the
plaintiff concerning these acts and plaintiff promised to conduct himself
and the business properly thereafter. Plaintiff was allowed to continue in
his employment for one month and was then barred from entering the
premises and was discharged. On suit for breach of contract, defendant
claimed the discharge was justified because of plaintiff's previous misconduct. On trial without a jury, the lower court found for the defendant
but, on appeal from that judgment, the Appellate Court reversed, holding
that the retention of the plaintiff for one month after notice of the breach
of duty amounted to a condonation and a waiver of the right to discharge
for the prior misconduct.
Surprisingly enough, for an industrial and commercial state like Illinois, very few cases of condonation of contractual misconduct in relation
to employment matters have arisen. 2 The law is, however, well settled
throughout the country that an employer may, by retaining an employee
after violations of duty, condone the acts complained of and waive the
right to discharge for those acts. 3 But just what acts amount to condona7 See also People v. Small, 319 Ill. 437, 150 N. E. 435 (1925).
1345 Ill. App. 279, 102 N. ED.(2d) 665 (1951).
2 One possible reason may be the fact that, at least in large industries, matters

of this character are usually covered by collective bargaining agreements and
grievance procedures. Disputes arising thereunder, if not amicably adjusted, are
typically resolved by arbitration rather than by litigation.
3 See, for example, Butterick Publishing Company v. Whitcomb, 225 Ill. 605, 80
N. E. 247, 8 I R. A. (N. S.) 1004 (1907).
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tion, or what time period must elapse before the employer can be said to
have condoned the act, are situations which the court must face as the cases
arise. The defendant claimed that an employer is entitled to overlook
breaches of duty on the part of the servant, hoping for reformation, and if
disappointed may then terminate the contract. That position had been
taken by a New York court in the case of Gray v. Shepard,4 upon which
the defendant relied, but the Appellate Court in the instant case, while
agreeing with that doctrine, pointed out that it applies only when the
employee continues, or repeats, the acts originally complained of as constituting a breach of duty. As the defendant in the instant case offered no
proof of any additional wrongful acts on the part of the plaintiff from the
time he was admonished until the time of his discharge, the rule of that
case was held to be inapplicable.
While not laying down any set rule as to when retention will become
a condonation and a waiver, the Appellate Court did indicate that a
retention for one month after knowledge of the breach of duty was a
sufficient time period under the prevailing facts. The case should, therefore,
serve as a warning to employers that, although they need not discharge an
employee immediately upon knowledge of his breach of duty, they had best
not delay too long or they will be apt to find themselves being sued for
breach of the employment contract.
WORKMEN 'S COMPENSATION-PROCEEDINGS TO SECURE COMPENSATION-

WHETHER PERIOD OF LIMITATION IS EXTENDED BY PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION FROM A FUND TO WHICH EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE HAVE CONTRI3UTED

-In

the recent case of International Harvester Company v. Industrial

Commission,' the Supreme Court of Illinois had to decide the question of
whether a claim for workmen's compensation had in fact been presented
within the statutory period. 2 The employee there concerned had sustained

an injury during the course of his employment. During the period of his
disability he applied for, and received, benefits from an employee's benefit
association, one primarily established to provide compensation for those
employees who might suffer an injury or an illness not covered by the
Workmen's Compensation Act and supported by funds contributed by
both the employer and its employees. More than a year after the date of
4 147 N. Y. 177, 41 N. E. 500 (1895).

1410 Ill. 543, 103 N. E. (2d) 109 (1951). Schaefer, J., wrote a dissenting opinion
concurred in by Bristow and Hersey, JJ.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 161, provides that an application for compensation must be made within one year from the date of injury or, where compensation has been paid, within one year from the date of the last payment of
compensation. The provision is now embodied in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. I. Oh. 48.
§ 138.6.
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his injury, but within one year from the receipt of the last benefit payment,
the employee filed a claim for workmen's compensation. The claim was
allowed by the commission and was confirmed by a judgment of the circuit
court over the protest of the employer. On writ of error, the Supreme
Court, divided four to three, reversed the award on the ground that payment of benefits from an allegedly independent fund to which the employee
had contributed was not to be regarded as the equivalent of a voluntary
payment of compensation within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act so as to extend the statutory period within which to institute
proceedings.
Payment of wages by the employer, whether in whole or in part,
especially when not coupled with a denial of liability, has long been held
in Illinois to be the equivalent of a recognition of a right to compensation
so as to prevent the tolling of what would generally be deemed to be a
period of limitation. 3 The precise question involved in the instant case,
however, has not appeared before an Illinois court prior to this time and
there still exists a large and undefined area on the subject notwithstanding
the aforementioned principle. It would appear that payments unrelated
to the Workmen's Compensation Act, and inconsistent with any acknowledgment regarding its application, should not be treated as payments of
compensation of a type sufficient to negate the limitation provision of the
statute. 4 It would, then, seem to follow that payments made by a stranger
would be equally ineffective for the purpose.
In line therewith, the majority of the court stressed the fact that the
employee was not paid by the employer but by an independent association
whose purpose it was to compensate those employees whose disabilities were
not covered by the act. Superficially, at least, there was a distinction in
law between the employing corporation on the one hand and the benefit
fund on the other. The dissenting opinion, however, observed the situation
in a more practical light. It pointed to the fact that both the benefit fund
and the employee compensation claims were administered by the same
office and by the same group of employees. It also noted that the claimant
had made a specific request for compensation and had been told that
benefits paid by the association would be larger, per week, than compensa3 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 346, 6 N. E. (2d) 487
(1936) ; Marshall Field & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 305 Ill. 134, 137 N. E. 121
(1922). As to the right of the employer to claim credit for payments so made

against the compensation eventually allowed, see Olney Seed Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 403 Ill. 587, 88 N. E. (2d) 24 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 178.
4 In Diamond T Motor Car Company v. Industrial Commission, 378 Ill. 203, 37
N. E. (2d) 782 (1941), for example, the claimant received $11.50, along with an
express statement denying liability, several years after an injury in which he lost
the sight of one eye. It was held that the payment was not compensation within
the meaning of the pertinent section of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
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tion payments.5 In addition, although fully informed, the corporation had
never denied its obligation to provide compensation payments and may, to
that extent, have lulled the employee into a false belief as to the nature of
his rights. There is, then, much in favor of the minority view. If there is
merit to the decision pronounced by the majority, it lies in the fact that it
neither upsets nor reverses prevailing principles but serves as an effective
guide to define the limits thereof.

5 Evidence showed that the company physician asked the employee if he would
"rather draw $18.50 as compensation, or $20 or $22 a week as he was then drawing."
See 410 Ill. 543 at 548-9, 103 N. E. (2d) 109 at 112. Actually, the overall total of
workmen's compensation payments due exceeded the sum paid out by the benefit
fund.
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Ruth C. Silva. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press (University of Michigan Studies, History and

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.

Political Science Series, Vol. XVIII), 1951. Pp. viii, 213.
Was John Tyler the President of the United States from 1841 to 1845
following the death of William Henry Harrison? Who would have succeeded Andrew Johnson, in the office of Chief Executive, if he had been
successfully impeached? Would that person have been President of the
United States or merely one exercising the powers of that high office? If
the latter, for how long would he have acted? What would have occurred
if Chester A. Arthur had assumed the office of President during the disability of James A. Garfield, or if Thomas R. Marshall had done likewise
during the second Wilson administration, and either Garfield or Wilson
had been restored to full health? Would the country have possessed two
presidents; would Arthur or Marshall have been obliged to step down;
or would Garfield or Wilson have ceased to hold the office given them by
popular vote? Is the present congressional act relating to presidential
succession constitutional? It is sound, if constitutional; does it cover all
possible problems?
These are but a few of the matters discussed in this excellently documented study by a member of the Political Science Department of Pennsylvania State College, one which gives detailed analysis to an ambiguous,
if not obscure, section of the United States Constitution and to the legislative attempts which have been made, from time to time, to implement
it to offset the potential disaster which could flow from a break in the
exercise of the executive power. Some answers, here noted, may have been
provided by what might be said to be a body of constitutional custom and
usage. Others may be worked out, at least in principle, from reference to
the writings and oral comments of the founding fathers, whose records
have been intensively combed by the author for light on the subject. The
balance of these questions remain to be resolved. Law makers and constitutional framers will find ammunition here at hand from which to work
out solutions, for all the issues are noted and logical answers have been
proposed. In the process, some analogies have been drawn to issues which
could arise at the state level, but the prime emphasis is on the office of the
Chief Executive of the nation and those who may succeed to it.
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OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM. Edith Tilton
Penrose. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951. Pp. xv, 247.

THE EcoNoMics

Lawyers, even those not actively engaged in the field of patent law,
are not unfamiliar with the changes which have been brought about in
recent years in what had, at one time, been regarded as the American ideal
for the reward of discoverers and inventors.' The attack, of course, has not
always been from the Marxist standpoint, but it has, too frequently, come
from uninformed areas wherein special interests have predominated.
This book, part of a larger study of the economies of the patent system,
views the entire problem of the patent system from the standpoint of the
economist. As little has been written in recent years from that viewpoint,
a large segment of the book is taken up with an historical introduction
reviewing the development of patent systems in the several countries where
they exist and of the creation of international conventions for the protection of industrial property. Necessarily, in that process, it has been
obligatory to review the several theories offered in justification of any sort
of patent right and the several methods devised to prevent monopolization
arising therefrom. To that point, the book offers invaluable background
for an appreciation of the several patent systems.
The controversial areas are entered when the author begins to weigh
the economic factors, to balance the costs and gains, accruing from the
granting to an inventor of a protection in the fruits of his achievement.
Whatever the economic facts may be within any given country, it is the
author's belief that, at the international level, the social cost of extending
patent protection exceeds the gains to be derived from it. While some of
these costs may be reduced by compelling the patentee to work, or forcing
him to license others to work, his invention in other areas, there is no
doubt that the wide diversity of technological and industrial development
throughout the world prevents a full utilization of this idea. The net
result, therefore, is that parts of the world must suffer for the benefit of a
few protected areas. That suffering, the author indicates should be brought
to an end, and will be ended when the complete economic account has been
written. That message is driven home without recourse to political arguments, of whatever stripe, and on the basis of cold, well-organized facts.
1 See, for example, Lutz, "A Proper Public Policy on Patents: Are We Adopting
the Soviet View?" 37 A. B. A. J. 905 (1951).
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Philip Davis.

New York:

The Philosophical

Library, 1951. Pp. ix, 239.
Autobiographical tales of the successful lives of penniless immigrants
too frequently follow the Horatio Alger formula, hence provide little more
than commentary on the fact that the United States has been a land of
opportunity for those who have been energetic or forceful enough to take
advantage thereof. After omitting the personal variations on that theme,
there would be little occasion to talk about this book if it were not for the
fact that it provides local color in the Chicago area, by reason of the
author's association with the revered Jane Addams of Hull House, and
for its account of the growth of the trade union movement, particularly
in New York, Philadelphia and Boston, where the author served as an
organizer and counsellor. Woven into the tale is a story of social service
revealed in the promotion of settlement houses and institutes for the relief
and education of the working masses of the east. Here, then, is the story
of a life spent not in amassing wealth but in an effort to carry out the
thought of Katharine Lee Bates, expressed in a verse from her poem
"America the Beautiful," to "crown thy good with brotherhood from sea
to shining sea!" While not a law book, it has a message for every lawyer
who may have given more than a passing thought for the under-privileged
and the under-paid.
THE BAR. Francis X. Busch. Indianapolis, Indiana: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1952. Pp. ix, 288.

PRISONERS AT

GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY? Francis X. Busch. Indianapolis, Indiana: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1952. Pp. ix, 287.
It can only be supposed that, in the course of preparing his earlier
book on law and tactics in the trial of jury cases,' Mr. Busch had occasion
to give consideration to many of the outstanding or noteworthy civil and
criminal trials to be found in the realm of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
In the preparation of that scholarly work, he no doubt found interest,
even enjoyment, in pursuing the details of those cases but doubtless recognized that legal records might make dull reading to all except a skilful
trial attorney such as himself. 2 Through these companion volumes, he now
1 See the review of Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials: The Art of Jury
Persuasion, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949, appearing in 27 CHrCAGO-K NT LAW

RmEEw 260.
2 The author, an Illinois lawyer for more than fifty years, gained trial experience
as attorney for several county offices, as corporation counsel for the City of
Chicago, and in private practice in Chicago. He has, during his busy career, also
been dean, now dean emeritus, of DePaul University College of Law.
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offers the public an intimate and highly readable account of eight notable
American criminal trials occurring in the twentieth century. Each trial is
reported, with careful but unbiased editing and supplementation, so that
the reader is furnished with the details relating to the crime, the steps
pursued in the investigation thereof, the conduct of the trial, sometimes in
synthesis but sometimes in direct quotation from the record with excerpts
from the closing arguments, as well as the verdict and judgment attained
and the post-trial history, where such exists. In so doing, Mr. Busch has
made each account so realistic in character that the reader is made to feel
as if he were a "thirteenth juror" in attendance at the hearing.
Few will fail to remember the newspaper furor over cases like the
trial of Leopold and Loeb for the murder of Bobbie Franks, of Bruno
Hauptmann for the kidnapping murder of the Lindbergh baby, of D. C.
Stephenson for the Indiana rape-murder of Madge Oberholtzer, or of Alger
Hiss for perjury. The details of other cases, such as the prosecution of
Samuel Insull for alleged mail frauds in the formation of his ill-fated
utility empire, or of Sacco and Vanzetti for the hold-up killing of the
payroll guards, have begun to dissolve into the past. The two remaining
trials here considered, those of "Big Bill" Haywood for the dynamitemurder of the ex-governor of Idaho, and of Leo Frank for the murder of
his shop-girl employee, may serve to reveal what are, to some, unknown
chapters in American criminal law.
The helpful comments of the author as to the conduct of each of these
trials should be reason enough to make the student of trial tactics anxious
to give close attention to the unfolding narrative. The gripping nature of
each account should draw the interest of even the most casual reader, for
every criminal trial has within it the seeds of powerful human drama. It
takes the skill of an accomplished author, however, to recreate the dramatic
effect for the benefit of those who are unable to be firsthand observers.
Mr. Busch has demonstrated that he possesses that ability to a high degree,
for these are two books of sterling quality.
ESTATE TAx HANDBOOK. Edited by J. K. Lasser.
Matthew Bender & Company, 1951. Pp. v, 846.

Albany, New York:

BUSINESS INTERESTS: Contractual Disposition Effective at Death. Edited by Solomon Huber. Mount Vernon, New York: Farnsworth Publishing Company, 1952. Pp. 64 (Paper).
The difficulty inherent in the efficient use of the symposium as a
means of conveying information regarding a particular topic or area of
law lies in the expense of bringing a suitable panel of experts to one
point where they may address a sufficient number of interested listeners
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who can afford to take the time and make the journey necessary to be at
that same place. Even then, the ear is apt to receive a less permanent
impression than that conveyed by the eye, hence the spoken discussions
are likely to be lacking in the value which may be gleaned from a perusal
of the printed word. Preparation of a printed transcript of the proceedings tends to bridge that gap, but any lawyer who has examined such
a transcript can vouch for the fact that few persons speak fluently and
to the point. Many of these objections may be obviated if the wisdom
of the experts on the panel is prepared in formal fashion and presented
in print. Then, each reader may sample at his pleasure and re-read for
understanding if the first contact fails to accomplish its purpose.
The two works under consideration are of that character, although
the first represents a much more thorough and diversified treatment of the
hundreds of rules and principles regarding estate planning which have
become crystallized in the past few years. In it appears the "know how,"
the methodology, and the successfully tested formulas of some twentytwo top-flight advisers scattered around the country. The contents range
from sound but general advice on trust planning, through detailed forms
of powers of appointment to meet certain tax contingencies, to problems
as diverse as valuation on the one hand and the tax consequences of divorce and separation on the other. There is much cogent advice on the
subject of the preparation of estate tax returns, and plenty of lucid, nontechnical illustrations of the varied tax-saving devices. If weakness
appears at all, it lies in the fact that certain of the discussions are localized in character, being particularly oriented toward New York law, while
other sections, such as the one dealing with the use of the personal foundation, are not entirely adequate in their coverage. The second publication
is, by contrast, quite limited in scope, being principally concerned with
the use of "buy-out" and similar agreements and the tax problems
attendant thereon.
Naturally, with different men working on aspects of a common subject, there is a tendency toward disjointedness as well as some obvious
duplication of effort and advice. Careful editing would have produced
a reduction of content without loss. More careful typographical spacing
would have resulted in fewer pages. Aside from these things, however,
the works in question afford the practitioner more for his money, social
considerations left aside, than he could have obtained by attendance at a
dozen symposia.
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TAXATION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY:

An Economic, Legal, and Ad-

ministrative Analysis. William H. Anderson. New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1951. Pp. xxi, 598.
Technical works on taxation, whether limited to income taxation or of
more general scope, too frequently treat with the subject from the standpoint of an assumption that the reader will be familiar with the economic,
social, and political factors involved. They, therefore, usually concentrate
on the legal aspects of the tax device, the impact thereof on the taxpayer
or the property subject to taxation, and the difficulties inherent in tax
administration or collection. In many instances the assumption is a valid
one, but no full understanding of tax law is possible without some appreciation of these other factors and they are often lost to sight under pressure
of the necessity of applying tax law to the preparation and filing of tax
returns or to the resistance of tax assessments and the like. The publication
of Professor Anderson's book should operate to relieve the student of
taxation, and the busy lawyer, against the possibility of oversight in some
areas of taxation where knowledge is important to provide background for
the evaluation, and correct application, of tax laws.
In his textbook, written at the collegiate level, the author, experienced
in both law and economics, has presented a thorough analysis of the several
schemes of taxation presently in vogue, both state and federal, extending
over general property taxes, income taxation, the taxation of gifts and
inheritances, business taxes, consumption and use taxes, even down to poll
taxes, with an explanation of the economic bases, the legal problems, and
the administrative difficulties appertaining to each. Details relating to tax
shifting, tax avoidance, and tax evasion are not omitted. Where profitable,
tables, graphs, even cartoons, help out the text. Theories of taxation and
the justification thereof are explored and evaluated while the mechanics of
tax practices are opened up to investigation. The product represents one
of the most clarifying and readable accounts concerning taxation that has
appeared to date. It should be made the basis of the student's introduction
to tax law.
Paul Hubert
Casselman. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. xii, 178.

THE COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT AND SOME OF ITS PROBLEMS.

Lawyers may, from time to time, be called on to advise or to assist in
the formation of cooperative enterprises. If so, they may find passing
interest in this slender volume as it sketches something of the history of
the cooperative development, treats briefly with the relation of the cooperative to labor, discusses its economic background, and dabbles with the
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question of its taxation. Obviously written by one with more than a passing
interest in the cooperative movement, the book tends in the direction of a
tract rather than toward that dispassionate and detailed type of analysis
one would expect to receive from the pen of an economics professor. It is,
therefore, not something to be recommended, but the bibliographical listings found therein may prove to possess utility.
Compiled and edited by Pauli Murray.
Cincinnati, Ohio: Woman's Division of Christian Service, The Methodist
Church, 1951. Pp. x, 746.

STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR.

A person concerned with civil rights, particularly as those matters
bear on segregation and discrimination, should be armed with information
concerning the extent of state legislation both in favor of or in opposition
to the general topic. Heretofore, such a person would have been obliged
to devote hours of labor picking through the contents of a seemingly endless
number of state constitutions and statute books to find appropriate references. Thanks to the effort of the compiler and the financial assistance
afforded by the publishing group, it is now possible to scan all such statutes
within the covers of one book.
The law of each state is treated separately, arranged according to
convenient rubrics such as education, employment, miscegenation, or
transportation, to mention only a few of the topics listed, but it is possible,
through an introductory note, to secure a nation-wide view of the subject.
In addition, appropriate reference has been made to judicial interpretation,
application or rejection of the statutes in question. Several valuable appendices and charts extend the scope of the material to governmental levels
as separate and apart as the United Nations on the one hand and municipal
councils on the other. Developments relating to discriminatory practices
have been made the subject of comment, and several significant briefs and
judicial opinions have been reproduced. Not being limited simply to the
problems of Negroes, the work provides an excellent summary of all laws,
discriminatory or otherwise, operating in the entire field of human relations. It furnishes a systematized basis for comparison with any universal
declaration as to human rights.
James Morfit Mullen. Philadelphia: Dorrance &
Company, Inc., 1952. Pp. vii, 371.

LET JUsTIcE BE DONE.

When a practicing lawyer, particularly one whose lifetime of activity
has been devoted to what is euphemistically referred to as "general"
practice, sits down to write about law, he is apt to see his subject more
nearly in terms of a series of personal experiences than as a comprehensive
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system for the administration of justice. It would, therefore, be practically
impossible for him to write anything more than a pattern of biographical
anecdotes no matter how much he might strive to give them a schematic
rather than a chronological arrangement. This book, written by a Maryland
lawyer, displays just that type of treatment despite the author's attempt
to make it into a simple account of law and the administration thereof in a
style likely to prove of interest to laymen as well as to other lawyers.
There is, in the process of so writing, much that is repetitious, much
that is trivial, and not a little that is the product of half-learned or halfforgotten knowledge. A legal scholar would probably be shocked at the
"horse" Latin, the apparent acceptance of ancient rumor, the uncritical
reiteration of long-since rejected concepts and institutions, and at the
overall picture that has been drawn. Some might find it humorous to discover that Robert Louis Stevenson, for example, has been claimed as a
"celebrated American writer." Others might be pleased to know that the
author has listened to speeches, some by eminent men, whose words were
heard but have since been forgotten. People of that type could have a
"field" day with this book. Others might be inclined to check the book off
as containing some not unpleasant, in fact occasionally interesting, thoughts
of one who felt, and followed, the urge to write whatever came to mind
without regard to the relevance thereof. One thing is certain, the heavens
will not fall even if justice has not been done to the book in question.
AND CORRECTION: Selected Papers. Sheldon Glueck. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1952. Pp. x, 273.

CRIME

Professor Glueck's views on the subject of crime and the criminal
offender are too well-known to call for much comment. He has long been
an advanced worker for reform in the administration of criminal justice,
especially in areas dealing with fundamental causes of criminal conduct,
with the application of psychiatry to the examination and treatment of
offenders, with the establishment of rational systems for parole and probation, and with the need to develop adequate social devices to prevent crime.
Except as some of these topics have received treatment in book form, much
of the author's writing has appeared in legal journals or in the proceedings
of learned societies. From among these scattered sources, the author has
made a selection of the most vital of his papers, dealing with issues yet
generally unsolved, and has compiled them in this book. In that way, it
has been made possible to survey the entire realm of the administration of
criminal law, to focus upon its defects, to recount the reforms which have
been urged before, to discuss the piecemeal efforts at reform, and to
emphasize what remains to be done.
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In the process, much has been said of the importance of developing an
adequate body of trained persons in the related fields of biology, psychology,
sociology, and penology, to assist the judge in achieving a thorough picture
of the offender, his background, his mental and physical traits, and the
like, in order that a true understanding of crime and of its correction may
be attained. Few would debate the validity of the argument that the proper
administration of a system of criminal law is not simply one calling for
standardized treatment for all violators, but involves much individualized
study and supervision in order that an indicated therapy may be carried
out. There is some occasion to question, at least under a constitutional
system of government as presently practiced, whether it would be possible
to separate the guilt-determining function from the sentencing one,' as
urged by the author, in order that specially trained personnel might furnish
their unique skills toward a more successful outcome of the criminal case.
There is no doubt, however, that much which the author has written is
possible of formulation into law and should be developed in order that
society be made able to cope with the problem of crime and its correction
in a more intelligent fashion than is presently the case.
As the effect of crime is not localized, but may be international in
scope, there should be no occasion for criticism over the fact that the author
has included among these papers one written to analyze, and vindicate, the
legal basis for the Nuernberg trials. Certainly, the supporting data goes a
long way to show that the argument over the alleged ex post facto treatment
given the Nazi leaders lacked soundness. One is led to remark, however,
over the seeming vindictiveness which underlies the discussion. That fact
might not have been too apparent when the paper appeared by itself. It
does, now, stand out in sharp contrast to the tone expressed throughout the
rest of the work. For the author's sake, the concluding article could well
have been omitted.
TAcTIcs.
1949. Pp. ix, 317.

SUCCESSFUL TRIAL

A. S. Cutler. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,

The reissue of a well-received publication seldom calls for comment
as it is obvious, from the fact of reissue, that the author has done a good
job in filling a need. There is occasion, however, in this instance, to remind
the prospective reader that this work is still available for the group to
which it is primarily addressed, those recently admitted or about to be
admitted to the bar, may be unfamiliar with its existence yet are most in
1 As to the right of an accused person to have the same judge act throughout
the case, from trial to sentence, see Freeman v. United States, 227 F. 732 (1915),
Durden v. People, 192 Ill. 493, 61 N. E. 317, 55 L. R. A. 240 (1901), and Commonwealth v. Claney, 113 Pa. Super. 439, 173 A. 840 (1934).
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need of the information contained within its covers. No matter how
excellent the degree of academic training received, facility in the handling
of the trial of cases is something acquired by the student principally as
the result of experience and of close attention to the actual court-room
scene. Theoretical preparation requires concrete application to develop a
good trial lawyer, but it is still possible to learn, from the experience of
others, some of the things that the young lawyer will be expected to face
so that, armed in advance, he may be prepared for most eventualities. The
author, from the treasure of a thirty-year career in the court-room, has
here indicated many of the hard-earned lessons he has had to face and the
solutions, not always developed on the spot, he has devised for the problems
which beset the advocate. In some sixty-odd short chapters he has covered
every phase of trial strategy and tactics from the grass-root standpoint,
not in abstract textual fashion but with a generous seasoning of anecdotes
and advice which make the book all the more readable. Except as it is
addressed to practice in New York, not always comparable with practice
elsewhere, it should be extremely useful to the young lawyer. He would,
without doubt, profit from an examination of the contents.

V. A. Leonard, Brooklyn, New
York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1951. Pp. xviii, 507.

POLICE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT.

Lawyers and civic groups concerned with the mounting rate of crime,
as well as police executives, will find this volume a useful guide to the
achievement of high standards of police department performance. That
a nineteenth-century police organization cannot be brought up to date by
the mere acquisition of radios and automobiles must be recognized. Organizational revamping, with a view to producing forces capable of striking
the twentieth-century criminal at the scene of the crime or shortly thereafter, must be achieved so as thereby to exploit to the fullest the special
services of detective, traffic, and records divisions. Achievement of this
"line power" by effective organization of the police department is the goal
toward which the author seeks to lead his professional readers. Many
years of study and of experience with police department methods form the
basis for Dr. Leonard's presentation of the principles of police department
organization, and for his comments thereon.'
Unity of command, with undivided responsibility in the police executive to those elected officials under whom he serves, and by them to the
voters, will at once enable formation of a coherent military operation
1 The author is chairman, Department of Police Science and Administration,
State College of Washington, Pullman, Washington.
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against crime, and fix responsibility for failure in suppressing it. 2 Among
other problems dealt with are those relating to the selection of an executive
with a proper background in administrative as well as in police or military
work, the lengthening of the police executive's tenure of office,3 the distinction between "line" and "staff" components of the organization, and
the matter of personnel selection and the tests which may be used to that
end.
Of particular importance to efficient police work would be the use
of modern machine records, with their cross-reference and tabulation
systems. The immensity of the job of manually searching burglary records
for a decade prior to a given date, for example, would prohibit use of
the analytic approach to most cases in large cities. Indicative of what
may be done, the author cites an illustrative case where the use of machines
permitted an extensive analysis to be made promptly. In that case, Los
Angeles police officers were baffled because they had no description of the
burglar they sought, although they knew his modus operandi. Following twenty-eight burglaries extending over a three-month period, the case
was finally turned over to the statistician who promptly solved it with
the machine record system. By the mechanical sorting out of all earlier
burglary cases, the complete description of the offender was discovered
and he was then easily apprehended. The author concludes, at page 220,
that crime "in all of its categories can be attacked successfully only
upon the basis of painstaking records analysis. Personnel problems, organizational changes, budget requests, design of a new headquarters building,
distribution of the force by function, time, and area, are representative
of an almost endless succession of problem situations which require analytical attention if they are to be met effectively."
The day-to-day organizational work of allotting supporting or staff
services to line units, the planning of strategy in the application of line
forces to the varied emergencies which may arise, are also treated. Using
the record system as a basis for forecasting peak loads upon patrols at
various times and areas, the police executive is able to deploy his men
most effectively.
2 The author states, at p. 294, that the "policy determining body in local government is the City Council, and the police have no alternative but to function in
accordance with policies laid down by this group of elected officials. If prostitution
and gambling are rampant in a city, responsible citizens are entitled to the reasonable assumption that members of the City Council have adopted general policies
which permit these conditions. Surely, no one is stupid enough to believe that a
City Council would tolerate a police administration which failed to carry its
policies into execution."
3 Quoting from R. Weldon Cooper, Municipal Police Administration in Texas
(Bureau of Municipal Research, University of Texas, 1938), p. 94, the author notes
that the "short tenure of the American chief of police is disastrous; it averages 2.8
years in cities of 100,000 population and over."
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Chapter Ten, on "Measurement," one of the more valuable inclusions
in the text, seeks to enable the police executive to find the answer to
the basic problem of the extent to which his department measures up to
the accepted professional standards of modern police science. Pointing
out that the volume of crime alone does not afford a basis for judging
police efficiency, 4 the author sets out criteria by which to measure this
efficiency, 5 together with a suggested check list and rating scale for each
item on the list.
By presenting the principles involved in straightforward manner,
and by relegating much detail, except that which is useful for illustration,
to appendices, the author has given his work a clearly visible outline.
The readable text is well adapted for use in police schools. The index
and the accompanying bibliography render the volume a useful reference
work for the student of political science, the lawyer, and the civic group,
as well as the police executive.

4 The Committee on Uniform Crime Records, International Association of Chiefs
of Police (Uniform Crime Reporting Manual, Washington, 1930), § 4, p. 4, cited by
the author on p. 352, reached the same conclusion.
5 At p. 359, the author lists (1) internal organization, (2) organization for line
power, (3) personnel selection and training, (4) police record controls, (5) patrol
system, (6) detective administration, (7) vice control, (8) traffic administration,
(9) crime prevention operations, and (10) self analysis.
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